12 Corporations

12.1 Introduction

12.1.1 Scope of this Chapter

This chapter deals with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ experience with corporations through discussion focused on the operation of the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders) Act 2006 (Cth) (‘CATSI Act’). However, the issues and challenges discussed in this chapter are not confined to the CATSI Act and can be experienced in varying degrees and different forms in any engagement between Indigenous peoples and the Australian state.1

Consultation with Indigenous practitioners, undertaken for the purpose of this Bench Book, highlighted that the CATSI Act sits at the intersection between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander laws, cultures and customs and Western legal concepts of ‘good’ governance. This positioning creates a unique and distinct intercultural environment for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations, one that is highly contested. This environment is further complicated by the role that many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations fulfil as legal entities that act on behalf of their Nation or community, tasked with engaging with the Australian state in the pursuit of their own economic, cultural, social and political rights.2

12.1.2 Judicial Relevance

This chapter is intended to assist judicial officers perform the dual task required by the CATSI Act: to uphold corporate governance standards, and to interpret and apply the CATSI Act consistently with its status as a special measure.3

This chapter provides information about the cultural, geographical and socio-economic contexts that can impact the Indigenous corporate sector. Increasing understanding of the operating environment for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations is intended to assist judicial officers to:

  • identify when intercultural governance considerations are legally relevant so that capacity and compliance are assessed within their context, rather than abstractly; and

  • scrutinise the exercise of discretionary powers of the Registrar.

Accounting for the specific cultural, geographical and socio-economic context of the Indigenous corporate sector does not excuse a breach or displace statutory duties but aims to assist in informing whether a breach is established, the scope of the remedy, the proportionality of the penalty, and appropriate discretionary relief.

12.1.3 Abbreviations and Glossary

12.1.3.1 Abbreviations

ACA Act

Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976 (Cth)

CATSI Act

Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth)

Corporations Act

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)

Native Title Act

Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)

PBC

prescribed body corporate as defined by the NTA

PBC Regulations

Native Title (Prescribed Body Corporate) Regulations (Cth)

Registrar

Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations as defined by the CATSI Act

RNTBC

registered native title body corporate

12.1.3.2 Glossary

Governance: Governance as a concept can have many different meanings. This chapter uses the term ‘governance’ to broadly refer to

the evolving processes, relationships, institutions and structures by which a group of people, community or society organise themselves collectively to achieve the things that matter to them. To do this they need to make decisions about:

  • their group membership and identity (who is the ‘self’ in their governance);

  • who has authority within the group, and over what;

  • their agreed rules to ensure authority is exercised properly and decision-makers are held accountable;

  • how decisions are enforced;

  • how they negotiate their rights and interests with others; and

  • what arrangements will best enable them to achieve their goals.4

Indigenous governance/Cultural governance: ‘Indigenous governance’ or ‘cultural governance’ are terms used in this Bench Book to broadly describe governance that is informed and/or influenced by First Nations laws and cultures. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have been practising governance since time began.5 There is no one type of Indigenous governance or cultural governance. This is in part due to each Nation having their own distinct laws, values and beliefs that inform how they govern, and in part to the way cultures and laws evolve over time,6 and are influenced by changes over time, or through the imposition of external forces (such as laws, policies and practices of dispossession).

The Australian Indigenous Governance Institute observes: ‘Culture lies at the heart of Indigenous governance. It informs a group’s values and ideas about what is the “right way” and “wrong way” of sharing power’.7

Broadly, there are some cultural features that may be common across First Nations that can influence an Indigenous organisation’s internal governance. These can include:

  • networked systems of kinship and family support;

  • deep connection to Country (lands and waters);

  • value of ceremony, traditions and ritual;

  • respect for law and the authority of Elders;

  • respect for women’s and men’s areas of knowledge; and

  • mutual responsibility and sharing of resources.8

This list is not exhaustive or prescriptive, but rather a starting point to recognise that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander governance is culturally specific to a Nation, group or community’s understanding of their own laws, cultures and norms.

Corporate governance: The Australian Institute of Governance defines ‘corporate governance’ as ‘the set of rules, relationships, systems, and processes within an organisation by which authority is exercised and controlled’. These rules, relationships and systems are also in and of themselves culturally specific, informed by Western instruments (legislation, regulations, regulatory bodies) that are reflective of Western legal values, cultural norms and accountability standards.9

Some common features of corporate governance include:

  • a governing body, often a board of directors, that acts as a steward, ensuring the organisation is effectively led; and

  • regulations, and regulatory bodies that monitor compliance (e.g. the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’), the federal regulator of corporates, markets and financial services operating in Australia).

Intercultural governance: ‘Intercultural governance’ in this chapter refers to the way Indigenous organisations must, in their organisational governance, accommodate both Western legal requirements and Indigenous laws, cultures and social norms, as well as internal and external accountability.10

12.1.4 Origins of Indigenous Corporations

The creation of Indigenous-specific corporations’ legislation has its genesis in the Aboriginal civil rights movement of the 20th century. The 1974 Woodward Aboriginal Land Rights Commission recommended a special system of incorporation for Indigenous groups, stating that ‘no existing legal provisions [relating to business structures] are really satisfactory for Aboriginal purposes’.11

The result was first the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976 (Cth) (‘ACA Act’) which provided for the incorporation of Aboriginal associations and Aboriginal councils. The ACA Act was intended to ‘be simple, flexible, and make provision for Indigenous methods of decision-making’.12 However, following a 2002 review finding widespread dissatisfaction with the ACA Act, due to ‘technical shortcomings’ and the legislation reflecting an ‘outdated model of corporate regulation’,13 the ACA Act was replaced by the CATSI Act, which came into effect 1 July 2007.

12.1.5 Why Incorporate?

Understanding the different reasons Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people register corporations, and under what legislative framework, is relevant to understanding the legal rights sought, and any capacity and compliance issues that may arise in respect of the statutory regime these corporations may be subject to.

Incorporation enables groups to establish a separate legal entity that offers distinct legal rights. These include a limit to the personal liability of members. Incorporation also establishes an entity that can:

  • remain the same despite changes in membership;

  • acquire, hold and dispose of property;

  • incur debt; and

  • sue and be sued.

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander groups can, in principle, choose between the following incorporation structures:

  • an incorporated association or cooperative under state and territory legislation, regulated by fair trading, consumer or business services agencies in each state and territory;

  • a proprietary or public company under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘Corporations Act’), regulated by ASIC; or

  • an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporation under the CATSI Act, regulated by the Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations (‘ORIC’).14

Which incorporated structure is appropriate will turn on the purpose, scale and type of activities the group seeks to carry out. Regardless of what legal structure Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander organisations take, any engagement between ‘Indigenous people, their organisations and the Australian state is essentially intercultural in nature’.15

Recognising the relationship between First Nations peoples and the state (including, by extension any mechanisms of the state, such as the corporation) as a constant intercultural negotiation is necessary in understanding the legal complexities, challenges and shortcomings that can arise for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, legal practitioners and judicial officers dealing with legal matters related to incorporation, and/or grappling with the concept of ‘good’ governance.16

12.1.5.1 Required by Law or Policy to Incorporate

Increasingly, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples are required by policy or law to register a corporation under the CATSI Act to be eligible to access funding or to seek legal recognition of their rights and interests under other government schemes.17 Broadly, the circumstances that require registration under the CATSI Act include the following:

  • The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) states that when a positive native title determination is made, the native title holders must nominate a corporation registered under the CATSI Act known as a prescribed body corporate (‘PBC’) to hold or manage their native title rights and interests.18

  • The Aboriginal Heritage Act 2006 (Vic) requires that registered Aboriginal parties (‘RAPs’) are registered as corporations under the CATSI Act;19 and

  • Commonwealth and state government ‘self-management’ policies aim to enable First Nations communities to deliver their own range of essential services (such as housing or health services). The Central Land Council has stated that remote communities ‘are compelled to incorporate in order to receive funding for housing, power, water, or a motor vehicle’:

    Aboriginal people living on remote communities are required to subject themselves to an additional level of bureaucratic regulation before they can be accorded their fundamental human rights to security, and a standard of living adequate for their health and well-being.20

12.1.6 Critiques of the Requirement to Incorporate under the CATSI Act

The following critiques do not alter the statutory task before the court, but they are relevant to understanding the limitations of the corporate structure in facilitating the legal rights and interests of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, and issues with capacity and compliance that can be experienced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations.

Requiring Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to form corporations, from the outset, undermines the rights of Indigenous peoples as set out in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.21 The requirement to establish a corporation does not take into account whether the corporation is a fit-for-purpose structure for that group or whether members of the group have the necessary cross-cultural and legal capacity to understand and comply with their statutory duties. By imposing the corporate structure on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, the CATSI regime operates in a way that is in direct conflict with the rights of Indigenous peoples to participate in decision-making in matters that affect their rights,22 to freely determine their political status, and to freely pursue their economic, cultural and social development.23

This approach has garnered critique since the creation of Indigenous specific corporations’ legislation. For instance, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs made the following observation in its final report, Our Future, Our Selves stating, ‘It is ironic that Aboriginal communities are being asked to accept non-Aboriginal structures in order to have greater control over their own affairs’.24

Further, some powers under the CATSI Act, in particular discretionary powers held by the Registrar, have been characterised by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations as ‘overly paternalistic’ and as

perpetuat[ing] a view that Aboriginal People require assistance and supervision in making decisions with respect their Country, their culture, their native title rights and interests, and their ways of life.25

Professor Nicole Watson, a Birri Gubba and Munanjali legal scholar, in her paper analysing key provisions of the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Bill 2005 (Cth) made the following reflection on whether the corporate form is a culturally appropriate structure to facilitate Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander self-determination:

A more enlightened Commonwealth Government would not overwhelm community organisations with a regime mirroring legislation designed to regulate corporations driven by the profit motive. Rather, it would seize the lessons of the ACA [Act] and ask the fundamental question thus far ignored: is the corporation really a culturally-appropriate vehicle for the delivery of essential services to Indigenous people?26

These critiques reflect the inherent limitations of Western legal structures as a mechanism for the pursuit of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander self-determination and begin to highlight the complex intercultural tensions that distinguish Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations from non-Indigenous corporations operating in solely commercial contexts. This is a distinction that courts should be mindful of when administering legal tests under the CATSI Act.

12.1.7 Types of Indigenous Corporations

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples may participate in corporations in a variety of ways:

  • as members, directors and officers of the corporation;

  • as creditors, clients and employees of the corporation; and/or

  • as members of the ‘community’, ‘polity’ or ‘society’ in which the corporation operates.27

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations registered under the CATSI Act are

uniquely Indigenous member owned and controlled. They carry an important mandate to deliver social, cultural and economic benefits to their members and communities, and to protect Indigenous rights and interests. A mandate that is granted and entrusted to them by their membership.28

There is no ‘one type’ of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporation. One feature that is distinct to many Indigenous corporations is that they often function as a ‘significant legal actor’ both within their own communities and broader society.29 This is due to incorporation being one of the few ways in which Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander collective identity is recognised under the Australian legal system.

Broadly, some of the types of services or functions that may be provided by Indigenous corporations include:

  • providing essential services that would usually be provided by mainstream local government, including access to basic human rights such as health, housing and medical services;

  • providing functions associated with native title;

  • providing an interface to ‘mainstream’ society;

  • providing infrastructure (such as power stations) to remote Indigenous communities; and

  • holding land for Indigenous groups or managing the group’s native title rights and interests. These Indigenous corporations include land-holding bodies such as state and territory land rights corporations and registered native title bodies corporate (‘RNTBCs’).30

Some large Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations have been observed to operate as ‘quasi-local governments, particularly those located in remote and regional areas’.31

Other responsibilities held by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations include:

  • being consulted or having decision-making authority in relation to government and non-government developments (across a range of areas including but not limited to commercial, property, policy and service development, town planning);

  • entering contractual or administrative arrangements as the legal representative of specific Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander groups and/or Nations; and

  • providing evidence of community recognition in relation to the community recognition test as required under the statutory categories of ‘Aboriginal person’ or ‘person of Aboriginal race of Australia’.

The above examples are not exhaustive but demonstrate the varied and significant responsibilities and functions that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations can be tasked with.

As at 30 June 2025, there were 3,284 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations registered under the CATSI Act, including 284 RNTBCs and 1,312 corporations that are also registered charities.32

12.2 Two-Way Governance

Governance is not just a matter of service delivery, organisational compliance, or management. It is about the self-determining ability and authority of clans, nations and communities to govern: to decide what you want for your future, to implement your own initiatives, and take responsibility for your decisions and actions.33

— David Ross, Central Land Council Director

Despite legislative limitations, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have developed ways to continue to uphold their own laws, cultures and accountability as well as those imposed through corporations law.

The Australian Indigenous Governance Institute refers to this process as ‘two-way governance’, recognising the unique challenges Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples can face when required to simultaneously uphold (at least) two culturally distinct forms of accountability:

Every culture has its own standards and rules about what is legitimate or not. For Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander groups, it means finding ways to work across two different ways of governing:

  1. Their own people’s cultural ways of governing.

  2. Their wider environment (including external stakeholders like governments, businesses and industry groups) where governance is usually based on non-Indigenous laws, rules and values.

…

Governing under these dual forms of accountability can be challenging. For example, when members’ expectations around decision-making, sharing benefits, or nominating board representation are different to government regulations and legislation. Many groups are coming up with innovative governance arrangements. This means they can work well with both Indigenous and non-Indigenous governance values and practices, even when they differ.34

Some examples of two-way governance include:

  • Arnhem Land Progress Aboriginal Corporation (‘ALPA’): Written into ALPA’s constitution are two elected representatives from each community: one a traditional landowner and one a community member representative. This helps provide a broader representation of community interests at directors’ meetings.35 ALPA’s board structure also includes a board cultural liaison and a board communications facilitator, as non-voting positions, to help communicate non-Indigenous or corporate governance concepts cross-culturally.36

  • Quandamooka Yoolooburrabee Aboriginal Corporation (‘QYAC’): QYAC has developed a governance structure and decision-making process that is underpinned by kinship and family centred decision-making. The board has one director from each of the 12 families descended from the 12 apical ancestors. A Council of Elders supports the board. The council comprises one female Elder and one male Elder from each of the 12 families. These Elders and directors consult with their families before and after meetings so that each family can put their views forward. Decision-making processes are also embedded in the QYAC rule book. If an issue cannot be resolved informally at an individual family meeting or by the board of directors as outlined in the constitution, the Council of Elders has the authority to make the final decision.37

  • Kanyirninpa Jukurrpa (‘KJ’): KJ holds meetings over two days, allowing sufficient time for unpacking and discussing complex topics, allowing directors to make well-informed decisions. If additional time is needed, decisions can be deferred to the next meeting.38

12.3 Overview of the CATSI Act Framework

The Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) (‘CATSI Act’) came into effect on 1 July 2007. It mirrors many requirements of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘Corporations Act’) and, to a certain extent, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth).

The purpose of the CATSI Act is to align the Indigenous corporate sector with ‘modern corporate governance standards and corporations’ law’ while also maintaining ‘a special statute of incorporation for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples that takes account of the special risks and requirements of the Indigenous corporate sector’.39

12.3.1 Key Features of the CATSI Act

The CATSI Act has a number of unique features that only apply to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations registered under the Act. These include the following:

  • Has the status of a special measure: The preamble to the CATSI Act states that the Act is a special measure under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) for the ‘advancement and protection of Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders’. Special measures are designed to ‘secure the disadvantaged groups the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms’.40 As a special measure, the CATSI Act must ensure that principles of non-discrimination and substantive equality for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples are incorporated under the Act.

  • Establishes the Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations:41 The Registrar is an independent statutory office holder appointed by the Minister for Indigenous Australians to administer the CATSI Act. The Registrar is supported by the Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations (‘ORIC’) to ensure compliance with the CATSI Act. See 12.3 Overview of the CATSI Act Framework for further discussion on the Registrar’s functions and powers.

  • Requires the majority of members and directors to meet the Indigeneity provisions:42 The majority of a corporation’s members must be Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander persons (at least 51%).43 All directors of a corporation must be Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander persons, unless a corporation’s rule book allows non-Indigenous people to become a director, in which case the majority of directors must be Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander persons. Indigeneity provisions are discussed further in 12.5.1 Assessing Capacity and Compliance in the Discharge of Duties.

  • Requires corporations to have a rule book: The rule book must at a minimum contain the objectives of the corporation, frequency of directors’ meetings and the dispute resolution process.44 The corporation may adopt the replaceable rules in the CATSI Act or modify or replace them.45 While these rules do provide some flexibility, companies under the Corporation Act 2001 (Cth) have more replaceable rules that they can amend and greater flexibility in regard to constitution requirements.

  • Imposes minimum age requirements on members:46 Members of a corporation must be at least 15 years of age.

  • Requires corporations to include certain words in their registered name: The name of a corporation must include one of the following sets of words: ‘Aboriginal Corporation’, ‘Torres Strait Islander Corporation’, ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporation’, ‘Torres Strait Islander Corporation’ or ‘Indigenous Corporation’.47 If a corporation is prescribed in a native title determination, the corporation’s name must include the words ‘registered native title body corporate’ or ‘RNTBC’.

  • Requires the majority of directors to be members:48 A director must be a member, unless a corporation’s rule book states otherwise.

  • Prohibits members owning or trading shares in their corporation: However, the members can include rules in the rule book about how any profits are shared.

12.3.2 The CATSI Act as a Special Measure

The preamble to the CATSI Act states that it is a special measure under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) for the ‘advancement and protection of Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders’.49 Special measures are designed to ‘secure the disadvantaged groups the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms’.50

As a special measure, the CATSI Act must consider relevant differences (such as unique cultural and legal contexts) and disregard irrelevant differences (for example, requirements that are not expected of corporations incorporated under the Corporations Act).51

Where legislation is identified as being beneficial and remedial, the High Court has stated that it should be given a ‘fair, large and liberal’ interpretation, rather than one that is ‘literal or technical’.52

Further, the Federal Court has characterised the CATSI Act as

legislation which is designed to have regard to cultural practices amongst [A]boriginal people…it is appropriate to have regard to those particular aspects of the corporation [about cultural practices] and the purposes which it [CATSI Act] services in deciding…appropriate orders.53

12.3.2.1 ‘Special Risks and Requirements of the Indigenous Corporate Sector’

The Revised Explanatory Memorandum states that one of the CATSI Act’s purposes is to ‘maintain a special statute of incorporation for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples that takes account of the special risks and requirements of the Indigenous corporate sector’.54

The CATSI Act does not make any express reference to, or define, the ‘special risks and requirements’. However, the 2002 review of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976 (Cth) identified them to broadly include four areas of consideration, noting that these areas of need may be experienced by Indigenous corporations under any general statute of incorporation:55

  • the general socioeconomic characteristics of Indigenous people which may affect their participation in corporations;

  • the impact of [Indigenous laws and cultural protocols] on corporate governance practices;

  • the involuntary nature of many corporations formed to facilitate the provision of services to Indigenous people;

  • the functions that corporations facilitating the social, economic and political objectives of Indigenous people may be expected to fulfil.56

12.3.2.2 Case Examples

The following case examples demonstrate some of the different ways courts have tried to account for the ‘special risks and requirements’ of the Indigenous corporate sector. They also aim to demonstrate the complex and often conflicting task put before the court in balancing the dual aims of the CATSI Act: its administration as a special measure to account for the needs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations, and its intention to modernise the Indigenous corporate sector by imposing alignment with the Corporations Act.

  • Capacity and compliance should be assessed in a way that is alert to the unique cultural qualifications required by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander directors: In Dunghutti Elders Council (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations (No 4),57 the Full Federal Court recognised that directors of Indigenous corporations qualify for their role in distinctly different ways to commercial corporations. They qualify based on their relationship and position within their community, not necessarily their technical corporate capacity. The Full Court rejected the application of the Registrar for a costs order against the directors personally in relation to prior unsuccessful proceedings pursued by the corporation to which the directors were not parties: see Full Federal Court appeal (‘the appeal’)58 and three further court applications.59 The Full Court agreed with the Registrar that the appeal was without merit and should not have been brought, but it declined to make a costs order against the directors personally as the Court was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the directors acted in the way that they did in the pursuit of their own interests.60 A matter that had been raised by the Registrar was the directors’ failure in respect of the appeal to insist that the counsel and the solicitors for the corporation provide written advice.61 In addressing this issue, the Court noted that the directors had not been advised by anyone at the time that they should obtain written legal advice.62 The Court further observed:

    The directors are not professional people or people who are ordinarily placed in a position such as they occupy as directors of the Corporation. Their qualification for their position is being a member of the Corporation, which means that they are Aboriginal persons of Dunghutti descent who identify as Dunghutti persons and who are recognised as such by the directors [as set out in the corporation’s rule book].63

  • Capacity to comply with statutory duties should be assessed against the specific social and cultural context of the parties: In Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Monaghan (No 2),64 the Federal Court considered breaches of statutory duties by three former directors of Southside Housing Aboriginal Corporation.65 The Court, in assessing each former director’s capacity to discharge their duties, gave consideration to several factors: each respondent’s lack of business experience or training in managing a corporation;66 the effect of ill health;67 and the position of the first and second respondents as Elders in the ACT community and the effect of that role on their decision-making. Regarding the last factor see, for example, the statement by the first respondent in relation to how the corporation responded to the non-payment or rental arrears by tenants of the properties:

    [T]he corporation did consider evicting tenants … [Mr Monaghan’s] personal consideration of the issue was made not only in the context of his role as a director of the Corporation, but also in the context of the issue of housing for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and his role as an Aboriginal [E]lder in the ACT community. He said that many of the tenants were unemployed and were looking after families with children and that evicting them would have caused them to be homeless. … the decision to evict tenants was ‘confronting and difficult with serious consequences and I wasn’t prepared to take the action of eviction’.68

    Despite these circumstances, the first and second respondents admitted, and the Court held, that they engaged in conduct which was in breach of their duties, that they gained an advantage for themselves and that their conduct constituted contraventions of various civil penalty provisions.69 In relation to the third respondent (Ms Peters), the Court noted that the case ‘was limited’ and held that she had breached her duties concerning the corporation’s recording-keeping and reporting obligations. On this matter, the Court inquired as to why Ms Peters had not approached the Registrar for training or assistance in the discharge of her duties as director, to which she stated it was due to ‘“fear”… she saw “ORIC [the Registrar] in the same light as what I see care and protection; you don’t contact them. You know, from my perspective”’.70 Griffiths J took the third respondent’s statement as ‘a reference to the anxiety or apprehension which many Indigenous people experience in dealing with government agencies’ and concluded that this was a matter of which judicial notice can be taken.71 In his Honour’s concluding remarks, Griffith J also observed in obiter:

    [T]hese proceedings vividly highlight the need for there to be appropriate training for people who are directors or officers of a CATSI Act corporation. It is plain on the evidence that none of the respondents had the appropriate knowledge, experience or understanding of their roles and responsibilities as directors of the Corporation. I respectfully suggest that consideration should be given to reviewing the relevant legislative regime to ensure that the Registrar has adequate powers and functions to provide appropriate training to persons such as the respondents and that adequate resources are available for this purpose. It may well be that it is considered that such training should be a condition of a person becoming a director or officer of such a corporation but that is a matter which is beyond the scope of these proceedings.72

  • Cultural pressures may mitigate penalty and influence the scope of orders but do not displace statutory duties: In Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Kerkhoffs,73 the respondent, Mrs Kerkhoffs, a Kalkadoon woman, was the chairperson of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Corporation for Welfare Services. The Federal Court ordered that she be disqualified from managing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations for a period of 5 years and that she pay a pecuniary penalty of $50,000 for a number of statutory breaches relating to the mismanagement of the corporation.74 In his Honour’s reasoning, Logan J characterised the case as ‘a unique case which requires a unique penalty’,75 acknowledging the distinct circumstances that influenced Mrs Kerkhoffs’ behaviour. These included that ‘the majority of the board were relatives’, that she ‘felt under considerable family pressure, particularly from her mother and [E]lder in relation to matters touching upon the governance of the corporation’,76 and that she had ‘inherited the [corporation’s insolvency position] when she assumed the role of chairman’.77 Logan J concluded that Mrs Kerkhoffs’ behaviour was not ‘surreptitious’.78 His Honour went further, and characterised her as ‘in many ways, a representative respondent … while she is individually responsible … those responsibilities for good corporate governance are not hers alone. They were shared by all of the members of the board’.79 While Logan J recognised these circumstances, his Honour held that a pecuniary penalty is warranted and disqualification necessary, stating

    those who take on the role of board responsibilities in corporations incorporated under the CATSI Act need to understand that that role carries with it duties that are akin to those which fall upon directors of corporations incorporated under the Corporations Act. One does not service the interests of one’s clan or tribal group by failing to adhere to those duties.80

    While the Court ordered disqualification, Logan J advised that this disqualification should not be extended to Mrs Kerkhoffs’ directorship of companies incorporated under the Corporations Act. This was a discriminating value judgment in recognition that she had demonstrated her ability to act as a director of her and her husband’s business, Kerkhoffs Transport, where ‘particular clan and within clan family obligations are not present’.81 His Honour stated:

    There needs to be a very discriminating value judgment … made as to the imperatives that intruded on the contravening conduct here, and the likelihood or otherwise that they would attend the governance of a corporation that conducts, for example, the business of Kerkhoffs Transport. There is not a direct translation.82

    In relation to the pecuniary penalty, Logan J held the importance of general deterrence, stating that ‘this is one of those cases where it is necessary, unequivocally, to send a wider message’ while also recognising in obiter ‘that there will be a particular hardship’ for the respondent and her family.83 To balance this, Logan J did not make an order for payment by instalments but left it for the Registrar to determine how repayments would be made, and concluded in obiter:

    Further, there may well be, in the circumstances of this case, humane considerations which may lead to the making of recommendations to the responsible Minister at some stage for the writing off of some or all of particular amounts that are owed. These are not value judgements for me to make. I mention them solely because it is not my intention in making reference to a need for general deterrence to foreclose in any way the prospect of what one might term executive clemency.84

12.4 The Registrar and ORIC

The Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) (‘CATSI Act’) and the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Regulations 2007 (Cth) establish the role of the Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations.

For courts, the key task is scrutinising the exercise of discretionary powers to ensure it is in accordance with the Registrar’s aims as set out in s 658-5 of the CATSI Act.

12.4.1 General Powers and Functions

Any exercise of power by the Registrar must be in accordance with the Registrar’s aims set out in s 685-5. These aims are:

  • to facilitate and improve the effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and accountability of corporations;85

  • to provide certainty for the members, officers and employees of corporations in their dealings with the corporation and each other;86

  • to provide certainty for people outside corporations in their dealings with those corporations;87

  • to have regard to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander tradition and circumstances;88

  • to administer the laws of the Commonwealth that confer functions and powers on the Registrar effectively and with a minimum of procedural requirements;89 and

  • to ensure that information is available as soon as practicable for access by the public.90

12.4.2 Powers Unique to the Registrar

The Registrar has a range of unique regulatory powers that are completely discretionary: for example, the power to change a corporation’s rule book,91 and the power to call a general or annual meeting.92 In contrast, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (‘ASIC’) has no powers in relation to deciding what can and cannot go into a corporation’s constitution, and under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘Corporations Act’) only a court may order a meeting of members.93

The exercise of the Registrar’s powers has been observed to ‘sometimes be disproportionate response to non-compliance’, particular in comparison to the ‘suite of lower-level discretionary powers’ available to ASIC, a regulatory body that serves a very similar purpose.94 Both the 2017 technical review of the CATSI Act and the 2020 NIAA-led comprehensive review of the Act found widespread support for the Registrar to have a broader range of lower level, discretionary powers that are accompanied with clear guidance as to how and when those powers could be used.95

Powers of note relate to examinations and special administration.

12.4.2.1 Examinations

Examinations are a regulatory power unique to the CATSI Act. The Registrar may send an authorised officer (‘an examiner’) to examine the books and records of an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporation registered under the Act and report to the Registrar on the results of the examination.96

The Registrar has complete, unfettered discretion in exercising examination powers, with no statutory requirement to apply to a court or to satisfy any statutory grounds to commence an examination of a corporation.97 The Registrar’s decision to appoint authorised officers and commence an examination of a corporation’s books is also not subject to an internal merits review.98 Further, failure to comply with an authorised officer and provide all relevant information and books during an examination attracts serious penalties under the CATSI Act for both corporations and natural persons, including strict liability offences and imprisonment.99

The Registrar conducts an ‘annual rolling program of examinations’, with a focus on ‘large, essential or publicly funded corporations’,100 and has reported that placing a corporation under special administration ‘more frequently arises after an examination of the corporation’s books by the Registrar or an authorised person’.101

12.4.2.2 Special Administration

Special administration is a form of external administration unique to the CATSI Act. Under the Act, only the Registrar may place an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporation under special administration.102

The Registrar describes special administration as ‘a special measure that address the unique role and circumstances of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations’ and is intended to enable the Registrar to ‘provide early proactive regulatory assistance when a corporation experiences financial or governance difficulties’.103

In practice, though, special administration can cause major disruption of not only a corporation, but also the community it serves, and can risk undermining the autonomy and legitimacy of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander organisations.

This risk arises because of the absolute power conferred on a special administrator over a corporation under the CATSI Act, including the powers to:

  • control the corporation’s business, property and affairs;

  • carry on any business and manage any property and affairs;

  • change a corporation’s rule book (limited only by the requirement to obtain the Registrar’s approval);

  • terminate or dispose of all or part of any business, and dispose of any property;

  • engage or discharge employees on behalf of the corporation;

  • perform any function and exercise any power that the corporation, its officers or its members could perform if the corporation were not under special administration;

  • admit and remove members;

  • appoint and remove directors or a secretary (if not vacated by the Registrar’s determination when a special administrator is appointed);

  • appoint and remove contact person; and

  • apply to the court for a winding up order.104

The grounds for placing a corporation under special administration are broad,105 and not restricted to insolvency or the inability to pay a debt. There is also a specific ground enabling prescribed bodies corporate to be placed under special administration ‘if there has been a serious failure, or a number of failures, by the corporation to comply with its native title legislation obligations’.106

Unlike the position under the Corporations Act, where the external administrator is required to be a registered liquidator, there are no prescribed qualifications for the special administrator under the CATSI Act. However, the Registrar maintains a panel of potential appointees with ‘specialised knowledge and experience in corporate governance, business turnaround and communication and working with Indigenous people’.107

The Registrar’s policy statement posits that special administration is given priority in the CATSI Act over other forms of external administration applied under Corporations Act provisions.108

Show Cause Procedure

In principle, a corporation is accorded natural justice through a show cause procedure.109 The show cause procedure is where a corporation is invited to respond within a ‘reasonable period’as to why it should not be placed under special administration.110 However, the Registrar may dispense with the show cause procedure if the Registrar is satisfied that the matter meets the ‘urgent situations’ set out in s 487-10(2) of the CATSI Act such as ‘a likely loss of property of the corporation’111 or a ‘likely loss of public money held or administered by the corporation’.112

Reviewable Decision

Special administration is a reviewable decision by both the Registrar and the Administrative Review Tribunal.113 The Full Court of the Federal Court has stated that

whether or not a determination [of special administration] should be made under s 487-1(1) of the CATSI Act is not a question for this court: the power to make such a determination is vested in the first respondent (and in this case in the second respondent as the first respondent’s duly authorised delegate) [the Registrar]. The court’s role is to ensure that the power to make a determination is exercised within the legal framework erected by the CATSI Act supplemented by the principles of procedural fairness which operate within that framework.114

12.4.2.3 External Administration and PBC’s

In addition to general CATSI Act provisions, there is also a specific ground enabling a PBC to be placed under special administration if ‘there has been a serious failure, or a number of failures, by the corporation to comply with its Native Title legislation obligations’.115

Appointment of an external administrator to a PBC, under the CATSI Act, is for the objects and aims of CATSI Act and is not driven by the interests of the PBC’s creditors (in contrast to external administration under the Corporations Act).116 The court will not appoint a receiver unless there is no other reasonable or satisfactory alternative.117

A court will avoid appointing external administration of the PBC where the problem may be rectified through declarations and injunctions, and the issues in dispute would unlikely be settled by external administration. Alternative remedies to external administration have included declarations of invalidity and injunctions to require certain action or to prohibit certain actions.

In proceedings contesting the administration of a PBC under the CATSI Act, the court is able to structure outcomes around undertakings from the parties even where the court may not have the jurisdiction to make the specific orders sought.118

12.5 Duties of Directors and Officers

Chapter 6 of the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) (‘CATSI Act’) deals with the officers (including directors) of an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporation.119

Directors of a corporation are determined under pt 6-2 of the Act and relevant provisions of the corporation’s rule book.

Part 6-4 of the CATSI Act sets out some of the most significant duties of directors, secretaries, other officers and employees of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations. Other duties are imposed by other provisions of the CATSI Act and/or the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘Corporations Act’) that are applied to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations, and other laws including the general law.

The principal duties of directors and officers set out in the CATSI Act mirror the statutory duties set out in the Corporations Act. They include:

  • a duty of care and diligence;120

  • a duty of good faith and proper purpose;121

  • a duty to disclose a conflict of interest (material personal interest);122

  • a duty not to improperly use position123 or information;124 and

  • a duty to not trade while insolvent.125

As the CATSI Act mirrors the provisions set out in the Corporations Act, they tend to be interpreted similarly. However, a key task for the courts in assessing the capacity of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander directors or officers to discharge their duties is the need to balance the dual aims of the CATSI Act:

  • to align the Indigenous corporate sector with corporate governance standards as established under the Corporations Act; and

  • to account for the distinct needs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations that have been recognised as necessitating the CATSI Act and its status as a special measure.

12.5.1 Assessing Capacity and Compliance in the Discharge of Duties

Courts should be mindful that the best interests of the corporation are assessed both objectively and according to the context of each particular factual circumstance and situation of the corporation.126 This should include taking into account the specific cultural, social, economic and political context of the corporation and its purpose and objects, as set out in the corporation’s rule book.127

Further, the application of objective legal tests, such as the reasonable person test, must account for the Indigenous-specific context of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations. For example, when applying the test established in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler128 — that whether a director has acted in the best interest of a corporation will be tested in accordance with ‘what the similarly placed reasonable director would have done’ — the courts should account for what a similarly placed reasonable Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander director would have done, under the specific circumstances of the corporation in question and faced by similar pressures.129

Courts should also keep in mind that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations at any one time are subject to multiple forums of accountability that, if not addressed, can increase a corporation’s vulnerability to unstable governance. Directors and officers of Indigenous corporations at any one time may be accountable to family, kin, Country, community members (particularly where corporations are providing services to their local community), employees and staff, and at times funding bodies, in addition to their legal duties under the CATSI Act and/or other government legislation. Corporations such as prescribed bodies corporate also bear accountability to future generations. This list is not exhaustive and is likely to grow in relation to the size, influence, objectives and purpose of a corporation. Being subject to multiple forums of accountability demands significant cross-cultural expertise, not necessarily required in the commercial context, in addition to the technical corporate expertise required to comply with statutory duties. Where directors or officers lack the required capacity, resources or support to navigate this complex operating environment, it can increase a corporation’s vulnerability to unstable governance, tension and conflict.

Figure 4 is a diagram provided by Associate Professor Marina Nehme130 to assist in understanding the different forums for director’s accountability and their overlap.

Figure 4: Different Forums for Directors’ Accountability131
Different Forums for Directors’ Accountability131

Courts have demonstrated their capacity to acknowledge the tension that the CATSI Act creates between these multiple forums of accountability. However, there is a tendency to undermine Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultural obligations and instead prioritise a strict application of ‘standards of corporate governance which are akin to those … established under the Corporations Act’.132 As Logan J noted:

[T]hose who hold office in [Indigenous] corporations must nonetheless observe standards of corporate governance which are akin to those who hold office as a director of a corporation established under the Corporations Act. In imposing that particular obligation, necessary as it is, particularly where public funds are deployed, the CATSI Act is pregnant with the potential of a clash between conventional expectations of appropriate corporate governance and directors’ behaviours and the very real, heartfelt obligations of clan and tribe to a fellow member of a clan or tribe in the Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community.133

Courts should be mindful to distinguish, where relevant, the specific experiences of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander directors or officers to ensure the special circumstances of directors and officers are accounted for and134 considered in alignment with the object of the CATSI Act to be a special measure for the ‘advancement and protection of Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders’.135

Nehme, in her analysis of the evolution of directors’ duties for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations, discusses the importance of considering the unique circumstances experienced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander directors or officers:

While it is important to uphold the duty of care from a corporate governance perspective, it is also key to cater for the special circumstance of these directors. Unlike company directors, the majority of directors in Indigenous corporations take their position to help their community and are not remunerated for the services they provide.

…

When the legislation and the regulator ignore this and fail to put directors’ action in the right context, mistrust may start appearing between ORIC and Indigenous corporations.136

12.5.1.1 Business Judgment Rule

Section 265-1(2) of the CATSI Act adopts the statutory business judgment rule, which mirrors s 180(2) of the Corporations Act. The rationale for including a statutory business judgment rule is the recognition that directors or officers must make decisions in a ‘business environment in which they are expected to take acceptable risks, make decisions quickly and take advantage of fleeting opportunities’.137 It is important to note that this rule is only available for the exercise of business judgment, which is defined in s 265-1(3) to mean any decision relating to ‘the business operations of the corporation’.

The court is yet to consider the application of s 265-1(2) of the CATSI Act in any substantial way. However, a small number of cases have considered the application of the rule in detail under the CATSI Act’s counterpart — s 180(2) of the Corporations Act. Empirical analysis of the courts dealing with s 180(2) suggests that ‘subject to a future appellate court ruling, [the business judgment rule] can be viewed as a safe harbor that operates as a defence even where the defendant’s conduct has been held to be unreasonable’.138 However, for Indigenous corporations, it has been observed that ‘there is a poor awareness of this safe harbour by directors … Consequently, building capacity should come hand in hand with the duty of care to enhance the way organisations are operating’.139

12.5.1.2 Native Title Defence

The CATSI Act recognises that there may be native title obligations outside the CATSI Act, and provides a ‘good faith’ defence to directors endeavouring to meet their NTA obligations. Where a PBC officer is acting in good faith in doing something believed necessary for obligations under native title law, that is a defence to a breach of the CATSI Act.140

Directors of Indigenous corporations are afforded protection against contraventions through the native title defence.141 This defence is intended to ensure that directors, officers and employees are not put in a position where their duties under the CATSI Act conflict with their duties under native title legislation.

12.6 Members

Membership of a corporation is determined under pt 4-2 of the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) (‘CATSI Act’), including ss 138-1 and 144-1.

12.6.1 Indigeneity Requirements

The CATSI Act sets out minimum requirements for the proportion of members and directors that must be Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander persons.142 At all times, the majority of members (at least 51%) of a corporation must be Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander persons.

The CATSI Act defines ‘Aboriginal person’ to mean ‘a person of the Aboriginal race of Australia’ and ‘Torres Strait Islander’ to mean a ‘descendent of an Indigenous inhabitant of the Torres Strait Islands’.143

A corporation has the responsibility of establishing the Indigeneity of members or directors, including that of the individual members or directors of corporate members.144 However, where the Registrar considers there to be ‘a reasonable risk to a corporation meeting the Indigeneity provisions’, the Registrar may seek evidence of the Indigeneity of a corporation’s members and/or directors.

The Registrar has broad discretionary powers to seek and determine the acceptability of evidence of the Indigeneity of a corporation’s members and/or directors. This can include the power to:

  • ask questions of those people with knowledge of the affairs of a corporation;145

  • require the corporation to produce additional documents or information about a submitted document;146

  • examine the books of a corporation; and147

  • convene meetings of interested persons.148

In matters where the Registrar considers there to be a reasonable risk to a corporation satisfying the Indigeneity provisions, regulatory powers must be exercised in alignment with the statutory role of the Registrar, noting that

it is not in the Registrar’s statutory role to determine an individual’s Indigeneity

…

The Registrar has a focus on being satisfied that a corporation meets the Indigeneity provisions as this ensures corporations are Indigenous controlled.149

This role distinction is critical in upholding the rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations to determine their own identities150 and exercise self-government and autonomy in relation to their own affairs. It is also critical to ensuring that the Registrar’s powers are exercised in alignment with the primary aim of the CATSI Act as a special measure for the ‘advancement and protection of Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders’.151

The Registrar’s 2025 Position Statement on Indigeneity outlines three guiding principles to be mindful of in monitoring compliance with Indigeneity provisions.

Where a Registrar determines that an existing corporation fails to comply with the Indigeneity provisions, the Registrar may:

  • issue a notice to the corporation requiring the corporation to comply with the CATSI Act;152 and

  • if the corporation fails to comply with the notice — request the Court wind up the corporation.153

12.6.2 Members Rights

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations have members (as opposed to shareholders). They may also have persons who observe the operation of the corporation’s meetings, called observers.154

The CATSI Act brings Indigenous corporations in line with members rights and remedies available under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘Corporations Act’). Broadly, these include the rights to:

  • request the directors call a general meeting;

  • make decisions for the corporation by voting in a general meeting;

  • demand a poll at a general meeting;

  • remove directors;

  • decide on financial benefits to related parties;155

  • access information;156

  • make an application to a court157 to investigate oppressive conduct by the corporation, inspect the books of a corporation or wind up a corporation;158 and

  • amend and approve the rule book.159

Despite alignment with the Corporations Act, there are differences in how some members rights and remedies operate under the CATSI Act. Key differences include the broadening of some provisions to give further powers to the Registrar: for example, the power to apply for a court order on behalf of members or in the name of the corporation,160 and the power to bring or intervene in proceedings on behalf of a corporation.161

The legislature’s rationale for giving the Registrar standing in relation to members rights and remedies has been characterised as a way to protect members’ rights and interests ‘where they are unable to protect their own’ and ‘takes into account the issue of capacity of some members, through enabling the Registrar to protect those members’ rights and interests’.162

12.7 Meetings

There are two main types of corporation meetings required under the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) (‘CATSI Act’):

  • general meetings for members to receive information on corporation performance and to make decisions on significant corporation issues such as changes to the corporation’s rule book, proposals to provide benefits to related parties, and appointment or removal of directors; and

  • directors’ meetings for directors to discuss and set strategic direction and policies and oversee corporation performance and management.

The obligation to hold meetings and the relevant procedures are set in ch 5 of the CATSI Act. A corporation’s rule book must also be checked for meeting requirements and procedures as a corporation can change or replace many of the rules about meetings in their rule book or ask the Registrar for exemption from them.

12.7.1 Judicial Considerations When Assessing Validity of Meetings

To be valid, general meetings must be properly convened, constituted and conducted. Below is a very brief outline of some legislative requirements and judicial considerations when assessing the validity of meetings for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations.

12.7.1.1 Adequacy of Notice (Process and Content)

The CATSI Act requires that written notice of a general meeting must be given by the corporation, at least 21 days prior to the meeting, to each of the members entitled to vote at the meeting. The notice must set out the details of the meeting and the general nature of the meeting’s business.163 If a special resolution is to be proposed, the notice must set out the intention to propose the special resolution.164 However, an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporation’s rule book may specify a longer minimum period of notice.

In addition to any other meetings held by an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporation during each year, and subject to any extension granted by the Registrar,165 the corporation must hold an AGM within five months of the end of the financial year.166

The purpose behind the requirement for notice is to ensure that ‘the members enjoy a full and proper opportunity by notice to consider the business of the meeting before they attend and then vote upon that business’.167

Further, the basic test that the common law has developed for notices calling meetings in corporation’s cases is suitable and adaptable to meetings such as those called under s 251B of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth):

Notices of meeting of native title claim groups called to authorise the progress of claims under the Act need to be clearly, simply and directly expressed. The Court must be mindful that the class of persons to whom such notices will be addressed are not lawyers, but indigenous people from many varied walks of life who have greater and lesser degrees of sophistication and understanding. Ordinarily, it would not serve any purpose to require such notices to set out at great length and detail material of the nature that is sometimes sent to members of a corporation who are asked to consider amending or voting on resolutions put forward by directors. Nonetheless, the basic test that the common law has developed for notices calling meetings is suitable and adaptable to meetings such as those called under s 251B of the Act. The notice must be sufficient to enable the persons to whom it is addressed, namely members or potential members of the native title claim group, to judge for themselves whether to attend the meeting and vote for or against a proposal or whether to leave the matter to be determined by the majority who do attend and vote at the meeting.168

12.7.1.2 Failure to Provide Notice

The WA Supreme Court held that failure to provide notice of a proposed meeting to a corporation’s members, including where the proposed meeting did not proceed, can still amount to conduct that is in breach of the requirements of the CATSI Act or the corporation’s rule book.177 Further, Pritchard J stated:

To fail to give a member proper notice of an AGM risks depriving that member of one of the fundamental rights of membership of an ATSI corporation, namely to attend, speak and vote at a general meeting… to engage in conduct which is liable to have that consequence is, in my view, conduct which is oppressive for the purposes of s 166-1(1)(e) of the CATSI Act.178

12.7.1.3 Language and Comprehension

For a detailed discussion of language and comprehension see 3 Language and Communication.

The demographic characteristics of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations can be incredibly diverse across age, gender, education, occupation, cultural knowledge and ways of doing, among other factors. Corporations can often be comprised of a number of smaller groups (linked by descent, estate, language identification, geographic location or other factors) who would not necessarily come together if not for the purpose or function of the corporation, for example a native title claim. Meetings can therefore require significant time, resources and support to ensure all members are provided a reasonable opportunity to participate.

Language barriers can be further compounded by limited or no understanding of legal English, corporate governance or corporate meeting ‘lingo’. Words that are common in a commercial context are, in many cases, culturally and conceptually foreign to Indigenous corporations. For examples, see the AIGI’s explainer on ‘meeting lingo’.179

Judicial officers should be alert to members, directors and officers having opportunities to speak in language during meetings and to their capacity to understand English and legal or corporate jargon. Consideration should be given to:

  • whether there were sustained and meaningful opportunities for those at the meeting to explore, in language, any meanings or consequences about what was being discussed that they did not otherwise understand;180 and

  • whether legal jargon or legal English terms were translated into plain English.181

12.7.1.4 Meeting Length

The length and/or timing of a meeting can further exacerbate challenges to meaningful meeting participation for members.

Judicial officers should be mindful of meeting duration and its impact on capacity to participate. For example, consideration may be given to the compounding impact of meeting length with:

  • resolutions and/or special resolutions being left to the end of a meeting;

  • members and/or claimants engaging in cross-cultural communication (need for translators, opportunity to speak in language, requirement to comprehend legal English); and

  • attendance of Elders.

In Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland,182 Mortimer J balanced evidence submitted by five Badu men (whose ages spanned from late forties to mid-seventies) as joinder applicants ‘that the language difficulties were exacerbated by the length of the meeting and what they describe as a rushed end to the meeting’ with evidence provided by a lawyer, Mr Knobel, of reasonable active participation of the joinder applicants.183 Evidence of a private meeting in language that counterbalanced the evidence submitted by the joinder applicants was such that her Honour held that there was a sustained and meaningful opportunity to participate. However, this case demonstrates the task before the court to consider the compounding effect of different elements of a meeting on participation.

Mortimer J also highlighted in obiter that, with the value of hindsight, leaving the decision-making to the next morning may have been a better course of action:

The evidence shows people left for a variety of reasons — some were elderly, and tired (such as Mr Nona); some (such as Ipad Nona) were indicating their disagreement in a culturally acceptable way, and other were supporting Ipad Nona. It may well be some had other reasons for leaving. What this does show is that leaving resolutions (the core function of the meeting) to the end of a very long day is another organisational flaw which, with the comfortable but sometimes unrealistic perspective of hindsight, would have been better avoided. The better course may have been to leave the decision-making until the following morning, when people were fresh and perhaps better attendance might have been secured. If it was the case that people discussed issues overnight and changed their minds, then that is no more than the decision-making process of the group at work.184

12.7.1.5 Evidence

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations can be complex socio-cultural legal environments. Meetings can involve many parties including a need for, or reliance on, different expert parties in decision-making processes and or in matters before the court (for example, lawyers and/or anthropologists in native title matters).

Where judicial officers are considering evidence from non-Indigenous people on Indigenous decision-making processes, judicial officers should be mindful of the appropriateness of whose evidence takes weight on certain matters.

For example, in Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland,185 in considering evidence from Badu joinder applicants with evidence adduced by Dr Murphy, an anthropologist who has worked with the Badu claim group on their native title claims since 2000,186 Mortimer J stated, ‘On balance, I consider the Badulgal themselves are in a better position to inform the Court about the state of knowledge about the meeting on the island, and about why people did not attend’.187 Her Honour held that the evidence of Dr Murphy ‘was to be considered to have some weight but not be determinative’.188

12.7.1.6 Cultural Communication

When considering the validity of a meeting and/or the passing of a resolution, judicial officers must be mindful of the Eurocentric values that can underpin meeting etiquette and how these ways of communicating or sharing information can show up differently in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporate or claim group meetings.

Being alert to cultural differences is important to minimise the risk of miscommunication in decision-making forums.

Cultural decision-making protocols may be set out in a corporation’s rule book. Some examples include the following:

  • Disagreement may not be verbalised and instead can look like standing up and leaving a meeting:

    In our way, which we call ‘danalaig’ (meaning our lifestyle), when a Badulaig disagrees with something, he doesn’t want to be a part of it. He stands up and walks out. Usually, in a gathering of our people, I would get up and walk out when I don’t agree, but for this native title, I partly understand that I should stay, even if I don’t want to — even if it is against what I believe. This is a hard thing for me to do, as a Badulaig.189

  • There is often a preference for consensus decision-making rather than majority voting. Consensus decision-making often requires extensive collective discussion and consultation:

    We make decisions like a washing machine. First we just push it all around, everything round and round and have a good talk about every part of it. Then we come to a decision. Once a decision is made, board members think it is important to stick to it … then we agree as one. Once a decision is passed, that’s it, it’s finished. Then we’re under one agreement, we get on with it.190

  • Silence is highly valued and can mean different things. For example, the use of silence in communication is a sign of thoughtfulness and indicates that an individual is thinking deeply about the subject matter.191 It may also indicate that an individual does not have authority to speak on a particular subject matter in the presence of a particular person.192

These examples are not exhaustive or authoritative. Judicial officers and legal practitioners should take the time to understand how a corporation’s culture(s) can influence meeting participation and decision-making processes.

12.7.1.7 Minutes

The corporation must keep a minute book in which it records, among other things, the proceedings and resolutions of all general meetings, and of directors’ meetings.193 Two factors are critical to the recording of minutes — namely, that:

  • minutes can be checked and verified by members and/or claim group members; and

  • a recording is available to the parties and the court to ensure there is access to an accurate and reliable record for evidentiary purposes.194

12.7.2 Other Factors That Can Impact Meetings

Circumstances that can impact a corporation’s capacity to hold meetings and/or fulfil decision-making processes can include:

  • limited resources (physical and financial) available to hold meetings. For example evidence provided by the CEO of Karakarri RNTBC, Mr Bin Rashid, in Karajarri RNTBC v Western Australia195 explained the significant expenses associated with authorisation meetings:

    …there are about 400 Karajarri members, and approximately a further 100 or 200 Karajarri common law holders who are not yet members, and that the costs of the last authorisation meeting were over $200,000. These are very significant sums of money for a small organisation.196

  • geographical dispersion of the group and its members (for example, members of a native title group may not live on, or close to their Country because of voluntary or coerced population movement over the last two centuries); and

  • cultural practices that may suspend or disrupt the day-to-day business of a community, including circumstances where visitors may be asked to postpone a visit (for example, during Sorry Business). There are no set times for practices around mourning and customs can vary between communities. These circumstances can make it difficult for corporations to hold meetings or meet time specific requirements. For more information on the significance of Sorry Business see the Bugmy Bar Book chapter ‘Significance of Funeral Attendance and Sorry Business for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’.197

12.8 CATSI Act Remedies

Remedies in the CATSI Act are mostly discretionary.

The Court’s discretion to make ‘any order…it considers appropriate in relation to the corporation’ must be exercised having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and should be proportionate to the conduct found to be contrary to the interests of the corporation.198

The Court should implement the ‘least intrusive remedy which eliminates the impugned conduct.’199 For example, in considering whether to grant an injunction, the court may reduce the scope applied so that the injunction only prohibits a particular motion being considered, rather than prohibiting any meeting from occurring.200

The Court may not issue remedies (even where there is a breach) where the impugned events are in the past and have since been rectified.201

12.9 Interaction of the CATSI Act and the Native Title Act

A key aim of the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) (‘CATSI Act’) is to ensure that it interacts appropriately with the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) (‘Native Title Act’). The Explanatory Memorandum to the CATSI Bill states:

The [CATSI Act] minimises the incompatibility between the Native Title Act and the CATSI Act through tailored provisions for RNTBCs or in relation to an application made for the purposes of becoming a RNTBC where necessary.202

Key parts of the CATSI Act which distinguish PBCs from general Indigenous Corporations include:

  • A PBC which is registered under the NRA to hold native title must include the words ‘registered native title body corporation’ or intial ‘RNTBC’;203

  • In determining which category covers a particular PBC (‘small’, ‘medium’ or ‘large’), no account is to be taken of the native title rights and interests which it holds;204

  • A PBC’s internal rules must also be consistent with the NTA and its regulations;

  • The CATSI Act gives, to courts and the Registrar, powers in relation to corporations and their directions, but the extent of these powers is reduced in relation to PBCs where the PBC directors were acting in good daith in a belief they were complying with the NTA and its regulations,205 see 12.5.1.2 Native Title Defence;

  • The power of the Registrar to deregister corporations is reduced where the corporation is a RNTBC;206

  • PBC directors who are members of the native title holding group for which the PBC acts (as agent or trustee), are not taken to be in conflict simply because of their native title rights;207

12.9.1 Overview of the PBC/RNTBC Scheme

12.9.1.1 Prescribed Bodies Corporate

If and when a native title application achieves a positive determination, the native title holders must nominate a prescribed body corporate (‘PBC’) to manage or hold the native title rights for the native title group, either as agent or trustee.208

Once a PBC is registered with the National Native Title Tribunal, it is officially termed a registered native title body corporate (‘RNTBC’).209 However, RNTBCs are generally referred to as PBCs, before and after that point, in the Native Title Act and publications, and by parties and courts.

In general terms, the primary role of a PBC is to manage, on behalf of the common law holders (either as agent or trustee), the native title rights and interests following a successful native title determination. This includes negotiating and contracting with third parties.210

PBC’s are mandated under pt 2 div 6 of the Native Title Act and the Native Title (Prescribed Bodies Corporate) Regulations 1999 (Cth) (‘PBC Regulations’). A PBC is subject to four principal requirements:

  • the body corporate must be registered under the CATSI Act;211

  • the purpose of becoming a registered native title body corporate must be set out in the objects of the corporation;

  • the corporation must meet the Indigeneity requirement mentioned in s 29-5 of the CATSI Act; and

  • all members of the body corporate must either be the native title holders in respect of the determination, or persons in respect of whom the native title holders have given their consent.212

The conduct and activities of a PBC are regulated by:

  • the determination under which the court recognised the native title rights and holders for which the PBC is now agent or trustee;213

  • ‘the general law’ which can include common law and equity, and statutes addressing other areas of law (such as the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), and the trustee and land law of the states and territories);

  • the Native Title Act (particularly s 58);

  • the PBC Regulations;

  • the PBC’s own rules; and

  • some aspects of the CATSI Act.

12.9.1.2 PBC/RNTBC Functions

Many of the key functions of a PBC arise only once the PBC is registered on the National Native Title Register (as an RNTBC). Broadly, these functions include:

  • to enter into agreements (for example, to negotiate future governmental acts and make Indigenous land use agreements);

  • to hold in trust money connected with the holding in trust of the native title rights and interests (if acting as a trustee) or the holding of the native title rights and interests (if acting as an agent);

  • to invest or otherwise apply money held in trust as directed by the common law holders;

  • to consult with the common law holders; and

  • to perform any other function relating to native title rights and interests as directed by the common law holders (exercise procedural rights, accept notices on behalf of the native title holders or beneficiaries, etc).214

In addition to the prescribed functions, at any one-time PBCs must also deal with complex interactions with equity, property law, administrative law, planning law, environmental law, resources law, land law, taxation, trusts, occupational health and safety, employment law and the many other legal obligations that emerge across native title operations.215

This list only considers other legal obligations under Australian law, and must also be considered alongside Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander laws, customs and protocols.

PBCs are often expected by government to fulfil a broader role in regard to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander issues outside their native title functions.216 This can include, but is not limited to, economic development, town planning, social harmony projects and cultural protocols.217 In some instances, PBCs have been ‘observed to operate as quasi-local governments’, particularly those located in remote and regional locations.218

Mantziaris and Martin in Native Title Corporations: A Legal and Anthropological Analysis make three observations about the PBC scheme that courts should be mindful of:

  • The ‘multitude of sources of law’ leads not only to many avenues along which parties may take legal action against one another, but also to an accompanying array of rules regarding who can take action using each avenue and regarding the associated remedies’.

  • The conjunction of the Native Title Act and the CATSI Act compels native title groups to use private instruments but prevents the groups from having the full flexibility to tailor the design of the PBC to reflect both the traditional laws and customs of the group or the internally differentiated character of their native title rights.

  • Many of the legal relationships are inconsistent with one another and the features of one relationship often undermine the functions of another.219

12.9.2 Judicial Considerations in PBC Governance and Operation

A major challenge faced by PBC’s is a lack of adequate funding and resourcing. This is in addition to socio-cultural, geographical and political challenges discussed earlier in this chapter that can impact Indigenous corporations more broadly. The PBC Futures: Roadmap to Reform report, prepared by the National Native Title Council (NTTC) stated:

According to the publicly available, financial reports that PBCs submit to the Office for the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations (ORIC), around 70 per cent of PBCs continue to have little or no income. This is an entrenched problem.220

Where appropriate, Courts have shown capacity to be mindful of how they can respond to the particular constraints experienced by a PBC, for example:

  • In Karajarri RNTBC v Western Australia,221 the Karajarri Traditional Lands Association (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC (the applicant) sought orders for the taking and preservation of evidence of five key, elderly Karajarri witnesses who were experiencing varying degrees of poor health, in anticipation of a future compensation claim being filed in the Federal Court of Australia.222 The Kimberley Land Council (KLC), who were supporting the applicant deposed that due to insufficient resources the applicant is unlikely to file the compensation claim until at least 2026 by which time the health and age of the witnesses may prevent evidenced being adduced.223 In this matter, Mortimer CJ acknowledged the financial and cultural difficulties faced by a PBC and agreed to litigation programming which gave greater flexibility in taking evidence.224 Relevant paragraphs of the reasons include: [34]–[38] (difficulties faced by PBC), [48] (PBC required support of the native title representative body, and that organisation had budgeting and operational constraints), and [124] (explaining the orders allowing early preservation evidence before the proceeding had even been commenced with that not expected until 2026.

12.10 Case Summaries

Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124

Keywords

‘Statutory corporation’ — ‘Oppression’ — ‘Conduct of meetings’ — ‘Participation of members in meetings’ — ‘Admission of members’ — ‘Obligations of directors with respect to financial reports’ — ‘Whether appointment of receiver appropriate’ — ‘Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) ss 166-1, 166-5’.

Summary

The failure of the directors of the Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation (YAC) to ensure that members could effectively express their views constituted oppressive conduct and was contrary to the interests of the members as a whole for the purposes of s 166-1(1)(e) and (d) of the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 2006 (Cth). The oppressive conduct included the rejection and acceptance of membership applications in order to control the outcome of voting on a matter, the holding of meetings to vote on important issues without notifying members, and the exclusion of members from meetings.

Facts

The plaintiffs are members of the Yindjibarndi people and the Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (YAC).225 The plaintiffs claimed that since 2010, YAC had acted in contravention of the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 2006 (Cth) (‘the CATSI Act’) and the YAC Rule Book and engaged in oppressive conduct, pursuant to s 166-1(1)(e) of the Act.226

There were opposing views within the Yindjibarndi community and within YAC’s membership as to whether the Yindjibarndi people should enter into a land access agreement with a mining company.227 YAC was the agent for the Applicant in the Yindjibarndi’s native title claim and an agreement with the mining company could not occur without YAC’s approval.228 YAC was unwilling to continue pursuing the negotiations, however a number of the members of YAC were in favour of continued negotiations which caused the establishment of the Wirlu-murra Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation (WMYAC).229

The plaintiffs claimed that YAC engaged in oppressive conduct, which included:

  1. The denial of membership rights

  2. The improper dealing with membership applications

  3. The failure to conduct or manage meetings properly

Held

In determining whether conduct is oppressive ‘the Court must decide whether, in balancing the interests of the company as a whole against minority interests, the directors of the company have acted so as to unfairly prejudice the interests of the minority.’230 Conduct that is not in the interests of the members as a whole, pursuant to s 166-1(1)(d) of the CATSI Act, may also constitute oppressive conduct, pursuant to s 166-1(1)(e) of the CATSI Act.231

Control of membership applications

On one occasion, the directors of YAC cancelled 26 memberships which was not in line with the procedural requirement of making a special resolution, and there was no opportunity given to the members to advance a case against the cancellation. This was considered a denial of procedural fairness and therefore, oppressive conduct.232

On another occasion, directors of YAC rejected 52 membership applications, and considered them as a bundle and not on their individual merits.233 The decision was made to ensure that members of WMYAC who supported entry into the land use agreement with the mining company were denied the chance to vote at general meetings.234 This was considered to be an improper exercise of power,235 and therefore contrary to the interests of the members of YAC as a whole:236

‘it is not in the best interests of the members of an ATSI corporation, nor is it consistent with the objects of YAC, for the directors of the corporation to use their powers to admit members for the purpose of stifling debate, and to stifle views which differ from their own’ (at [366]).

Additionally, 46 membership applications were approved for the purpose of collecting enough votes to support the director’s views on the land access agreement.237 This also constituted oppressive conduct.238

Conduct of meetings

The exclusion of certain members from an Annual General Meeting (AGM)239 and the failure to provide notice of a proposed AGM to its members breached the fundamental right of membership of an ATSI corporation to attend, speak and vote at a general meeting, constituting oppressive conduct.240

YAC threatened to convene a meeting to propose an amendment allowing the membership of Yindjibarndi people to be denied.241 This would have affected the ability of Yindjibarndi people to participate in decisions concerning their native title rights.242 This was considered as oppressive conduct as it limited the ability of members to express their views on a particular matter:

‘..It is in the interests of the members of an ATSI corporation that all members be entitled to express their views about the proposed decisions of the corporation, and about whether, and the terms on which, that corporation should enter into agreements concerning compensation for acts which are inconsistent with established native title rights’ (at [311]).

Useful Quotes

Test for oppressive conduct:

In judging whether particular conduct is oppressive, the Court must decide whether, in balancing the interests of the company as a whole against minority interests, the directors of the company have acted so as to unfairly prejudice the interests of the minority. Whether the conduct complained of is oppressive is to be determined objectively, from the position of a hypothetical and reasonable director, and according to ordinary standards of reasonableness and fair dealings (at [109]).

Conduct which is not in the interests of the members as a whole (contrary to s 166-1(1)(d)) may also constitute conduct which is oppressive (contrary to s 166-1(1)(e)). By way of example, rejection of membership applications as a bundle, and without consideration of each individual application, and for a purpose unrelated to the objects of the corporation, may be oppressive, and not in the best interests of the members as a whole (at [116]).

Contrary to the interests of the members as a whole:

Conduct by a board of directors will be contrary to the interests of the members as a whole if no board, acting reasonably, could have engaged in that conduct. It is not necessary to show bad faith on the part of the directors. In other words, conduct may be contrary to the interests of the members as a whole even though the board of directors does not act in bad faith’ (at [102]).

Although they are separate grounds, there may be conduct which falls within both subsections (d) and (e)…(at [116]).

Concerning the right of members to have their view expressed:

…it is in the interests of the members of an ATSI corporation that all members be entitled to express their views about proposed decisions of the corporation, and about whether, and the terms on which, that corporation should enter into agreements concerning compensation for acts which are inconsistent with established native title rights. Members of an ATSI corporation, and of YAC in particular, are entitled to actively participate in the decision making of the corporation — for example, by exercising their rights to vote on resolutions moved in general meetings or outside them, to move resolutions, and to ask questions or to make comments about the management of the corporation. Each member of an ATSI corporation, and each member of YAC, has one vote in a vote at a general meeting of the corporation. In other words, each person’s vote, and each person’s viewpoint, is treated equally. If these rights are to have any substantive content, debate — even robust debate — and the ability to express different points of view, must be permitted, and decisions must then be made consistently with the views of a majority of the corporation (or of a special majority, if required) (at [311]).

Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Monaghan [2016] FCA 1143

Keywords

‘Contraventions under the CATSI Act involving Duties of Directors and Officers’ — ‘Duty of Care and Diligence, Not to Improperly Use Position to Gain Advantage or Cause Detriment and Record Keeping’ — ‘Multiple Contraventions of Civil Penalty Provisions’ — ‘Totality Principle’ — ‘Whether to Make Declarations and Orders for Disqualification, Compensation and/or Pecuniary Penalties’ — ‘Admissions by some respondents’

Summary

This matter considered breaches of statutory duties by directors and officers of an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Housing corporation under the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (‘CATSI Act’). The court-imposed disqualification of five years on the first and second respondents and six months on the third respondent. The first and second respondent were also ordered to pay pecuniary penalty of $38,500 and costs. The case exemplifies challenges faced by Indigenous directors/officers in the discharge of duties, namely no prior experience or training in managing an Aboriginal corporation, complex health problems, conflict between statutory duties and responsibilities as Elders to their community.

Facts

The respondents, Mr Fred Monaghan (‘Mr Monaghan’), Ms Teresa Monaghan (‘Ms Monaghan’), and Ms Kim Peters (‘Ms Peters’), were directors and/or officers of the Southside Housing Aboriginal Corporation (the Corporation).1 The primary objective of the Corporation is to provide affordable alternative housing for Aboriginal people in the inner south Canberra region. The Registrar alleged they breached their statutory duties under the CATSI Act, specifically ss 265-1(1), 265-10(1), and 363-1(1), by mismanaging the Corporation’s finances, failing to recover outstanding rent and not maintaining accurate financial records.

Prior to the trial, Mr Monaghan and Ms Monaghan reached an agreement with the Registrar regarding the relief sought after admitting to breaches of their duties. They acknowledged allowing tenants, including themselves, to accrue over $26,000 in rent arrears without taking adequate action to recover the amount. They also caused the Corporation to pay tenant-related expenses, such as excess water charges and property damage, which should have been the tenants’ responsibility. As a result, the Court granted the agreed relief. The focus then shifted to the Registrar’s case against Ms Peters, addressing her conduct and responsibilities within the Corporation.

Held

The Court found that Mr Monaghan and Ms Monaghan contravened multiple provisions of the CATSI Act. They breached section 265-1(1) by failing to exercise the necessary care and diligence, section 265-10(1) by misusing their positions for personal gain and causing detriment to the Corporation, and section 363-1(1) by neglecting to ensure the Corporation maintained proper financial records. Mr Monaghan and Ms Monaghan also failed to ensure proper property maintenance, neglected to recover rent arrears, and did not implement required systems for financial record-keeping, AGM management, and compliance with the CATSI Act. Additionally, they did not disclose personal interests in matters discussed at directors’ meetings, breaching the Corporation’s Rule Book.

In relation to Ms Peters, the Court found a breach of section 363-1(1) concerning the Corporation’s record-keeping and reporting obligations.9 Ms Peters was disqualified from managing any Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporation for six months and ordered to repay any outstanding rent owed.10 The Court noted that the Registrar’s case against her was limited. The proposed orders against the Monaghans were approved, and the Court issued a declaration and disqualification order for Ms Peters, alongside the repayment order. The parties were directed to seek agreement on costs or submit outlines if no agreement could be reached.

Useful Quotes

Principles in relation to Multiple Contraventions:

[254] The Registrar submitted that these proceedings relate to many separate acts, which contravene a number of provisions of the CATSI Act, which extend over the Relevant Period. Accordingly, the proper assessment of appropriate penalties requires consideration of the following three well-recognised principles regarding the treatment of multiple contraventions:

  1. If multiple provisions are simultaneously breached by the same wrongful act (as here) it is appropriate to impose a penalty for only the most serious of the multiple offences.

  2. While separate contraventions arising from separate acts should ordinarily attract separate penalties, where separate acts giving rise to separate contraventions are inextricably interrelated, it may be appropriate to treat the contraventions as part of a single multi-faceted “course of conduct”.

  3. A “final check” of the cumulative effect of the proposed penalties must be conducted to ensure the total is not unjust or disproportionate to the circumstances of the case. If it is unjust or out of proportion, the penalty is to be moderated in accordance with the totality principle. Consideration of totality will not necessarily result in a reduction. However, in cases where the Court considers that the total penalties to be imposed are inappropriate the Court should alter the final penalties to ensure that they are “just and appropriate”. As to the mechanism by which such adjustment is made, it is now recognised in the civil penalty context that the proper approach when applying the totality principle is to start by ascertaining the penalty that would be appropriate for each individual contravention and then reduce those amounts for reasons of totality, rather than point to a single global total penalty (or to identify a global total and then divide it among the individual contraventions in order to derive separate penalties).

On conflict between role as Elder in Community and as Director of Aboriginal Corporation:

Mr Monaghan deposed that the Corporation did consider evicting tenants and that this was raised with tenants. He said that his personal consideration of the issue was made not only in the context of his role as a director of the Corporation, but also in the context of the issue of housing for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and his role as an Aboriginal elder in the ACT community. He said that many of the tenants were unemployed and were looking after families with children and that evicting them would have caused them to be homeless. He explained how, as a youth worker, he had witnessed and worked with Aboriginal children who had been removed from their parents because of homelessness. He said that the decision to evict tenants was ‘confronting and difficult with serious consequences and I wasn’t prepared to take the action of eviction’.

Ms Monaghan gave similar evidence to that of Mr Monaghan regarding the steps taken by the Corporation to deal with the outstanding rent issues. She also gave similar evidence to him regarding the sensitivity of the issues confronting her as an Aboriginal elder in evicting Aboriginal tenants. She deposed that she had worked with women living in refuges who had faced the real possibility of losing their children if they became homeless and that she had seen women in her community lose their children because of homelessness and cramped living conditions.

On relationship to the Registrar:

Ms Peters confirmed that she never approached the Registrar about her obtaining training or assistance in the discharge of her duties as a director. When asked why she had not done so she said that this was because of ‘fear’. Ms Peters said that she saw “ORIC in the same light as what I see care and protection; you don’t contact them. You know, from my perspective”. She explained that she had this view because of ‘fear’ and that it was ‘all fear-based’. I understood this to be a reference to the anxiety or apprehension which many Indigenous people experience in dealing with government agencies, a matter as to which judicial notice can be taken.

On the need for training of CATSI Act Directors and other officials:

Finally, these proceedings vividly highlight the need for there to be appropriate training for people who are directors or officers of a CATSI Act corporation. It is plain on the evidence that none of the respondents had the appropriate knowledge, experience or understanding of their roles and responsibilities as directors of the Corporation. I respectfully suggest that consideration should be given to reviewing the relevant legislative regime to ensure that the Registrar has adequate powers and functions to provide appropriate training to persons such as the respondents and that adequate resources are available for this purpose. It may well be that it is considered that such training should be a condition of a person becoming a director or officer of such a corporation but that is a matter which is beyond the scope of these proceedings.

Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Kerkhoffs [2013] FCA 1445

Keywords

‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporation’ — ‘Alleged Contravention of the CATSI Act’ — ‘Conflict between Corporate Governance Standards and Cultural Obligations’ — ‘Disqualification and Pecuniary Penalties.’

Facts

The respondent and member of the Kalkadoon People, Mrs Kerkhoffs, was the chairperson of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Corporation for Welfare Services (‘the Corporation’) and was an officer of the Corporation within the meaning of s 683-1(3)(b) of the CATSI Act. The Corporation is a not-for-profit charitable entity which provides affordable rental accommodation to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in Mt Isa, many of whom face difficulty securing housing in Mt Isa due to the tight rental market caused by extensive mining activities in the surrounding region.

On 15 October 2012, the Corporation was placed under special administration by a delegate of the Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations (‘the Registrar’) pursuant to s 487-1 of the CATSI Act. The Corporation was insolvent at this time. Its cash assets amounted to $444.13 whereas it owed its creditors $650,643.57 (excluding GST), and it was not collecting sufficient rent to cover its outgoings. The special administrator was required to sell four of the Corporation’s properties to pay all of the debts of the Corporation, and the number of rental properties owned by the Corporation was reduced from 33 to 29. Nearly all of the properties had been purchased with public funds, sourced from the Commonwealth Government.

The Respondent was a director of the Corporation during 1997 and remained a director of the Corporation until the Corporation was placed into special administration on 15 October 2012 (Relevant Period). In April 2009, the Respondent was elected as the chairperson of the Corporation and remained in that role until the Corporation was placed under special administration on 15 October 2012. Throughout the Relevant Period, the Respondent made, or participated in making, decisions that affected the whole, or a substantial part, of the business of the Corporation. By reason of this, she was an ‘officer’ of the Corporation within the meaning of s 683-1(3)(b) of the CATSI Act.

The majority of the board of directors of the Corporation were relatives of the respondent, and it is acknowledged that she felt considerable family pressure, particularly from her mother and elder in relation to matters concerning the corporation’s governance.

The contraventions in respect of which the Registrar sought pecuniary penalties and disqualification are summarised as:

  1. Breaches arising from the forgiveness of rent arrears in the amount of $23,194 owed by Mrs Kerkhoffs to the corporation in respect of rent due for the occupancy of one of the corporation’s houses.

  2. The unauthorised receipt of financial benefits by way of ‘wages’ for reimbursements from the corporation. The total of these unauthorised wages or reimbursements, when added to the arrears of rental, yields a total of $31,414.17.

  3. With her husband, entering into a contract with the corporation for the sale of the property in which they resided and which had hitherto been rented from the corporation to them, in the amount of $248,000. The worth of that property at the time was $290,000. At the time when the contract was entered into, and when the wages and reimbursements were paid, the corporation was insolvent.

Held

The court ordered that the respondent be disqualified from managing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander corporations for a period of 5 years, and that she pays a pecuniary penalty of $50,000. She was also required to pay the Corporation $31,414.17, which was the total amount of the financial benefits she received, as well as the applicant’s costs of the proceeding.

Logan J held that the severity of the breaches and the need for general deterrence necessitated the imposition of significant penalties. Notwithstanding acknowledgement of the ‘very real’ tension that exists between conventional expectations of corporate governance and the behaviour of directors, and the obligations which individuals holds to their kin and to their Nation, Logan J held that the respondent’s contraventions had in fact caused ‘a detriment to Kalkadoon people and other Aboriginal Australians within the Mount Isa area’. The court thereby upheld the primacy of the corporate governance standards under the CATSI Act, which he affirmed are akin to those which exist under the Corporations Act, and which corporations registered under the CATSI Act must comply with.

Useful quotes

On Conflict between Corporate Governance Standards and Cultural Obligations

Logan J at [10]:

A concomitant, though, of that self-administration is that those who hold office in such corporations must nonetheless observe standards of corporate governance which are akin to those who hold office as a director of a corporation established under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). In imposing that particular obligation, necessary as it is, particularly where public funds are deployed, the CATSI Act is pregnant with the potential of a clash between conventional expectations of appropriate corporate governance and directors’ behaviours and the very real, heartfelt obligations of clan and tribe to a fellow member of a clan or tribe in the Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community.

At [11]:

that the behaviours that have become the subject of these proceedings carry with them, in terms of outcome, very real lessons in terms of the difficulties presented by reconciling legitimate expectations as to good corporate governance with equally worthy expectations as to the ability of Australian Aboriginals and Torres Strait Islanders, not to be the subject of paternal supervision, but instead to have a determinative say in matters touching upon their aspirations and lifestyle.

At [30]:

…. I am quite sure that she feels that deeply and that she tried to the best of her ability to balance what she saw as obligations to a mother much respected and an elder with obligations in relation to corporate governance. It is just that the former has triumphed over the latter. Where those particular clan and within clan family obligations are not present, the performance of Kerkhoff’s Transport demonstrates that she is not without ability to act as a director.

On Disqualification and Pecuniary Penalties

At [31]:

….Where particular clan obligations and intimate family obligations have intruded, Mrs Kerkhoffs has succumbed to those obligations, as opposed to observing what one might term wider obligations through the corporation to the Aboriginal community more generally. These are very, very difficult circumstances, and by no means unique to Mrs Kerkhoffs. They disclose in respect of all Aboriginal corporations, a potential risk that balancing between clan obligations and obligations of prudent financial management is a singular challenge to the worthy social experiment represented by incorporation under the CATSI Act and the various roles which such corporations fulfil. Those particular considerations, as I have mentioned, intrude in relation to deterrence, both with respect to pecuniary penalty as well as on the subject of whether there should be disqualification.’

Different considerations when assessing disqualification

  • the character of the offenders;

  • the nature of the breaches;

  • the structure of the companies and the nature of their business;

  • the interest of shareholders, creditors, and employees;

  • the risk to others from the continuation of offenders as company directors;

  • the honesty and competence of offenders;

  • the hardship to offenders and their personal and commercial interests; and

  • the offenders’ appreciation that future breaches could result in future proceedings.4 [33]

At [44]:

This is one of those cases where it is necessary, unequivocally, to send a wider message. It is for that reason that I have determined the penalty in the amount of $50,000 and disqualification for a period of five years. In so doing, I am very conscious that there will be a particular hardship indeed for Mrs Kerkhoffs, and necessarily more widely for her family with that.

….

Further, there may well be, in the circumstances of this case, humane considerations which may lead to the making of recommendations to the responsible Minister at some stage for the writing off of some or all of particular amounts that are owed. These are not value judgments for me to make. I mention them solely because it is not my intention in making reference to a need for general deterrence to foreclose in any way the prospect of what one might term executive clemency.

12.11 Further Reading

12.11.1 Bench Books

Bugmy Bar Book Project Committee, Bugmy Bar Book (2020)

This is a free, evidence-based resource for lawyers and legal decision-makers, as well as policymakers and other professionals. It is separated into chapters that are accessible summaries of key research about the impacts of experiences of trauma, socio-economic inequality, structural disadvantage and strengths-based rehabilitation. Chapters may provide an evidence base to support legal advocacy and decision-making and are intended to promote improved understanding of the experiences of people who are brought into contact with the legal system.

12.11.2 Books

Christos Mantziaris and David Martin, Native Title Corporations: A Legal and Anthropological Analysis (Federation Press, 2000) 275.

This book provides a legal and anthropological analysis of the legal framework for native title management by corporations. The authors rational for the analysis stems from ‘lack of legislative foresight and subsequent executive neglect’ which have ‘resulted in a mandatory system of title management by corporations which lacks unity and a firm basis in public policy’ (p.xvii). The authors believe that this lack of unity in the framework may cause institutions developed within this framework to fail, especially when subjected to a variety social, political, cultural and economic pressures (p.258). While the books analysis centres around the ACA Act which has since been replaced by the CATSI Act, issues raised in relation to native title management by corporations remain in varying degrees, salient.

Stephanie Garling, Diane Smith, Will Sanders and Janet Hunt (eds), Contested Governance: Culture, Power and Institutions in Indigenous Australia (ANU E Press, 2008)

Contested Governance: Cultural, Power and Institutions in Indigenous Australia is a collection of papers that examine the challenges experienced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples for the development and recognition of systems of governance that are recognised as both legitimate and effective by the Australian state. The authors highlight the nature of the contestation and negotiation between Australian governments, their agents, and Indigenous groups over the appropriateness of different governance processes, values and practices, and over the application of related policy, institutional and funding frameworks within Indigenous affairs. The research demonstrates that Indigenous and non-Indigenous governance systems are intercultural when it comes to issues of power, authority, institutions and relationships.

12.11.3 Journal Articles

Nehme, Marina. “Indigenous Corporations and the Best Interests of the Corporation: Members or Beyond?” Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, vol. 55, no. 3, September 2024, pp. 537–61.

Associate Professor Nehme considers the extent to which the best interests obligation imposed on directors goes beyond the interest of members to consider the interest of stakeholders. Of note, is the articles review of s 265-5 of the CATSI Act and its sister provisions of s 265-5 of the corporations Act, to understand how the provision operates and the implications of this interpretation on the management of Indigenous corporations.

Marina Nehme. “Indigenous corporations and accountability — the evolution of the directors’ duties”. Australian Journal of Corporate Law, 36(3), (2021) pp 240–266.

Associate Professor Nehme explores the introduction and evolution of directors’ duties imposed on directors of Indigenous corporations. This includes a discussion on the tensions between western standards of accountability being imposed on Indigenous corporate directors and the need to ensure that duties are culturally appropriate. Further, the article discusses the importance of capacity building being a key function of the Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations as a support structure over a reliance on punitive processes.

Watson, Nicole. “The Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Bill 2005 (Cth): Coming Soon to a Community Organisation Near You” [2006] IndigLawB 32; (2006) 6(19) Indigenous Law Bulletin 13.

Professor Nicole Watson, a Birri Gubba and Munanjali legal scholar, discusses the history of the ACA Act and issues identified through various reviews and provides an analysis of key provisions contained in the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Bill 2005 (Cth).

12.11.4 Reports

Corrs Chambers Westgarth, A Modern Statute for Indigenous Corporations: Reforming the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act (Final Report of the Review of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976, 2002) 2.

The Final Report of the ACA Act review outlines recommendations from the 2002 Independent Review of the ACA Act that looked at how the ACA Act could be made more consistent with the Corporations Act. The findings of the review led to the introduction of the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006.

National Indigenous Australians Agency, CATSI Act Review (Final Report, October 2020) 44.

In December 2019, a comprehensive review into the CATSI Act was announced. The National Indigenous Australians Agency (NIAA) led the review. This comprehensive review built on the findings of the Technical Review of the CATSI Act in 2017. Its scope was expanded to assess the effectiveness of the CATSI Act as a special measure under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975. This review also looked at whether the CATSI Act can better support economic and community development opportunities for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and considered the parts of the CATSI Act that are working, and areas that could be improved.

The CATSI Act Review Final Report informed the CATSI Amendment Bill Exposure Draft. The CATSI Act Amendment Bill was introduced in the House of Representatives on 25 August 2021. The Bill passed the House on 2 September. The Senate referred the bill to the Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee for inquiry and report. The Committee’s report on Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Amendment Bill 2021 [Provisions] was published in October 2021.The bill lapsed when Parliament was prorogued on 11 April 2022.



1Janet Hunt, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Self-Determination, Mainstreaming and Indigenous Community Governance’ in Janet Hunt, Diane Smith, Stephanie Garling and Will Sanders (eds), Contested Governance: Culture, Power and Institutions in Indigenous Australia (ANU E Press, 2008) 27.

2Diane Smith and Janet Hunt, ‘Understanding Indigenous Australian Governance: Research, Theory and Representations’ in Stephanie Garling, Diane Smith, Will Sanders and Janet Hunt (eds), Contested Governance: Culture, Power and Institutions in Indigenous Australia (ANU E Press, 2008) 1, 3, 9.

3Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) Preamble; Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Bill 2006 (Cth) ii [1.7].

4Diane Smith and Janet Hunt, ‘Understanding Indigenous Australian Governance: Research, Theory and Representations’ in Stephanie Garling, Diane Smith, Will Sanders and Janet Hunt (eds), Culture, Power and Institutions in Indigenous Australia (ANU E Press, 2008) 3, 9.

5Australian Indigenous Governance Institute, ‘Indigenous Governance’, Indigenous Governance Toolkit (Web Page, October 2023) <https://aigi.org.au/toolkit/indigenous-governance>.

6Australian Indigenous Governance Institute, ‘Indigenous Governance’, Indigenous Governance Toolkit (Web Page, October 2023) <https://aigi.org.au/toolkit/indigenous-governance>.

7Australian Indigenous Governance Institute, ‘Indigenous Governance’, Indigenous Governance Toolkit (Web Page, October 2023) <https://aigi.org.au/toolkit/indigenous-governance>.

8Australian Indigenous Governance Institute, ‘Indigenous Governance’, Indigenous Governance Toolkit (Web Page, October 2023) <https://aigi.org.au/toolkit/indigenous-governance>.

9Marina Nehme and John Juriansz, ‘The Evolution of Indigenous Corporations: Where to Now?’ (2012) 33(1) Adelaide Law Review 10, 13.

10Diane Smith, ‘Cultures of Governance and the Governance of Culture: Transforming and Containing Indigenous Institutions in West Arnhem Land’ in Culture, Power and Institutions in Indigenous Australia (ANU E Press, 2008) 75, 88.

11Marina Nehme and John Juriansz, ‘The Evolution of Indigenous Corporations: Where To Now?’ (2012) 33(1) Adelaide Law Review 10, 106.

12Marina Nehme and John Juriansz, ‘The Evolution of Indigenous Corporations: Where To Now?’ (2012) 33(1) Adelaide Law Review 10, 106, citing Aboriginal Land Rights Commission, Second Report: April 1974 (Report, 1974) 65 [330].

13Corrs Chambers Westgarth, A Modern Statute for Indigenous Corporations: Reforming the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act (Final Report of the Review of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976, 2002) 2 [6].

14Auditor-General, Supporting Good Governance in Indigenous Corporations (ANAO Report No 3 2017–18, July 2017) 13.

15Diane Smith and Janet Hunt, ‘Understanding Indigenous Australian Governance: Research, Theory and Representations’ in Stephanie Garling, Diane Smith, Will Sanders and Janet Hunt (eds), Contested Governance: Culture, Power and Institutions in Indigenous Australia (ANU E Press, 2008) 1, 3.

16Diane Smith and Janet Hunt, ‘Understanding Indigenous Australian Governance: Research, Theory and Representations’ in Stephanie Garling, Diane Smith, Will Sanders and Janet Hunt (eds), Contested Governance: Culture, Power and Institutions in Indigenous Australia (ANU E Press, 2008) 1, 3.

17Larissa Behrendt (Eualayai/Gamillaroi), ‘The New Paternalism’ in Larissa Behrendt, Chris Cunneen and Terri Libesman, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Relations (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2019) Chapter 12.

18Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) pt 2 div 6; Native Title (Prescribed Bodies Corporate) Regulations 1999 (Cth).

19Aboriginal Heritage Act 2006 (Vic) s 150(2).

20Central Land Council, Submission No 49 to Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, [Review of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976(1996)] cited in Nehme, Marina. “Indigenous Corporations and the Best Interests of the Corporation: Members or Beyond?” Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, vol. 55, no. 3, September 2024, pp. 537–61, 549.

21See, eg, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (2 October 2007, adopted 13 September 2007) arts 3, 4, 5, 18.

22United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (2 October 2007, adopted 13 September 2007) art 18.

23United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (2 October 2007, adopted 13 September 2007) art 3.

24House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs (HRSCAA) 1990. Our Future Our Selves: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Community Control, Management and Resources, Commonwealth of Australia, AGPS, Canberra, 25, [2.40].

25ESJ Law, Submission No 17 to National Indigenous Australians Agency 2020 Review of the CATSI Act, Review of the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (21 September 2020) 3 [12].

26Nicole Watson (Birri Gubba and Munanjali), ‘The Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Bill 2005 Cth: Coming Soon to a Community Organisation Near You’ (2006) 6(19) Indigenous Law Bulletin 13, 16.

27Corrs Chambers Westgarth, A Modern Statute for Indigenous Corporations: Reforming the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act (Final Report of the Review of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976, 2002) 4 [9].

28Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations, Regulatory Posture of the Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations (February 2026) 2.

29Christos Mantziaris and David Martin, Native Title Corporations: A Legal and Anthropological Analysis (Federation Press, 2000) 275.

30Australian Human Rights Commission, Native Title Report 2007 (Report No 2/2008, February 2008) 117.

31Australian Human Rights Commission, Native Title Report 2007 (Report No 2/2008, February 2008) 117.

32National Indigenous Australians Agency, Annual Report 2024–25 (Report December 2025) 199.

33David Ross, ‘Taking Power, Taking Responsibility: Achieving Strong Aboriginal Governance and Self Determination’ (Presentation, Strong Aboriginal Governance Summit, 2013), quoted in Australian Indigenous Governance Institute, ‘Indigenous Governance’, Indigenous Governance Toolkit (Web Page, October 2023) <https://aigi.org.au/toolkit/defining-governance>.

34Australian Indigenous Governance Institute, ‘Centre Your Culture’, Indigenous Governance Toolkit (Web Page, October 2023) <https://aigi.org.au/toolkit/centre-your-culture>.

35Australian Indigenous Governance Institute, ‘ALPA’s Two-Way Governance Approach’, Indigenous Governance Toolkit (Web Page, October 2023) <https://aigi.org.au/resource/example-alpas-two-way-governance-approach>.

36Australian Indigenous Governance Institute, ‘ALPA’s Two-Way Governance Approach’, Indigenous Governance Toolkit (Web Page, October 2023) <https://aigi.org.au/resource/example-alpas-two-way-governance-approach>.

37Australian Indigenous Governance Institute, ‘QYAC’s Traditional Decision-Making Processes’, Indigenous Governance Toolkit (Web Page, October 2023) <https://aigi.org.au/resource/example-qyacs-traditional-decision-making-processes>.

38Australian Indigenous Governance Institute, ‘Kanyirninpa Jukurrpa (KJ)’, Indigenous Governance Toolkit (Web Page, October 2023) <https://aigi.org.au/governance-stories/kanyirninpa-jukurrpa-kj>.

39Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Bill 2006 (Cth) ii [1.2].

40International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969) art 1(4). For a definition of special measure, see Maloney v The Queen [2013] HCA 28; Gerhardy v Brown [1985] HCA 11.

41Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 1-25.

42Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) Part 3-2.

43Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 29-5.

44Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 66-1.

45Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 60-1.

46Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 141-20.

47Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 85-1.

48Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 246-5.

49Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) Preamble.

50International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969) art 1(4). For a definition of special measure see Maloney v The Queen [2013] HCA 28; Gerhardy v Brown [1985] HCA 11.

51Lisa Strelein, Ophelia Rubinich, Casey Millward and AITSIS, Submission to National Indigenous Australians Agency, Review of the CATSI Act: Phase Two (October 2020) 4.

52IW v City of Perth (1997) 191 CLR 1, 12 (Brennan CJ and McHugh J), 39 (Gummow J). See also AB v Western Australia (2011) 244 CLR 390, [24].

53Graham v Newchurch [2023] FCA 1411, [9] (Colvin J) (making orders ‘properly protecting’ the PBC’s funds pending an annual general meeting to address the issues in dispute).

54Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Bill 2006 (Cth) ii [1.2].

55Corrs Chambers Westgarth, A Modern Statute for Indigenous Corporations: Reforming the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act (Final Report of the Review of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976, 2002) 4 [10].

56Corrs Chambers Westgarth, A Modern Statute for Indigenous Corporations: Reforming the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act (Final Report of the Review of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976, 2002) 4 [8].

57Dunghutti Elders Council (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations (No 4) [2012] FCAFC 50.

58Dunghutti Elders Council (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations [2011] FCA 370.

59Dunghutti Elders Council (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations [2011] FCAFC 88; Dunghutti Elders Council (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations [2011] FCAFC 110; Dunghutti Elders Council (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations [2011] FCA 1019.

60Dunghutti Elders Council (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations (No 4) [2012] FCAFC 50, [100].

61Dunghutti Elders Council (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations (No 4) [2012] FCAFC 50, [98].

62Dunghutti Elders Council (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations (No 4) [2012] FCAFC 50, [98].

63Dunghutti Elders Council (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations (No 4) [2012] FCAFC 50, [98].

64Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Monaghan (No 2) [2016] FCA 1143.

65In Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Monaghan (No 2) [2016] FCA 1143, the respondents breached s 265-1(1) of the CATSI Act by failing to exercise the necessary care and diligence, s 265-10(1) by misusing their positions for personal gain and causing detriment to the Corporation, and s 363-1(1) by neglecting to ensure the Corporation maintained proper financial records. The respondents also failed to ensure proper property maintenance, neglected to recover rent arrears, and did not implement required systems for financial record-keeping, AGM management, and compliance with the Act. Additionally, the respondents did not disclose personal interests in matters discussed at directors’ meetings, breaching the corporation’s rule nook.

66Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Monaghan (No 2) [2016] FCA 1143.

67Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Monaghan (No 2) [2016] FCA 1143, [184].

68Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Monaghan (No 2) [2016] FCA 1143, [188].

69Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Monaghan (No 2) [2016] FCA 1143, [316].

70Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Monaghan (No 2) [2016] FCA 1143, [224] (Griffith J).

71Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Monaghan (No 2) [2016] FCA 1143, [224].

72Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Monaghan (No 2) [2016] FCA 1143, [403].

73Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Kerkhoffs [2013] FCA 1445.

74In Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Kerkhoffs [2013] FCA 1445, the Registrar sought pecuniary penalties and a disqualification order for (a) breaches arising from the forgiveness of rent arrears in respect of rent due for the occupancy of one of the corporation’s houses, (b) the unauthorised receipt of financial benefits by way of ‘wages’ for reimbursements from the corporation and (c) the respondent, and her husband, entering in a contract for the sale of a property which had hitherto been rented from the corporation to them, in the amount of $248,000 when the worth of the property at that time was $290,000. At the time the contract was entered into and at the time the reimbursements were paid, the corporation was insolvent.

75Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Kerkhoffs [2013] FCA 1445, [41].

76Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Kerkhoffs [2013] FCA 1445, [16].

77Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Kerkhoffs [2013] FCA 1445, [14].

78Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Kerkhoffs [2013] FCA 1445, [17].

79Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Kerkhoffs [2013] FCA 1445, [16].

80Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Kerkhoffs [2013] FCA 1445, [37].

81Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Kerkhoffs [2013] FCA 1445, [30].

82Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Kerkhoffs [2013] FCA 1445, [36].

83Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Kerkhoffs [2013] FCA 1445, [44].

84Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Kerkhoffs [2013] FCA 1445, [46].

85Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 658-5(a).

86Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 658-5(b)(i).

87Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 658-5(b)(ii).

88Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 658-5(c).

89Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 658-5(d).

90Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 658-5(e).

91Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 658-1)(d).

92Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) div 439.

93Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 249G.

94National Indigenous Australians Agency, CATSI Act Review (Final Report, October 2020) 44 [3.7].

95DLA Piper, Technical Review of the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Report, 2017); National Indigenous Australians Agency, CATSI Act Review (Final Report, October 2020).

96Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 453-1. Section 453-1 is based on the examination power contained in s 60 of the former Aboriginal Councils Associations Act 1976 (Cth). The power was explained by the Federal Court in National Aboriginal and Islanders Legal Services Secretariat Aboriginal Corporation v Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations (1998) 54 ALD 55.

97Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Bill 2006 (Cth) 17 [1.8]. In National Aboriginal and Islanders Legal Services Secretariat Aboriginal Corporation v Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations (1998) 54 ALD 55, the Federal Court stated: ‘There is nothing in s 60 which preconditions the exercise of the power by the Registrar under the section. Nor is there anything limiting or fettering the exercise of the discretion. Accordingly, there are no circumstances in which the Registrar is bound to take into account, nor precluded from taking into account, before exercising the power. The exercise of discretion is only confined by any limitation implied by the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act’: at 67.

98Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 617-1.

99See, eg, Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) ss 453-1(5) (failure to produce), 456-10(11) (intentional or reckless failure to explain matters about the compilation of books), 461-1(1) (obstructing or hindering an authorised office), 461-5 (providing false or misleading information).

100Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations, Policy Statement No 25: Examinations (26 October 2016) [4.1].

101Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations, Policy Statement No 20: Special Administrations (21 February 2017) [2.5].

102Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations, Policy Statement No 20: Special Administrations (21 February 2017) [2.1].

103Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations, Policy Statement No 20: Special Administrations (21 February 2017) [2.1].

104Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations, Policy Statement No 20: Special Administrations (21 February 2017) [8.3].

105The CATSI Act provides that the grounds for placing a corporation under special administration set out in ss 487-5(1)(d) and (e) do not apply to the conduct of registered native title bodies corporate and their officers acting in good faith and with the belief that their actions (or inactions) are necessary to meet a native title legislative obligation of the corporation.

106Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 487-5(1)(ca) (inserted by Native Title Legislation Amendment Act 2021 (Cth) sch 8, item 25, assented to 16 February 2021). ‘Native Title legislation obligations’ are broadly defined as the obligations to consult with the common law holders of native title; act in accordance with the directions of the common law holders of native title; act only with the consent of the common law holders of native title; or take any other action in relation to the common law holders of the native title: at s 700-1 (definition of ‘Native Title legislation obligations’).

107Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations, Policy Statement No 20: Special Administrations (21 February 2017) [21.1].

108Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations, Policy Statement No 25: Examinations (26 October 2016) [26.1].

109Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations, Policy Statement No 20: Special Administrations (21 February 2017) [2.6].

110‘The length of time a corporation has in which to show cause to the Registrar will depend on the circumstances of a particular corporation, but it is the usual practice of the Registrar to allow at least 14 days. A corporation may write to the Registrar to request an extension of time in which to show cause’: Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations, Policy Statement No 20: Special Administrations (21 February 2017) [2.6].

111Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 487-10(2)(a).

112Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 487-10(2)(b).

113Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) div 617; Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Bill 2006 (Cth) 11 [1.29].

114Dunghutti Elders Council (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations [2011] FCAFC 88, [35].

115Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth), s 487-5(1)(ca).

116Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corp RNTBC [No 4][2018] WASC 12, [95] per Pritchard J.

117Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corp RNTBC [No 4][2018] WASC 12, [95] per Pritchard J.

118See, eg, Onus v Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corp [2017] FCA 798, undertakings 1-3 and [23]–[26] per O’Callaghan J.

119Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) ch 6.

120Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 265-1.

121Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 265-5.

122Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 268-1. Note that this duty only applies to directors.

123Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 265-10.

124Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 265-15.

125Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 531-1. Note that this duty only applies to directors.

126Shaw v Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] FCA 1397, [367].

127Shaw v Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] FCA 1397, [302]–[304].

128Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler [2002] NSWSC 171.

129Bede Harris, ‘Embedding Indigenous Experiences in the Teaching of Corporations Law’ (2012) 4 Ngiya: Talk the Law 16.

130This diagram is provided with the consent of Associate Professor Marina Nehme who adapted it from Marina Nehme, ‘Indigenous Corporations and Accountability: The Evolution of the Directors’ Duties’ (2021) 36(3) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 240, 251.

131This diagram is provided with the consent of Associate Professor Marina Nehme who adapted it from Marina Nehme, ‘Indigenous Corporations and Accountability: The Evolution of the Directors’ Duties’ (2021) 36(3) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 240, 251.

132Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Kerkhoffs [2013] FCA 1445, [16].

133Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations v Kerkhoffs [2013] FCA 1445, [16].

134Marina Nehme, ‘Indigenous Corporations and Accountability: The Evolution of the Directors’ Duties’ (2021) 36(3) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 240, 259.

135Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) Preamble.

136Marina Nehme, ‘Indigenous Corporations and Accountability: The Evolution of the Directors’ Duties’ (2021) 36(3) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 240, 259.

137Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Bill 2006 (Cth) 70 [1.311].

138Jason Harris and Anil Hargovan, ‘Still a Sleepy Hollow? Directors’ Liability and the Business Judgment Rule’ (2016) 31 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 319, 333.

139Marina Nehme, ‘Indigenous Corporations and Accountability: The Evolution of the Directors’ Duties’ (2021) 36(3) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 240, 266.

140Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 166-1(2); Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corp RNTBC [No 4] [2018] WASC 123 per Pritchard J.

141Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) ss 265-20 and 265-25(2).

142Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 29-5.

143Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 700-1 (definitions of ‘Aboriginal person’ and ‘Torres Strait Islander’).

144Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations, Indigeneity Provisions (Fact Sheet, May 2025).

145Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 435-5.

146Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 407-5.

147Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 453-1.

148Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 439-5.

149Office of the Registrar of Indigenous Corporations, Indigeneity Provisions (Registrar’s Position Statement, May 2025).

150United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 61/295, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (2 October 2007, adopted 13 September 2007) art 33.

151Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) Preamble.

152Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 439-20.

153Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 526-15(1)(h).

154Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 439-10(8).

155Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 284-1.

156Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 163-1(d).

157Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) ss 163-1(a), 163-1(b).

158Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) ss 163-1(a), 163-1(b).

159Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) Div 60.

160Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 166-10(d).

161Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 169-1(a)(ii).

162Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Bill 2006 (Cth) 55 [1.181].

163Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 201-35.

164Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [304].

165Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 201-155.

166Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 201-150(1).

167Adams v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC [2014] WASC 467, [126] (K Martin J).

168Gomeroi People v A-G (NSW) [2017] FCA 1464, [66] (Rangiah J), quoting Weribone obh of Mandandanji People v Queensland [2013] FCA 255, [40]–[41] (Rares J).

169Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland [2020] FCA 983.

170Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland [2020] FCA 983, [73].

171Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland [2020] FCA 983, [113].

172Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland [2020] FCA 983, [107].

173Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland [2020] FCA 983, [113].

174Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland [2020] FCA 983, [109].

175Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland [2020] FCA 983, [111].

176Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland [2020] FCA 983, [120].

177Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [303]–[305].

178Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [305] (Pritchard J).

179Australian Indigenous Governance Institute, ‘Meetings’, Indigenous Governance Toolkit (Web Page, October 2023) <https://aigi.org.au/toolkit/meetings>.

180Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland [2020] FCA 983, [197].

181Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland [2020] FCA 983, [189]–[198].

182Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland [2020] FCA 983 [2020] FCA 983.

183Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland [2020] FCA 983 [2020] FCA 983, [194]–[197].

184Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland [2020] FCA 983, [154].

185Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland [2020] FCA 983.

186Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland [2020] FCA 983, [127].

187Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland [2020] FCA 983, [132].

188Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland [2020] FCA 983, [133].

189Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland [2020] FCA 983, [154].

190Diane Smith, Yarnteen Corporation Board member, Yarnteen Board Self-Evaluation Report (2006), quoted in Australian Indigenous Governance Institute, ‘Decision Making’, Indigenous Governance Toolkit (Web Page, October 2023) <https://aigi.org.au/toolkit/decision-making>.

191Ilana Mushin and Rod Gardner, ‘Silence Is Talk: Conversational Silence in Australian Aboriginal Talk-in-Interaction’ (2009) 41 Journal of Pragmatics 2033, 2036.

192The Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Equality before the Law Bench Book (April 2025) 2133 [2.3.3.3].

193Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 220-5.

194Nona obh of Badu People (Warral and Ului) v Queensland [2020] FCA 983, [177].

195Karajarri RNTBC v Western Australia [2024] FCA 1114, [36].

196Karajarri RNTBC v Western Australia [2024] FCA 1114, [36].

197‘Significance of Funeral Attendance and Sorry Business for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, May 2023).

198Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4)[2018] WASC 124 at [1086] per Pritchard J.

199Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4)[2018] WASC 124 at [1087] per Pritchard J.

200See, eg, Blair v First Nations Aboriginal Corp RNTBC [2022] FCA 1520, [62]–[69] per Halley J.

201See, eg, Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4)[2018 WASC 124] where the Western Australian Supreme Court accepted the defendant’s submissions that the oppression in question (the invalid cancellation of 26 memberships) had ceased and been remedied (those persons were recognised as having remained members and were able to participate in subsequent AGM’s). Pritchard J held ‘Considered on its own, the finding of oppression in respect of this conduct does not warrant the grant of relief’ at [278]–[279].

202Revised Explanatory Memorandum, Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Bill 2006 (Cth) 10 [1.25].

203Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth), ss 85-1(4),(6) and 85-10.

204Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 37-10(4).

205Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) ss 69-35(5), 166-1(2), 169-5(5), 265-20, 265-25, 271-1(3), 279-1(3), 487-5(2) and 526-10.

206Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) s 546-15.

207Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth) ss 265-1(2A), 268-5.

208Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ss 55–7; Gumana v Northern Territory [2005] FCA 50, [134] (Selway J).

209Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 253; Wintawari Guruma v Western Australia [2015] FCA 1053, [7] (Rares J).

210Farrer (Ngarrawanji Group) v Western Australia [2021] FCA 1497, [34]–[35] (Mortimer J).

211There is one exception to a PBC needing to be an CATSI Act–registered corporation, which is made for the Indigenous Land and Sea Corporation, which is deemed a PBC under regulations.

212Karkdoo (Purrukwarra Estate Group)v Northern Territory [2024] FCA 176, [56] (O’Bryan J).

213Wintawari Guruma Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC v Western Australia [2015] FCA 105, [30], [34] (Rares J).

214Australian Human Rights Commission, Native Title Report 2007 (Report No 2/2008, February 2008) ch 6. The legal obligations that flow from these functions will vary according to whether a PBC/RNTBC acts as a trustee or as an agent. However, courts have noted that these differences must still be read pursuant to structures in the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).

215See, eg, Paul Memmott and Peter Blackwood, ‘Managing Mixed Indigenous Land Titles: Cape York Case Studies’ in Toni Bauman, Lisa M Strelein and Jessica K Weir (eds), Living with Native Title: The Experiences of Registered Native Title Corporations (AIATSIS Research Publications, 2013) 217, 218 (‘Native title is one of several categories of Aboriginal-owned land on Cape York, each of which is associated with a particular corporate land holding entity’).

216Raelene Webb, ‘The Next Wicked Problem in Native Title: Managing Rights to Realise Their Potential’ (2016) 18 Southern Cross University Law Review 101.

217Toni Bauman, Lisa M Strelein and Jessica K Weir, ‘Navigating Complexity: Living with Native Title’ in Toni Bauman, Lisa M Strelein and Jessica K Weir (eds), Living with Native Title: The Experiences of Registered Native Title Corporations (AIATSIS Research Publications, 2013) 1, 7.

218Australian Human Rights Commission, Native Title Report 2007 (Report No 2/2008, February 2008) 117.

219Christos Mantziaris and David Martin, Native Title Corporations: A Legal and Anthropological Analysis (Federation Press, 2000) 29–30.

220National Native Title Council (NNTC) 2023. PBC Futures: Roadmap to Reform. Unpublished report: Canberra. Page 7.

221Karajarri RNTBC v Western Australia [2024] FCA 1114.

222Karajarri RNTBC v Western Australia [2024] FCA 1114, [3].

223Karajarri RNTBC v Western Australia [2024] FCA 1114, [24] and [29].

224Karajarri RNTBC v Western Australia [2024] FCA 1114, Relevant paragraphs of the reasons include: [34]–[38] (difficulties faced by PBC), [48] (PBC required support of the native title representative body, and that organisation had budgeting and operational constraints), and [124] (explaining the orders allowing early preservation evidence before the proceeding had even been commenced with that not expected until 2026).

225Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [1] (Pritchard J).

226Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [3] (Pritchard J).

227Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [154] (Pritchard J).

228Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [171] (Pritchard J).

229Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [140] (Pritchard J).

230Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [109] (Pritchard J).

231Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [116] (Pritchard J).

232Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [275] (Pritchard J).

233Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [352] (Pritchard J).

234Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [354] (Pritchard J).

235Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [367] (Pritchard J).

236Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [352] (Pritchard J).

237Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [486] (Pritchard J).

238Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [486] (Pritchard J).

239Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [254] (Pritchard J).

240Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [305] (Pritchard J).

241Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [309] (Pritchard J).

242Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC (No 4) [2018] WASC 124, [309] (Pritchard J).