9 Criminal Law
9.1 Introduction
This chapter1 focuses on a number of criminal justice issues affecting First Nations people that arise in the context of both policing and court practices and processes across Australia. It aims to support judicial decision-making by informing a deeper understanding of the issues affecting First Nations people at various stages of the criminal justice process. It also aims to consider culturally safe and appropriate responses to those issues, including by drawing upon the strengths of First Nations people, families and communities. This chapter begins with an overview of some guiding themes that are critical to improving cultural safety and access to justice for First Nations people.
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander individuals, families and communities are diverse, and the most effective judicial approach will be one that is tailored to an individual’s specific needs, experiences and circumstances. Nonetheless, understanding the broader themes which are relevant throughout the criminal justice process will empower courts to better identify and respond to the issues and experiences of First Nations people who come before them.
The five guiding themes outlined at 9.1.1 Equality before the Law–9.1.5 Diversion and Solution-Focused Justice below have been discussed in detail in 1 Introduction. Below we consider their importance in relation to the equitable application of criminal law.
9.1.1 Equality before the Law
Equality before the law may be distinguished as either formal or substantive.2 Formal equality ‘suggests that all people should be treated the same regardless of their differences’.3 Substantive equality is ‘premised on the basis that rights, entitlements, opportunities and access are not equally distributed throughout society and that a one size fits all approach will not achieve equality’.4 Substantive equality for First Nations people is important and includes, for example
the consideration upon sentencing of the unique and systemic factors affecting Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander offenders. It also includes not only consistency in the provision of sentence options and diversion and support programs across the country, but also ensuring that these are culturally appropriate.5
Judicial officers and lawyers should be mindful of individual and systemic factors that could impact the achievement of substantive equality for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people before a criminal court. An example of this applied in criminal law is the use of Indigenous Experience Reports (see 9.6.2 Improving Evidence: Indigenous Experience Reports).
9.1.2 Cultural Safety
The need for cultural safety applies equally to First Nations defendants, complainants and witnesses. The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) identifies a lack of cultural safety as a barrier to the disclosure of criminal offences by First Nations victims and the continuation of court proceedings:
[Witness Assistance Service] officers have also noted that concerns about culturally unsafe court proceedings are particularly pressing where a First Nations complainant’s family, or other First Nations community members, have been called as witnesses. As identified in the Significance of Culture Report, this is because wellbeing may be collective for First Nations people. Accordingly, First Nations complainants may be unwilling to continue court proceedings where they know that this may involve the re-traumatisation of family or community members.6
Cultural safety considerations are addressed in detail by Ngarabal woman and registered psychologist Vanessa Edwige and Wiradjuri man Dr Paul Gray in their report, Significance of Culture to Rehabilitation and Wellbeing.7
Edwige and Gray refer to Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency guidance which provides that, to ensure culturally safe and respectful practice, health practitioners must:
Acknowledge colonisation and systemic racism, social, cultural, behavioural and economic factors which impact individual and community health;
Acknowledge and address individual racism, their own biases, assumptions, stereotypes and prejudices and provide care that is holistic, free of bias and racism;
Recognise the importance of self-determined decision making, partnership and collaboration in health care which is driven by the individual, family and community;
Foster a safe working environment through leadership to support the rights and dignity of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and colleagues.8
These guidelines are equally applicable to the provision of legal services by legal professionals and judicial officers.
9.1.3 Being Trauma Informed
Judicial officers, legal practitioners and other people supporting accused persons, complainants and witnesses must understand intergenerational trauma. Tujague and Ryan state that it is ‘just not possible to be culturally safe if you don’t have a trauma lens’.9 The prevalence of trauma experiences by those within the criminal justice system means that being trauma informed, including reducing re-traumatisation, is a matter of integrity and procedural fairness.10
Knowing the impacts of trauma and trauma responses informs the work of judges in practical and important ways. For example, it enables judges to:
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better understand an accused person’s or witness’s behaviour or responses (or lack thereof) during their interactions with police or when giving evidence in court;
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assess the appropriateness of questions being put to an accused or witness;
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make modifications (where appropriate) to ensure that the court functions in a trauma-informed way, including minimising the risk of re-traumatisation;
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appreciate the impact of the experience of trauma on offending; and
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develop conditions of bail or sentence which are tailored to reducing the person’s experience of trauma and/or intergenerational trauma.
When judicial officers aim to address the experience of trauma or intergenerational trauma when deciding on conditions of bail or sentence, it is important that courts seek guidance and advice from First Nations support persons, health professionals, or other First Nations controlled organisations who deliver care and healing where possible. The same applies to First Nations programs, that are only culturally appropriate if they involve
consulting with Indigenous people and facilitating their genuine input and advice in policy, planning, service delivery and resource allocation; and demonstrating a commitment by service providers to Indigenous knowledge, ways of working and decision making that acknowledges and is respectful of Indigenous cultures.11
Judicial resources are available to assist courts in adopting trauma-informed practices (see 9.12 Further Reading: 9.1 Introduction).12
9.1.4 Improving Information Available to Inform Judicial Decisions
Understanding social and cultural factors is critical to achieve substantive equality before the law and judicial impartiality. Section 4.2 of the Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration’s Guide to Judicial Conduct states:
A judge should attempt, by appropriate means, to remain informed about changing attitudes and values in society and to take advantage of suitable educational opportunities (which ought to be made reasonably available) that will assist the judge to be, and appear to be, impartial.13
Judicial officers and legal practitioners should seek to be informed about social, cultural and political factors that may impact Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples before a criminal court. Keeping up to date with information available regarding these factors can mitigate the potential for cultural bias.14 Consideration should also be given to the operation of other systems and institutions outside the criminal justice system and how they may influence the likelihood of a person coming before a criminal court.
Legal representatives in the criminal jurisdiction have the responsibility to prepare and tender high-quality evidence to ensure the person’s whole story is before the court, and this should include information about the person and their family, community and history. There are a number of evidence-based resources available that can support this undertaking (see 9.6 Enhancing Practice and 9.12 Further Reading: 9.1 Introduction).
9.1.5 Diversion and Solution-Focused Justice
Inquiries and reports have repeatedly recommended the need for diversion at every stage of the criminal justice system. The final report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody stated:
The first group of diversion schemes are those which occur before a defendant gets before the court and concerns the interaction with police, the arrest or charge on summons, the questions of bail …
Equally important are diversionary schemes by which a court sentencing a defendant found guilty can direct him or her away from the prison system as opposed to into it. Here again there is a proliferation of creative ideas and of innovative schemes which provide courts with some further and better sentencing options.15
The Pathways to Justice report provides a range of recommendations focused on making community-based sentence regimes more accessible and flexible.16 Judicial officers should be mindful of any practical issues relating to the availability and accessibility of culturally safe programs in remote and rural communities and consider opportunities available for the legal profession to connect to local services and programs to enhance the potential for engagement and diversion. The Just Reinvest project is one example of an initiative that incorporates (and depends on) community support and co-design.17 See also 9.7 Therapeutic, Restorative and Solution-Focused Justice for discussion of First Nations sentencing courts and therapeutic courts.
9.2 Interactions with Police
9.2.1 Historical and Contemporary Context
When considering the interactions between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and the police, judicial officers and lawyers should be mindful of the history and context that may inform these interactions.
The police have deep historical origins as enforcers of violent colonial laws, policies and accepted practices against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The final report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody stated:
The relations between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people in Australia are revealed perhaps most starkly in the relations between Aboriginal people and police. Police in many cases acted as the main agent for enforcing repressive government policies. A deep animosity and often hatred developed between Aboriginal people and police.18
…
Aboriginal people remember this history and it is burned into their consciousness.19
See 1.3.1 Collective, Historical and Intergeneration Trauma.
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have actively resisted the taking of their land and violence against their communities. During the Frontier era, this resistance was met with military-style and vigilante responses from the colony, which included killings and massacres, often at the hands of police, but also of civilians, with very limited examples of offenders being prosecuted.20
The police also played a key role in the implementation and enforcement of ‘protection’ and assimilation policies, including forced child removal,21 dispossession of land, and social and cultural control through the implementation of missions and reserves.22
Today, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples continue to resist state intervention and ongoing police mistreatment in many ways, including but not limited to protest, law and policy reform, complaints mechanisms and litigation.23 This resistance occurs in response to ongoing child removals from families and communities,24 continued racist policing of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people including children and young people,25 and avoidable black deaths in custody. This is despite a significant evidence base of recommendations designed to mitigate police harm and risk of death informed by both community-led advocacy, and government inquiries into policing and Aboriginal deaths in custody.26
These historical and contemporary experiences of police have an enduring impact on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ perception and experiences of police, ‘and more broadly the failure of the rule of law’. Weatherburn et al in their report ‘Towards a Theory of Indigenous Contact with the Criminal Justice System’ note that the relationship between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and police
is greatly exacerbated by a shared oral history of indiscriminate murder, forced removal, abduction, harassment and police brutality. Much of this harassment and brutality was and is directed at Aboriginal youth. The result is an undercurrent of fear and hostility towards police that puts young Aboriginal men at heighted risk of arrest for even minor breaches of the law.27
Understanding this historical and contemporary context and how it could impact an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander person’s interaction with police is important in achieving culturally safe and solutions-focused justice.
9.2.2 Over-Policing
The Yoorrook for Justice report defines over-policing as ‘the unjustified, disproportionate and unreasonable use of police powers against First Peoples or other racial groups’.28 The report identifies various ways that over-policing affects Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people:
racial profiling: police seeking out, stopping, questioning, searching or detaining a person because of their Aboriginality
misuse of police discretion: choosing to charge and prosecute an Aboriginal person instead of cautioning or supporting diversion, choosing to arrest instead of charging via summons or choosing to remand people in custody instead of supporting bail
inappropriate use of police as first responders: using the criminal law and police to respond to conduct associated with social inequality such as intoxication, drug use and mental illness.29
While Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are more likely to be charged and brought before the courts and are overrepresented in the national remand and prison population,30 Weatherburn et al report that the high rate of arrest does not reflect a high rate of offending, as the historical evidence suggests that police are more likely to arrest Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people than non-Indigenous people who commit similar offences:31
This is particularly true in relation to so-called public order offences, such as offensive behaviour and offensive language. The Indigenous arrest rate for offensive behaviour, for example, exceeds the non-Indigenous arrest rate for that offence by a factor of 4.5 in New South Wales, 10.1 in Queensland, 10.2 in the Northern Territory and 22.7 in South Australia. These considerations and other evidence … suggest that, other things being equal, rates of Indigenous arrest will be higher among those more exposed to police. Thus, we would expect higher rates of arrest among those who are homeless, who have a mental health problem, or who live in areas regularly patrolled by police.32
And further:
[S]imply being visible to police increases the risk of Indigenous arrest, even if no serious offence is committed. This conclusion is consistent with evidence that police make less use of diversionary alternatives when dealing with minor offences (eg offensive language, offensive behaviour) committed by Indigenous Australians than when dealing with similar offences by non-Indigenous Australians.33
The Aboriginal Legal Service NSW/ACT submitted to the Pathways to Justice inquiry that their community consultations showed:
The majority of participants considered there to be very little or nothing working well between the police and their community … A number of participants suggested that institutional racism has become a feature of policing in NSW. These participants noted that police offer very little discretion when dealing with Aboriginal people, and that many communities in regional and remote NSW communities suffer from over policing.34
9.2.3 Police Powers
The Australian Federal Police has its own police powers and responsibilities legislation, codes, orders and manuals,35 as does each state and territory.36 There are specific responsibilities in relation to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in legislation, codes, orders and manuals.37
9.2.4 Arrest
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are arrested at almost nine times the rate of non-Indigenous people.38 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women are the fastest growing prison population in Australia, and more than 80% of these women are mothers.39
The strongest factor reducing the likelihood of arrest is education; others include being married, secure housing, close family, friends and community connections, and an income above the average wage.40 The highest risk factor is problematic alcohol and drug use; other factors include psychological distress, being a member or descendant of the Stolen Generations,41 living in a ‘problem-affected neighbourhood’,42 and having a higher level of exposure to police.
Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights sets out the principle that everyone has the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention.43
The process of arrest, and the deprivation of liberty which follows, can only be justified if the decision to arrest is within the bounds of the law which govern the power to arrest.44 The Court of Appeal in New South Wales v Robinson set out the purpose of arrest:
The principle of the common law, that the freedom of an individual should not be restricted without a warrant simply for the purpose of investigation, is of fundamental importance … In that way, the ultimate purpose of arrest is still to bring the arrested person before an authorised officer, by laying a charge, and the arrest cannot be for the purpose of investigation.45
In Donaldson v Broomby, Deane J recognised the impacts of arrest:
Arrest is the deprivation of freedom. The ultimate instrument of arrest is force. The customary companions of arrest are ignominy and fear. A police power of arbitrary arrest is a negation of any true right to personal liberty. A police practice of arbitrary arrest is a hallmark of tyranny. It is plainly of critical importance to the existence and protection of personal liberty under the law that the circumstances in which a police officer may, without judicial warrant, arrest or detain an individual should be strictly confined, plainly stated and readily ascertainable …46
The power to arrest is discretionary, is an option of last resort, and should not be used for minor offences.47 In Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Carr,48 an arrest for offensive language was technically lawful; however, it was held to be improper. Smart AJ said:
This Court in its appellate and trial divisions has been emphasising for many years that it is inappropriate for powers of arrest to be used for minor offences where the defendant’s name and address are known, there is no risk of him departing and there no reason to believe that a summons will not be effective. Arrest is an additional punishment involving deprivation of freedom and frequently ignominy and fear. The consequences of the employment of the power of arrest unnecessarily and inappropriately and instead of issuing a summons are often anger on the part of the person arrested and an escalation of the situation leading to the person resisting arrest and assaulting the police. The pattern in this case is all too familiar. It is time that the statements of this Court were heeded.49
Hemming et al discuss the disadvantages to the suspect that flow from arrest; these include the reduced likelihood that the suspect will be released on bail, obstacles in the preparation of a case, and the negative connotation created in the mind of a judicial officer or jury by virtue of the suspect appearing in custody.50
In terms of carrying out arrests, the Yoorrook for Justice report documented the continued harm and violation of rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people by police:
Aboriginal people still experience human and cultural rights violations, harm, violence, serious injury and death from police contact. These outcomes continue despite repeated recommendations for reform to policies, procedures and practice.51
…
The issue of use of force is more widespread. Yoorrook does not accept that the unlawful use of force by police is a purely individualised action. It is not a matter of a ‘few rogue police’ or ‘bad apples’. This behaviour is supported by the systemic racism that continues to pervade the organisation. Police members who inflict unlawful violence do it because they think they can get away with it.52
The Yoorrook Justice Commission received evidence about Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people being arrested in traumatic circumstances, where force was used resulting in physical injury; these circumstances often led to an escalation of conflict, resulting in further charges being laid against the person being arrested, such as resist and assault police.53
9.2.5 Police Questioning and Admissions
The right to silence is a fundamental protection afforded to accused persons within the criminal justice system as expressed by the High Court in Petty v The Queen:
A person who believes on reasonable grounds that he or she is suspected of having been a party to an offence is entitled to remain silent when questioned or asked to supply information by any person in authority about the occurrence of an offence, the identity of the participants and the roles which they played. That is a fundamental rule of the common law which, subject to some specific statutory modifications, is applied in the administration of the criminal law in this country.54
It is for the prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt before a verdict of guilty may be returned. It ‘is never for the accused person to prove his innocence’.55 A fundamental measure which expresses this principle is the privilege against self-incrimination.56 Where a suspect does not respond to police questioning, it has long been the case that exercising the right to silence could not be held against the person at their trial. The Uniform Evidence Acts have given legislative effect to this right, in particular s 89 which provides that unfavourable inferences are not to be drawn by a jury from an accused’s silence during the investigation period. In New South Wales only, there is an exception to this rule, provided for in s 89A, which sets out circumstances in which unfavourable inferences may be drawn.57
There are many reasons why it may not be in a person’s interests to answer police questions. They may be experiencing mental illness or cognitive impairment; they may be under the influence of alcohol or other substances; they may be distressed or experiencing trauma. It is important to keep in mind that the impact of an arrest and detention on a person can be traumatic. This experience in itself may give rise to conditions which mean that it would not be in the person’s interest to answer police questions. It is important, where relevant, for lawyers to adduce and judicial officers to appreciate the impacts of arrest:
For a suspect a police station is a very scary place. Police, often young and energetic, have the power to: interrogate or not, initiate criminal proceedings or not and to deprive or curtail a person’s liberty or not — according to the exercise of their own judgment.
Police interviewers can be extremely foreboding — even when they are acting entirely within the law. It is not just the questioning that is difficult for a suspect; it is the context in which it takes place. Usually, the suspect is questioned after an arrest. Being arrested is a shocking experience. It is often meant to be a shock. Arrests are timed for police convenience — often late at night or early in the morning.
Sometimes an arrest is at gunpoint. Always an arrest is accompanied by actions that make it clear that the suspect is no longer a free agent. People who are arrested, hand-cuffed and locked in a cell are not in a good condition to be able to make important decisions about what to say in their defence.58
When considering legal issues relating to police questioning of First Nations people, it is important that judicial officers keep firmly in mind historical issues which have impacted relationships between First Nations people and police including massacres, forced dispossession of land, child removal and cultural dispossession (see 9.2.1 Historical and Contemporary Context). It is also critical that issues relating to language, communication and understanding (addressed extensively in 3 Language and Communication) are well understood and inform decisions relating to, for example, whether the person has fully understood their rights, whether admissions were made as a result of oppressive conduct59 or in circumstances which may have affected the reliability of the admissions,60 or if admissions were made in circumstances in which any admissions made were unfair.61
Breaches of safeguards which police must provide to detained persons may also give rise to a basis for excluding admissions pursuant to s 138 of the Evidence Act. This section does not attempt to set out the safeguards available to First Nations people who are detained in every State and Territory. Those safeguards are set out in State and Territory legislation relating to police powers and responsibilities.
The following paper by Justice Yehia helpfully details safeguards in NSW LEPRA and the LEPRA regulations which apply to all detainees as well as those which apply to vulnerable people62 and specifically to First Nations people: Yehia, Justice Dina, The Essential Guide to Sentencing in NSW (LexisNexis, 2023).
LEPRA safeguards that apply to all detailed persons are detailed in Part 9 and include the rights to communicate with a friend, relative, guardian, independent person, or legal practitioner,63 to be provided with an interpreter and64 to receive medical attention.
There are additional safeguards in the LEPRA regulations that apply to ‘vulnerable persons’. The definition of ‘vulnerable persons’ includes Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander persons.65 Additional rights for vulnerable persons include, amongst others, the requirement of the custody manager to assist the person exercising their rights under Part 9 and the requirement of a support person to be present during any investigation66 including notifying the detained person of their right to a support person and facilitating the arrangements for a support person.67 If a person is a child or has impaired intellectual or physical functioning the custody manager is required to find the person responsible for the welfare of person and advise them of the detained persons whereabouts and the grounds for their detention68 and ascertain any specific physical care needs and arrange for those to be attended to.69 There are additional considerations when cautioning a vulnerable person, including ensuring that the vulnerable person understands the caution and giving the caution in the presence of the support person.70
Safeguards for First Nations people relating to the Custody Notification Service71 are referred to at 9.2.6 Custody Notification Services.72
Mann v R [2023] NSWCCA 256 demonstrates the infringement of the right to silence arsing from non-compliance with LEPRA safeguards relating to vulnerable persons. The applicant was an Aboriginal man who lived with intellectual impairment and therefore a vulnerable person as defined in clause 38 of the LEPRA regulations. The applicant was charged with child sexual offences. He made admissions in an ERISP, which was the only evidence against him in relation to 18 of the charges.
The ERISP was held to be admissible at first instance. He was found not guilty of five charges and guilty of the other 13 which relied solely on the admissions in the ERISP. He was found guilty of a number of other charges which did not rely solely on the admissions. One of the grounds of appeal was whether the admissions were admissible pursuant to s 138 of the Evidence Act.
The impropriety alleged was summarised as follows at [3]:
There was no error in the findings of fact of Madgwick ADCJ. The detective in charge had been told by another Police officer that an Aboriginal Legal Service solicitor had indicated that on the solicitor’s advice the applicant did not want to be interviewed. The detective then asked the applicant’s mother — the applicant’s support person under the LEPRA Regulation — if he wished to be interviewed, thus recognising that the applicant’s capacity for autonomy and his understanding were limited. The mother said he did not. The detective nevertheless proceeded to lead the applicant into the interview room without explanation and commenced the interview. Although a caution was given, he did not ask either the applicant or his mother if they were content for the applicant to participate. In this way, the detective required the applicant to go to the interview room and be subject to questioning.
The applicant’s mother gave evidence, summarised at [82]:
After she had communicated the decision that the applicant would not be interviewed, Detective Gibson said “Let’s go in and just see what Beau’s got to say”. She said “I’d prefer that he didn’t speak to you”. They then went back in inside and the detective said to the applicant “If you’d like to come through and we can continue with the interview if you’re happy to do that”. The applicant said “Whatever”. Ms Mann said “Don’t say anything”. Ms Mann’s evidence was that Detective Gibson and another detective then walked in front of them towards the interview room, followed by the applicant. As they were walking towards the interview room the applicant said “Mum I’m scared”. In the interview room she sat in a chair placed by the detective. She gave evidence that she did not saying anything in the interview room about the applicant not wanting to be interviewed “because I didn’t know I could say anything”.
Kirk JA at [103], in upholding the appeal said:
…Thus in this case, contrary to his Honour’s conclusion, the difficulty of obtaining the evidence legally was one which weighed against admission. And the same is true insofar as the issue is considered at a somewhat higher level relating to the difficulty of obtaining inculpatory evidence generally in cases of this kind. Such a general difficulty may give an incentive for a deliberate “cutting of corners” by those gathering evidence (as referred to in the Australian Law Reform Commission report quoted in Kadir at [19]). It is important that any willingness by Police to give into that temptation be deterred.”
Police conduct was characterised as ‘substantially improper’, at [115]:
There was further impropriety in the way the interview was conducted. Detective Gibson did not properly facilitate Ms Mann’s role as support person during the interview. She was given information as to her role. However, cl 34(1) of the LEPRA Regulations provides that a support person may assist and support the suspected person, observe whether the interview is being conducted properly and fairly, and identify communication problems. These protections were undermined as she was effectively sidelined in the interview process, in particular by being “placed in the room in a way that would indicate she was not on an equal footing with the other people in the room” (to quote Madgwick ADCJ).
Kirk JA concluded at [126]:
In sum, there are significant factors militating in favour of admitting the ERISP. But where the impropriety directed to a vulnerable person was deliberate and very serious, and in circumstances where obtaining such evidence without impropriety or illegality was likely to be difficult, I consider it clear that the desirability of admitting the evidence does not outweigh undesirability of admitting it in light of the manner in which it was obtained. My view, thus, is that the evidence is inadmissible pursuant to s 138 of the Evidence Act.
9.2.5.1 Unreliable Admissions
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are over-represented for wrongful convictions and one factor contributing to this is false confessions.73 Other factors include prosecutorial misconduct, inadequate legal counsel, and ‘difficulties faced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people navigating the criminal justice system’.74
Adam and van Golde identify reasons for false confessions including making ‘voluntary false confessions’ to protect others, and being coerced into making a confession, for example where the person is innocent but they make a confession to avoid punishment.75 A common example which is often reported by Aboriginal Legal Service lawyers is that people may participate in an interview with police after being told that they are more likely to get bail if they tell their side of the story. False confessions may also be made where, because of the way in which questions are asked, the person comes to believe they did commit the crime alleged. Adam and van Golde also identify that some people voluntarily confess because of psychological issues.76
It is important to keep an open mind in relation to the multitude of reasons why an innocent person may implicate themselves in a crime or otherwise provide an unreliable account in the context of police questioning.
9.2.5.2 Anunga Principles
The Anunga principles (also referred to as the Anunga guidelines or rules) are a comprehensive set of principles for interrogating Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, and other partial speakers of English. The principles were set out in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory by Forster J (Muirhead and Ward JJ agreeing) in R v Anunga.77 They are designed to reduce the difficulties experienced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people during the course of police questioning. Forster J stated that the ‘guidelines are not absolute rules, departure from which will necessarily lead to statements being excluded, but police officers who depart from them without reason may find statements are excluded’.78
The Anunga principles are as follows:
When an Aboriginal person is being interrogated as a suspect, unless he is as fluent in English as the average white man of English descent, an interpreter able to interpret in and from the Aboriginal person’s language should be present, and his assistance should be utilized whenever necessary to ensure complete and mutual understanding.
When an Aboriginal is being interrogated it is desirable where practicable that a ‘prisoner’s friend’ (who may also be the interpreter) be present. The ‘prisoner’s friend’ should be someone in whom the Aboriginal [person] has apparent confidence … The important thing is that the ‘prisoner’s friend’ be someone in whom the Aboriginal [person] has confidence, by whom he will feel supported.
Great care should be taken in administering the caution when it is appropriate to do so. It is simply not adequate to administer it in the usual terms and say, ‘Do you understand that?’ or ‘Do you understand you do not have to answer the questions?’ Interrogating police officers, having explained the caution in simple terms, should ask the Aboriginal [person] to tell them what is meant by the caution, phrase by phrase, and should not proceed with the interrogation until it is clear the Aboriginal [person] has apparent understanding of his right to remain silent. Most experienced police officers in the Territory already do this. The problem of the caution is a difficult one but the presence of a ‘prisoner’s friend’ or interpreter and adequate and simple questioning about the caution should go a long way towards solving it.
Great care should be taken in formulating questions so that so far as possible the answer which is wanted or expected is not suggested in any way. Anything in the nature of cross-examination should be scrupulously avoided as answers to it have no probative value. It should be borne in mind that it is not only the wording of the question, which may suggest the answer, but also the manner and tone of voice which are used.
Even when an apparently frank and free confession has been obtained relating to the commission of an offence, police should continue to investigate the matter in an endeavour to obtain proof of the commission of the offence from other sources. …
Because Aboriginal people are often nervous and ill at ease in the presence of white authority figures like policemen it is particularly important that they be offered a meal, if they are being interviewed in a police station, or in the company of police or in custody when a mealtime arrives. They should also be offered tea or coffee if facilities exist for preparation of it. They should always be offered a drink of water. They should be asked if they wish to use the lavatory if they are in the company of police or under arrest.
It is particularly important that Aboriginal and other people are not interrogated when they are disabled by illness or drunkenness or tiredness. Admissions so gained will probably be rejected by a court. Interrogation should not continue for an unreasonably long time.
Should an Aboriginal [person] seek legal assistance reasonable steps should be taken to obtain such assistance. If an Aboriginal states he does not wish to answer further questions or any questions the interrogation should not continue.
When it is necessary to remove clothing for forensic examination or for the purposes of medical examination, steps must be taken forthwith to supply substitute clothing.79
These principles have been included in the Northern Territory Police’s General Orders,80 the Queensland Police Service’s Digital Electronic Recording of Interviews and Evidence Manual,81 and, in Western Australia, the Commissioner of Corrective Services’ Operating Policies and Procedures.82
In R v BL,83 Blokland J considered the application of the Anunga principles in the course of an application to exclude a record of interview of a 17-year-old from the Tiwi Islands. BL’s first language was Tiwi and he spoke only ‘partial English’. He was charged with one count of sexual intercourse without consent. In his second interview, he made various admissions.84 Her Honour excluded the interview for reasons including the following:
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BL was not provided an interpreter, particularly in circumstances where his support person only spoke English, was not known to BL, and was not from the same cultural background. She was also female, in circumstances where it had been raised that BL should only be interviewed by male officers.85
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BL’s support person was inappropriate. This was markedly demonstrated in contrast to the first interview, where his grandfather had been his support person. He spoke Tiwi, was from the same cultural background as BL, and was able to interpret and reformulate questions so that BL understood his rights and was able to exercise them.86
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Leading questions were asked and answered by BL in the affirmative. There was a likelihood of gratuitous concurrence, particularly given his age, language proficiency, lack of an interpreter, and the fact that his support person was not able to intervene and reformulate questions in a way that BL was likely to understand.87
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BL did not ‘in any real sense’ understand the caution (in the second interview sought to be excluded) something that was ‘evident from his poor explanation of most parts of it’. Also, the caution was administered at the conclusion of the interview.88
Blokland J made the following observations in relation to the application of the Anunga principles:
Since the introduction of the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act, R v Anunga and other common law cases have been displaced. As noted however by Professor McCrimmon, although no longer binding precedent, as guidelines for the conduct of police in the interrogation of Indigenous persons, they will continue to apply. I proceed on the basis that both the Police General Orders (eg General Order Q2 ‘Questioning People Who Have Difficulties with the English Language — the Anunga Guidelines’) and the Anunga Guidelines remain useful in assessing certain of the characteristics that may be required to be addressed in the context of s 85 of the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act.
The Anunga Guidelines and Police General Orders with respect to questioning Aboriginal suspects for whom English was not a first language in certain situations are not and never have been absolute rules. Their relevance to questions under the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act are readily accommodated or associated with s 138(2)(a) (improperly or illegally obtained evidence) or s 139 (cautioning of persons) or the general discretion to exclude under s 90. They also have some relevance to s 85. Both the Guidelines and General Orders remain useful in a discussion of any relevant ‘condition’ or ‘characteristic’ bearing on reliability, as they signal certain issues that require particular attention.
As with many of the common law cases, the Anunga Guidelines and Police General Orders were intended to ensure vulnerable suspects were not disadvantaged and unreliable admissions were not admitted. They especially, but not exclusively, address vulnerabilities resulting from deficiencies in language or the inability to properly explain or to guard against gratuitous concurrence in the face of leading questions. In large part, the Anunga Guidelines and Police General Orders expressed in similar terms assist to prevent the unreliability that readily flows from miscommunication. Both the Anunga Guidelines and the Police General Orders represent a pragmatic approach to assist with ensuring fairness and reliability concerning suspects who are vulnerable because of language difficulties.
Although the question of admissibility on the basis of unreliability is to be determined according to s 85 of the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act, issues concerning language, comprehension, miscommunication and other factors that were directly relevant to the Anunga Guidelines and other common law cases as well as Police General Orders such as Q2 are not irrelevant to the question of unreliability in s 85.89
The Anunga principles continue to be applied in the court’s discretion to exclude admissions for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and other partial speakers of English.90 Following the Anunga principles, suggested trial directions were formulated by Justice Mildren,91 and further relevant resources developed such as Indigenous Protocols for Lawyers,92 and Recommended National Standards for Working with Interpreters in Courts and Tribunals.93
The Anunga principles formed part of the reasoning to exclude a record of interview in the WA case involving Gene Gibson.94
For further resources relating to the right to silence, admissions and the operation of the provisions which govern the admissibility of admissions, see Stephen Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law,106 and Jill Hunter and James Metzger, The Trial.107 For jurisdiction specific guidance see:
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In Victoria, Christopher Beale KC, Pocket Evidence Law;108
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In Queensland, Equal Treatment Benchbook;109
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In Western Australia, Stephanie Fryer-Smith, Aboriginal Benchbook for Western Australia Courts.110
9.2.6 Custody Notification Services
Each state and territory in Australia has a Custody Notification Service (‘CNS’) operated by the relevant Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander legal service, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The CNS is an important safeguard to protect the right to silence and safety of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people who have been detained.
Each CNS provides legal advice to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander detainees in a culturally sensitive manner, and staff are trained to detect and respond to issues such as threats of self-harm or suicide, or any injuries sustained during arrest.111
Practitioners should be alert to their respective state or territory requirements for their CNS.112
Failing to contact the CNS may form the basis of an application to exclude evidence obtained, including admissions, as occurred in Campbell v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW).113
9.2.7 Community Police, Liaison Officers and Patrol Services
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community police, liaison officers and patrol services bring their cultural expertise to policing and have the capacity to improve relationships between police and communities.
The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody recommended that ‘all Police Services pursue an active policy of recruiting Aboriginal people into their services, in particular recruiting Aboriginal women. Where possible Aboriginal recruits should be taken in groups’.114
Some progress has been made towards implementing this recommendation; however, the employment of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people by police services is not commensurate with the population.115
9.2.7.1 Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers
The value of appointing Aboriginal Community Liaison Officers (‘ACLOs’) is emphasised in the Alternatives to Incarceration reports which set out how ACLOs can play a pivotal liaison role between local Aboriginal communities and police:
They are community representatives within the organisation. In consultation with the community, ACLOs:
provide advice to senior police members on local Aboriginal issues;
encourage Aboriginal communities to engage with police members to resolve issues; and
help to develop and deliver appropriate training programs.116
The positive contributions made by ACLOs in brokering connections between the community and the police were set out in submissions from the Aboriginal Legal Services in New South Wales, the Northern Territory, Victoria and Western Australia during the Pathways to Justice inquiry. It was submitted that ACLOs should be at all police stations, and be available after hours and at weekends.117
9.2.7.2 Community Patrol Services
Indigenous justice programs, such as night patrols and community patrol services have been operational since the 1980s. When Kungarakan Elder Professor Tom Calma AO was the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, he made an address to the NSW Police in which he noted the value of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people being the first responders to issues in the community:
The great advantage of night patrols is that they are made up of people from the community who have the respect of the community. They can go in and defuse a situation where the police involvement can often escalate it. Communities feel empowered because they are dealing with their own problems …118
The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare reported that ‘[c]ommunity patrols have the potential to increase Indigenous community safety’ and ‘can assist in reducing crime rates and alcohol-related harm and empower the local community’.119
Community patrol programs lead to improved outcomes for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, the communities where the patrols operate, and the local police services.120
The Alternatives to Incarceration in the Australian Capital Territory report outlines:
There are over 130 Aboriginal community patrols in operation across Australia in metropolitan and rural locations. Patrols operate without police powers and rely on mediation to move people on from risky situations. They rely on ‘cultural authority’ as well as their local knowledge of Aboriginal families and issues to navigate their way through and resolve situations which may, in the hands of state authorities, deteriorate.
These patrols work to keep people safe, assist in finding people accommodation and provide people with referrals. While each has a different focus depending on the local need, they work with people to encourage and support them towards safer behaviours and to find safe accommodation. They also work to keep women safe from violence and discourage violence through their presence and the respect they carry in communities.
These models operate from a basis of caring for their communities, not criminalising them. They provide healthy role models for community members and their work reduces contact between Aboriginal people and the police. The patrols have made a significant contribution to crime reduction and community safety strategies. Several favourable evaluations have found that the Patrols have resulted in reduced levels of offending, reduced fear of crime and reductions in alcohol and other drug-related problems. There is also evidence to suggest significant cost savings for key justice, health, and education agencies from the presence of community patrols.121
Further:
Alternative policing and alternative first-responder models reduce criminal justice system involvement and lessen the likelihood of arrest by 58%, halve the rate of crime and justice system involvement, significantly reduce levels of specific crime, improve health and wellbeing (especially for people with mental health conditions) and address the social drivers of incarceration while avoiding contact with police.122
Support for these programs, and recruitment of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people at all levels of the justice system, builds safer communities.
9.2.8 Misidentification of Family or Intimate Partner Violence Victims
There are serious risks associated with misidentification of family and/or intimate partner violence victims as perpetrators. Understanding the factors that contribute to misidentification will assist when assessing applications for domestic violence protection orders and when determining the outcome of domestic violence related criminal charges.
Misidentification can occur in various ways, including by deliberate manipulation of the legal system by actual perpetrators of violence. This is termed ‘system abuse’ or ‘legal system abuse’. The National Domestic and Family Violence Bench Book observes that ‘[p]erpetrators of domestic and family violence who seek to control the victim before, during or after separation may make multiple applications and complaints in multiple systems’.123
Misidentification can also occur when police officers attend a domestic violence incident and charge the victim rather than the perpetrator of violence:
The misidentification of women as predominant aggressors was a concern raised in the [Royal Commission into Family Violence]; it refers to situations where police officers respond to [a family violence] incident, are unsure which party is the predominant victim–survivor and which is the predominant aggressor, and criminally charge or apply for a family violence intervention order (FVIO), Victoria’s civil protection order, against the ‘wrong’ party. The report, while acknowledging that this may happen to men, suggests that misidentification primarily affects women victim–survivors …124
Recommendation 41 of the Royal Commission into Family Violence is ‘amend the Victoria Police Code of Practice for the Investigation of Family Violence to ensure that it provides suitable guidance on identifying family violence primary aggressors’.125
The Queensland Equal Treatment Benchbook refers to R v Kina,126 which involved an Aboriginal woman who was found guilty of the murder of her de facto husband, referring to complex issues arising in that case:
At trial, no evidence was led of the woman’s history of physical and sexual violence suffered at the hands of her husband and the defence of provocation was not raised. The defendant had significant difficulty talking with her male solicitor and counsel about the events leading up to the stabbing of her husband, which included prolonged sexual violence and a threat of sexual violence against her niece. The Court of Appeal held that the trial involved a miscarriage of justice:
‘In this matter, there were, insufficiently recognised, a number of complex factors interacting which presented exceptional difficulties of communication between her legal representatives and the appellant because of:
her Aboriginality;
the battered woman syndrome; and
the shameful (to her) nature of the events which characterised her relationship with the deceased.
These cultural, psychological and personal factors bore upon the adequacy of the advice and legal representation which the appellant received and effectively denied her satisfactory representation or the capacity to make informed decisions on the basis of proper advice.’127
Impacts of misidentification identified by Reeves highlight ‘the need for improved policing and court responses to the issue beyond existing reforms’.128 The impacts on female victims include:
These experiences may also cause female victims of domestic violence to feel devalued, discredited and stigmatised as well as further entrenching distrust of the system. A stakeholder participating in Reeve’s study said:
I’ve had many clients say to me at the end of it all, ‘I will never call the police again, no matter what happens’, you know and that’s terrifying to think about because we know what we know about family violence perpetrators, and these women could be at risk from that violent partner for a really long time …137
The National Domestic and Family Violence Bench Book identifies that ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women are at greater risk of all forms of violence and related death than other Australian women’.138 At the same time, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women may not seek help for domestic and family violence for reasons including ‘distrust or fear the police, criminal justice system and mainstream services’; this is especially acute where those women themselves have a criminal record which includes violent offending.139
Misidentification can result in victims not only being charged with criminal offences but also being deprived of key supports offered to victims of domestic violence. Misidentification can further entrench the marginalisation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women and reinforce the power dynamics which operate in domestic violence relationships.
9.3 Court Bail
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are more likely to be refused bail than non-Indigenous people.140
Each state and territory has its own bail legislation,141 as does the Federal Court of Australia.142 Bail laws require judicial officers143 to make risk assessments relating to issues including the defendant’s likelihood of attending court, committing an offence, causing harm to complainants, and interfering with witnesses and evidence.144
It is not uncommon for people who are refused bail to remain in custody for lengthy periods of time. Some may be sentenced to a non-custodial option or for a shorter term of imprisonment than they have served;145 others may be acquitted or have charges withdrawn. This may result in ‘people [receiving] a harsher punishment by reason of being charged with a crime than they are receiving on being found guilty of the crime’.146
As there are protective factors that may mitigate risks relevant to bail decisions, judicial officers should consider any issues that arise due to a person’s Aboriginality, including cultural background, ties to family and place, and cultural obligations.147 Judicial officers should also ensure that the impact on the bail applicant’s children is given strong consideration.148
Bail hearings for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people should be trauma informed and culturally safe,149 and judicial officers should ensure that applicants understand the proceedings.150 See 14 Judicial Practice.
Judicial officers should be mindful of imposing conditions which include culturally safe support for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people on bail.
Judicial officers should also engage in training and education about cultural safety and being trauma informed151 and engaging Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander staff in the proceedings.152 Judicial officers should explain what information has been taken into account and, where appropriate, how a person’s Aboriginality is relevant to the bail outcome.153
9.3.1 Barriers to Court Bail
Barriers to police and court bail for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have been extensively considered at the national, state and territory levels.154
Key factors contributing to bail refusals include a lack of secure accommodation, irregular (or lack of) employment, mental health issues, physical disability, prior failures to appear in court, and previous convictions for low-level offending.155
Language and communication barriers can also affect an applicant’s ability to accurately communicate living arrangements, support networks, cultural obligations and other relevant information.156 3 Language and Communication provides guidance for enhancing cross-cultural communication.157
Cultural obligations and relationships — such as obligations to care for family, avoidance relationships, or to attend funerals or Sorry Business — may conflict with many standard bail conditions (such as place restrictions) and lead to breaches of bail.158 The court should be made aware of the importance of cultural obligations to ensure these factors are taken into account when formulating conditions.159 Difficulties appearing at court, or at an appointed place or time, may also arise for reasons including mental health issues, disability or communication difficulties.160
9.3.2 Impacts of Remand and Imprisonment
The impacts of imprisonment on a person and their family and community are critical matters to consider when making a bail decision. Incarceration may risk or compound the impacts of institutionalisation.161 Impacts of remand include the prospect of losing employment and housing, the sudden loss of mental health support, the impact of substance withdrawal without the support that is available in the community, and uncertainty about the future.162
For Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, important connections may be impacted:
Given the distributed networks of care and focus on extended family and community relationships, the absence of family and community members (and particularly the incarceration of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women) can disrupt these processes.163
The applicant in R v Vincent164 was a 33-year-old Aboriginal woman who had been removed from the care of her mother and placed into the care of her father at a very young age. She left school in Year 7, gave birth to her first child when she was 14 years old, and had her second child when she was 16 years old. She was a victim of domestic violence and began problematic substance use at 14 years of age. When she was arrested, she was scheduled under mental health legislation and diagnosed with drug-induced psychosis.165 It was recommended that she engage with the Dubbo Aboriginal Medical Service and the Dubbo Community Mental Health Drug and Alcohol Service in the community, services that would not be available to her in custody.166 The impacts of incarceration were taken into account as a relevant factor when determining bail for an Aboriginal woman. In doing so, Yehia J referred to the Bugmy Bar Book chapter ‘Impacts of Imprisonment and Remand in Custody’:
[16] The applicant relies upon the Bugmy Bar Book Chapter titled ‘Impacts of Imprisonment and Remand in Custody’ (‘the Chapter’). Research shows that imprisonment has negative impacts on the physical and mental health of incarcerated individuals, and these impacts persist after release. Other documented impacts of imprisonment include loss of housing, barriers to employment, and significant negative impacts on families and communities, which may affect families and communities in different ways.
[17] The family and community impacts of incarceration are more pronounced for Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander Peoples, particularly women. Loss of culture and disconnection from Country and community due to imprisonment may have adverse impacts on the social and emotional well-being of Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander Peoples incarcerated.
[18] Even short periods of incarceration, including remand, can have a wide-ranging detrimental impact and may be linked with subsequent contact with the criminal justice system. The Chapter refers to research which shows that people who receive non-custodial penalties are significantly less likely to be re-convicted, even within the next 12 months, than those who receive sentences of imprisonment.
[19] The Australian Government Productivity Commission (2021) found the 21% of people in prison have a history of self-harm. In this case, as indicated above, the applicant’s NSW Corrective Services Records indicate a history of self-harm and depression.
[20] The 2009 New South Wales Inmate Health Survey found that First Nations Peoples in prison ‘were more likely to have ever attempted suicide than non-Aboriginal inmates and Aboriginal men were more likely to have ever self-harmed’.
[21] The Australian Law Reform Commission (2017) found that ‘being held in prison for even a short period of time can be disruptive and destabilising, especially for women where the “social as well as the financial costs of these short-term remands can be very high”’.
[22] The Bugmy Bar Book research is a useful resource which has assisted the Court in understanding the impact of remand in custody, even for short periods. The research lends context to the material that has been tendered on behalf of the applicant which relates directly to her individual circumstances and background. The impact of incarceration on First Nations Peoples, and, in particular, First Nations women should never be under-estimated.167
Bail was granted in this case. This decision demonstrates how research can be used to provide a deeper understanding of the impacts of incarceration.
9.3.3 Aboriginal Deaths in Custody
The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (‘RCIADIC’) found that ‘the gross disproportionate numbers of Aboriginal people in custody, compared with non-Aboriginal people, provides an immediate explanation of the disturbingly high number of Aboriginal deaths in custody’.168
Veronica Marie Nelson, a Gunditjmara, Dja Dja Wurrung, Wiradjuri and Yorta Yorta woman, passed away while on remand on 2 January 2020, having been refused police and court bail for relatively minor, non-violent offences. Ms Nelson was alone in a cell at the Dame Phyllis Frost Centre when she passed away, after begging for assistance for several of the last hours of her life. Her cause of death was found to be ‘complications of withdrawal from chronic opiate use and Wilkie Syndrome in the setting of malnutrition’.169
Coroner McGregor presided over the inquest into Ms Nelson’s death170 and found that her death was preventable.171 The Coroner found failings of health and custodial services and described her treatment as a denial of ‘equivalent care to that available in the community’ which amounted to ‘cruel and inhumane treatment’.172
Ms Nelson’s mother, Aunty Donna Nelson, stated:
Veronica did not deserve to die in such a cruel, heartless and painful way.
I chose for a long time not to hear or watch the tapes of her final moments, but I finally watched them during this inquest. It ruined me and has changed me forever. My daughter’s pleas for help haunt me every night, and I can’t stop hearing her voice.
To the law makers, I want you to sit and listen to Veronica’s final hours. I want her voice to ring in your ears until you realise that our justice system is broken. Veronica should never have been locked up. You were supposed to change bail laws to stop a white male monster from killing people, but instead you filled our prisons with non-violent Aboriginal women like my daughter Veronica. Our bail laws need to change now.173
The Coroner emphasised the importance of cultural safety and trauma-informed training, including awareness of the vulnerability of Aboriginal applicants, especially when unrepresented, and made findings about the inadequacy of Ms Nelson’s legal representation, the under-resourcing of culturally specific support at court, and the discriminatory impact of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic). His Honour’s findings included the following:
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The police bail decision-maker failed to give proper consideration to the discretion to grant bail, and failed to adequately consider Ms Nelson’s vulnerability in custody as an Aboriginal woman. The training provided to police fails to equip its members with an adequate appreciation of the vulnerability of an Aboriginal person in custody.174
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The legal services provided to Ms Nelson were inadequate and she should not have been unrepresented, notwithstanding that Victorian Aboriginal Legal Service had briefed a barrister to appear.175
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‘Culturally specific support for Aboriginal court users was under-resourced and designed to address the cultural needs of only some Aboriginal people — those attending Koori Court. The restrictions of the cultural support role as planned by the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria, and the inadequate process for identifying people who might need it, failed to give proper consideration to Veronica’s rights to equality and culture and those of other Aboriginal court users.’176
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‘[T]he Bail Act has a discriminatory impact on First Nations people resulting in grossly disproportionate rates of remand in custody, the most egregious of which affect alleged offenders who are Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander women.’177
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Had the RCIADIC recommendations been successfully implemented by the Government of Victoria and its agencies, Veronica’s passing would have been prevented.178
Other inquests into the deaths of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women in police custody have investigated the deaths of Julieka Ivanna Dhu (2016), Rebecca Maher (2019) and Aunty Tanya Louise Day (2020)179 (see 11 Human Rights).
Subsequent to the inquest into the passing of Ms Nelson and publication of the Yoorrook for Justice report, s 3A was introduced into the Bail Act 1977 (Vic) (set out at 9.4.1.4 Victoria below).
The RCIADIC provided the following guidance relating to judicial officers informing themselves of First Nations issues and experiences, which remains relevant today:
That judicial officers and persons who work in the court service and in the probation and parole services and whose duties bring them into contact with Aboriginal people be encouraged to participate in an appropriate training and development program, designed to explain contemporary Aboriginal society, customs and traditions. Such programs should emphasise the historical and social factors which contribute to the disadvantaged position of many Aboriginal people today and to the nature of relations between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities today. The Commission further recommends that such persons should wherever possible participate in discussion with members of the Aboriginal community in an informal way in order to improve cross-cultural understanding.180
9.4 Improved Access to Court Bail
This section focuses on the following issues which commonly arise in bail applications for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people:
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cultural considerations;
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family and community;
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risk of institutionalisation;
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funeral attendance and Sorry Business; and
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homelessness.
9.4.1 Cultural Considerations
Bail legislation in some jurisdictions provides specifically for consideration of Aboriginality and cultural protocols and practices.
Legal representatives should seek to be informed (where appropriate) of cultural obligations specific to their client to ensure that, where possible, bail conditions and bail applications reflect the cultural needs of their client. This may include, but is not limited to, informing the court of a person’s obligations to family, kinship obligations including any avoidance practices, and/or responsibilities in Sorry Business.181 There are resources available to support legal practitioners understand different cultural considerations; however, it is critical that legal representatives attempt to seek specific instructions regarding the cultural needs of their client, where appropriate, from their client.
The Australian Law Reform Commission recommends182 that all state and territory bail laws should adopt the 2024 amendments to the Bail Act 1977 (Vic) which introduced s 3A (see 9.4.4 Funeral Attendance and Sorry Business).
9.4.1.1 New South Wales
Section 18(1)(k) of the Bail Act 2013 (NSW) provides for ‘any special vulnerability or needs the accused person has including because of youth, being an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander, or having a cognitive or mental health impairment’.
In R v Brown183 the Court stated that ‘the respondent is a person of Aboriginal background whose extended family and kinship, and other traditional ties, warrant significant consideration in the determination of whether or not to grant bail’.184 The Court emphasised the need to carefully consider alternatives to the refusal of bail and also the need to be mindful of exploring bail proposals which are culturally appropriate:
In the cases of Aboriginal accused, particularly where the applicant for bail is young, alternative culturally appropriate supervision, where appropriate, (with an emphasis on cultural awareness and overcoming the renowned antisocially effects of discrimination and/or an abused or disempowered upbringing), should be explored as a preferred option to a remand in gaol.
Since the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (see particularly Recommendations 89–91 and the National Report at 21.4 and following), the incidence of Aboriginal incarceration has increased dramatically, overwhelmingly as a result of the increase in the numbers on remand. In this case, no such culturally appropriate alternative supervision is proposed or available.185
The Equality before the Law Bench Book outlines practical considerations in relation to bail for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, including that they must not be subject to more stringent tests in relation to bail, or more stringent bail conditions, than would be applied for non-Indigenous people, and that paternalism is not appropriate.186
It recommends that bail should be assessed in the following way:
Assess bail and bail conditions not just based on police views but also on the views of the defence and respected members of the local Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community and/or the Local Court Aboriginal Client Service Specialist (if there is one) about the particular person’s ties to the community and likelihood of absconding, and about culturally-appropriate options in relation to bail conditions. Community-based support, for example, might provide a viable option as family-based support …187
The Significance of Culture report supports the position that ‘engagement in culturally appropriate programs reduces the likelihood of recidivism’:
For rehabilitation programs to benefit Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, they must operate within an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander community governance and culture framework, so that they may effectively respond to the rehabilitation needs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people within the criminal justice system.188
…
Similarly, Hovane, Dalton (Jones) and Smith argue that culturally strong environments promote both sustainable impacts of offender rehabilitation programs, as well as supporting community efforts to address the social determinants of offending:
‘Creating such pro-social and culturally strong environments is essential for supporting and reinforcing not only positive gains made by Aboriginal people through engaging in offender rehabilitation programs once they return to the families and communities, but also for changing the environments which have given rise to offending behaviour in the first instance — for reducing recidivism.’189
It is recognised that, often, Aboriginal offenders have experienced significant social and economic disadvantage, exposure to family and community violence, drug and alcohol misuse and disconnection. The importance of addressing the environmental context to reduce exposure to this disadvantage is seen as an important factor in reducing recidivism. Aboriginal offenders returning to their communities without significant support and pathways to engage in culturally appropriate programs to recovery and healing, places them at risk to reoffend due to the continued exposure to the known risk factors. Strong cultural supports and programs in communities that help facilitate the building of healthy communities ‘will facilitate the successful reintegration of Indigenous offenders once they leave custody, while also reducing the likelihood of Indigenous people commencing a criminal trajectory’.190
Where an applicant is able to secure a place in a cultural program, the Significance of Culture report may provide the court with comfort that the program is more likely to assist the person’s recovery and healing, and therefore may reduce the likelihood of the person committing a further offence and reducing non-attendance at court.
Baker J granted a Griffiths remand in Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) v Welsh (No 2),191 identifying a culturally safe residential rehabilitation program as providing an opportunity for the applicant to connect with his ‘spirit and culture’. Her Honour also referred to the Significance of Culture report:
The material from the Glen is very positive. The letter of 23 October 2023 addresses the offender’s Indigenous heritage, and notes that the offender has spent time with therapists and completed ‘cultural healing courses’ which have ‘allowed him to reconnect back with his spirit and culture.’ As Vanessa Edwige and Dr Paul Gray report in Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation … connection to culture is a powerful protective factor that promotes resilience, self-esteem, self-worth and ultimately, rehabilitation (see especially at [212]–[214]). See similarly HA (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 64 at [58]–[59], where the Court noted that ‘[r]econnection of an Aboriginal offender with culture and Country can constitute a pivotal factor diverting such a person from entrenched offending behaviour’.192
When the matter was finalised by way of a suspended sentence, Baker J stated in Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) v Welsh (No 3):
Culturally sensitive programs such as the Glen can be of immense importance: see Vanessa Edwige and Dr Paul Gray, Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation … [at] 19–40. As that report notes, ‘strong cultural supports and programs in communities that help facilitate the building of healthy communities “will facilitate the successful reintegration of Indigenous offenders once they leave custody, while also reducing the likelihood of Indigenous people commencing a criminal trajectory”’ (at 32 [130]). As Mr Welsh explained, it was ‘the whole experience’ of the Glen program which has been so critical to his rehabilitation.193
9.4.1.2 Northern Territory
Another legislative provision that includes considerations specific to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people is s 24(1)(b)(B)(iiic) of the Bail Act 1982 (NT), which provides that the court must consider ‘any needs relating to the person’s cultural background, including any ties to extended family or place, or any other cultural obligation’.
9.4.1.3 Queensland
Sections 15, 16 and 34C of the Bail Act 1980 (Qld) provide that the court may take into account submissions from community justice groups (‘CJGs’)194 in relation to the applicant and any risk factors, and may allow the CJG to inspect the court file. Chapter 24 of the Queensland Magistrates Court’s Bail Benchbook (titled ‘Indigenous Defendants’) provides guidance for decision-makers about these sections.195
9.4.1.4 Victoria
As noted above, the Australian Law Reform Commission recommends196 that all state and territory bail laws should adopt the 2024 amendments to the Bail Act 1977 (Vic) which introduced s 3A. Section 3A supports decision-makers not to exacerbate incarceration rates of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.197 The section also provides guidance to remind decision-makers to challenge any unconscious biases and promote culturally safe decisions,198 and to support the cultural rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.199
Section 3A(1) provides that a decision-maker must take into account
any issues that arise due to the person’s Aboriginality, including the following:
the historical and ongoing discriminatory systemic factors that have resulted in Aboriginal people being over-represented in the criminal justice system, including in the remand population;
the risk of harm and trauma that being in custody poses to Aboriginal people;
the importance of maintaining and supporting the development of the person’s connection to culture, kinship, family, Elders, country and community;
any issues that arise in relation to the person’s history, culture or circumstances, including the following —
the impact of any experience of trauma and intergenerational trauma, including abuse, neglect, loss and family violence;
any experience of out of home care, including foster care and residential care;
any experience of social or economic disadvantage, including homelessness and unstable housing;
any ill health the person experiences, including mental illness;
any disability the person has, including physical disability, intellectual disability and cognitive impairment;
any caring responsibilities the person has, including as the sole or primary parent of an Aboriginal child;
any other relevant cultural issue or obligation.200
The Judicial College of Victoria201 publishes guidance for decision-makers in applying s 3A.202
In Re McLaughlin,203 Incerti J granted bail to a woman after careful consideration of the fact of her Aboriginality, both in relation to her specific circumstances and the broader context:
The consideration of these factors is necessarily an involved process. It requires the decision maker to contemplate what the historic and ongoing overrepresentation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in custody means for the individual before them. It also requires the decision maker to contemplate the specific circumstances of the individual within the broader context of their cultural identity and to view their circumstances through that lens. The Bugmy Bar Book provides carefully researched materials that speak to the significance of this cultural identity on every aspect of the individual and their application.204
Ms McLaughlin has never served a term of imprisonment and has no recorded convictions. It is therefore very unlikely that she will receive a sentence that exceeds the period on remand and this is a compelling factor. Further, I take into account that discrimination has pervaded the lives of Aboriginal people and that incarceration has a cyclical impact on their social and emotional wellbeing. I have also taken into account the challenging circumstances that Ms McLaughlin has faced in her life, especially an involvement with foster care from a very young age and an upbringing riddled with trauma. Additionally, her offending appears to coincide with a deterioration in her mental health, which provides yet another compelling reason for placing her with supports rather than behind bars. Ms McLaughlin is also a direct descendant of the Stolen Generation and it is important to acknowledge the impact this may have on her. For example, a recent study of the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare has explored the lasting impacts on the descendants of the Stolen Generation as compared to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people without any experience of being removed, which included a finding that descendants are 1.5 times as likely to have been arrested in the last five years and 1.3 times as likely to have poor mental health.205
9.4.1.5 Western Australia
In Western Australia, the Equal Justice Bench Book outlines the availability of relevant services such as the WA Aboriginal Legal Service’s Bail Support Service and Prison In-Reach Service.206
9.4.2 Family and Community
Family and community is an important protective factor for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, and this should be kept in mind when assessing risk. Edwige and Gray state that ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander identity and belonging is a function of family and community relationships, according to the perspectives and concepts of kinship within each Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community’.207 And as set out in 1 Introduction:
Relationality is embodied through First Nations peoples’ connections to Country, family, kinship, non-human beings, Ancestors, community and culture. These connections are critical and determining of First Nations experiences of health and wellbeing.
The importance of keeping Aboriginal families together was considered in R v Alchin by McCallum J who granted bail, noting the ‘cycle of disadvantage and deprivation notoriously faced in Indigenous communities’.208 McCallum J said: ‘If the Court can reasonably impose conditions which are calculated to break that cycle, in my view it should’.209 Her Honour stated:
The applicant faces a show cause requirement and needs to demonstrate cause why his detention is not justified. Two matters have been identified in support of finding that the applicant has shown cause. One is the birth of the applicant’s first child, who is three months old. That appears to be a matter which would motivate him to comply with conditional bail.
Secondly, the matter is an indictable matter which will have to be committed to the District Court and there is a likelihood of a lengthy period on remand awaiting the trial date. During that period the applicant would in all likelihood see very little of the child if bail is refused. That is a factor which seems to me to be likely to perpetuate the cycle of disadvantage and deprivation notoriously faced in indigenous communities and, as a matter of evidence in the material before me, specifically faced in the family of this applicant. If the Court can reasonably impose conditions which are calculated to break that cycle, in my view it should. That is a strong factor in my finding cause shown.210
The NSW Equality before the Law Bench Book,211 in acknowledging the significance of kinship, family ties and connection to Country, states, ‘it may also be less appropriate to attach a condition for a First Nations person that the person leave town, than it would be to do so for a non-Indigenous person’.212 It also highlights that any period of time on remand that causes a separation of a caregiver and a child
in the context of disadvantage and deprivation within a First Nations community (in the circumstances described by the High Court in Bugmy v The Queen), has been considered a significant factor in showing cause why the detention of the applicant for bail is not justified.213
In R v Webb,214 Hinton J noted a significant factor was that the applicant was the primary caregiver of two young children, and referred to ‘bearing in mind’ the over-representation of Aboriginal people in custody, referencing other decisions that took this approach. Hinton J found the significance of the applicant’s family and cultural ties to be a protective factor in relation to complying with bail conditions:
Mr Webb is a Ngarrindjeri man. He will soon turn 24. He has two children, Archie and Izayah, aged five and two respectively. Mr Webb is no longer in a relationship with either of the mothers of his sons. He is, however, the boys’ primary caregiver, although their mothers do continue to play a significant part in the boys’ lives.
Mr Webb’s grandfather, Mulla Sumner, gave evidence on the hearing of the review. Mr Sumner is 69 years old. He also is a Ngarrindjeri man and an elder of the Ngarrindjeri people …
At the time of his giving evidence Archie and Izayah were with their mothers but it was expected that they would be returned to Mr Sumner and his wife’s care in the coming days.
In R v Hayes Kelly J said:
‘I bear in mind that the recent Australian Law Reform Commission Report Pathways to Justice — An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People has reported that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have continued to be over-represented in the remand population by a factor of 11 …’
I agree with Kelly J that the criminal courts should bear the concerns and conclusions expressed in the Australian Law Reform Commission Report in mind. Amongst other things, they serve as an important reminder to ensure that cultural bias is avoided. In this regard, the observations of the Court of Criminal Appeal in New South Wales in R v Brown are also worthy of note …
As mentioned, Mr Sumner is an elder with Ngarrindjeri people. He told me that his grandson, Mr Webb, embraces their traditional culture. As an example, he told me how Mr Webb had travelled to Hawaii with his uncle, Moogie Sumner, as part of a group of traditional Ngarrindjeri dancers. Mr Sumner considered that Mr Webb would listen to him …
Returning momentarily to generalities, even if being cautious to avoid cultural bias and being culturally sensitive and understanding, nonetheless in all the circumstances it is appropriate that an Aboriginal person be denied bail, then it is the duty of the court to make such order. Where the question is finely balanced, however, the statistics regarding the overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in custody will likely tip the scales in favour of granting bail.
I consider this a finely balanced case … I am particularly influenced by the fact that Mr Webb is the primary caregiver of his two young sons, the importance to them of their father being around, the inability of their mothers to assume greater responsibility for their care, and the hardship that would be caused to Mr Sumner and his wife if they were left to shoulder the burden for the children.
… I am satisfied that Mr Webb’s cultural ties are strong and that cultural influences in the person of his grandfather and his uncle will provide added reason for him to comply with the terms of any bail agreement he enters into in addition to providing an added level of comfort and protection for the community. Lastly, Mr Webb’s age, he is only 23, and the presumption of innocence should not be overlooked. Accordingly, for these reasons I am satisfied that special circumstances exist justifying Mr Webb’s release on bail.215
In Re Males,216 Incerti J granted bail to an Aboriginal woman after considering the impact of incarceration on her family and children. Incerti J referred to two chapters from the Bugmy Bar Book: ‘Impacts of Imprisonment and Remand in Custody’ and ‘Incarceration of a Parent or Caregiver’. Her Honour stated:
What is equally clear is that incarceration has a lasting impact on the families and children of the offender. The incarceration of a parent may impact negatively on the physical and mental health of the children of an offender, their development, education and employment outcomes. I reject the submission that Ms Males’ children are doing fine while their mother is on remand. The children of incarcerated persons are the ‘invisible victims’ of the criminal justice system. The parenting duties and the objective of keeping families together is a significant factor in any application. When I consider the historic separation of Aboriginal families, along with Ms Males’ own difficult family upbringing, I see no good reason to contribute to her continued incarceration at this stage. I therefore consider that there are exceptional circumstances justifying the grant of bail.217
9.4.3 Risk of Institutionalisation
The risk of institutionalisation should be considered in bail determinations. This factor is likely to be relevant to many First Nations applicants given the overrepresentation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in institutional settings as noted by Dr Robyn Shields AM (Bunjalung) and Dr Andrew Ellis, in their report Impacts of Institutionalisation:
Now, although the policies are ostensibly applicable to all, Indigenous people are grossly over-represented in places of detention and [out-of-home care]. These longstanding policies have left those who experienced institutional separation being charged with bringing up their own children, leaving generational effects still felt currently.218
As to the impacts of institutionalisation:
For Indigenous people, the impact of loss of identity, connection with land, language, culture and people is profound and difficult to measure. As noted, this impact is likely to be multigenerational. The impact of multiple and recurring traumas is known to be cumulative. There continues a sense of alienation from ‘white’ culture compounded by a lack of identity within their own Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander culture.219
In Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym),220 Taylor J considered several factors including the risk of institutionalisation, the significance of the defendant’s participation in a First Nations sentencing court and the availability of culturally appropriate support:
The principal factors put forward as in combination establishing special or exceptional circumstances are that the young person is at risk of institutionalisation, that at this point, the young person is at a crossroads. The young person seeks a Griffiths-style remand to allow him the opportunity to work with his community and cultural supports to demonstrate progress towards his goals. The young person’s opportunity and eagerness to engage first in the Warrumbul Circle Sentencing Court and then the Supreme Court Pilot Program is inherently special. He will be making a commitment to the Elders Panel not just to the court to progress his rehabilitation.221
The young person has a significant amount of culturally appropriate bail and throughcare supports that are typically not made available to young Indigenous people …222
The material makes clear that he has experienced significant trauma in his life and it was submitted that this has been compounded by systemic failures which have contributed to his continued involvement in the youth justice system. The applicant has verbalised his determination to change the trajectory of his life and appears to have developed a support network who are committed to assisting him with the transition from Bimberi into the community.223
It would be an indictment on the youth justice system and care systems if such a prospect [institutionalisation] was not special or exceptional. It’s been recognised that incarceration fails to meet the developmental needs of youth offenders and is limited in its ability to provide appropriate rehabilitation. This is a young person on any view demonstrative of that failure. Indeed, given the substantial period the applicant has spent over the course of his young life in the Director-General’s care, his risk of institutionalisation, in my view, ought to be considered an outrageous failing.224
The risk of institutionalisation is a compelling factor for a person so young. The risk extends not just to the applicant personally, there is a risk to the community by way of the cost of a 17-year-old young person who because of sustained periods of incarceration cannot live independently and has a diminished capacity for personal responsibility. These kinds of outcomes so early in the applicant’s life do not bode well for his rehabilitation or for long-term protection of the community.225
The risk of institutionalisation for the applicant, I am satisfied, meets the threshold … as a factor taken in isolation.226
The Impacts of Institutionalisation report sets out potential impacts of institutionalisation on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people,227 including negative impacts on their mental and physical health, social and emotional wellbeing, living skills and decision-making ability, identity, self-worth and stigmatisation, emotional and behavioural regulation, neurological development, relationships, education, access to healthcare and treatment, homelessness, and risk of institutional sexual abuse.228 These impacts can compound trauma and worsen with further time spent in institutions.229 The report also outlines remedial measures that can address the impacts of institutionalisation.230
9.4.4 Funeral Attendance and Sorry Business
Attending funerals and participating in Sorry Business is an important part of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander culture and wellbeing,231 and non-attendance can have profound impacts on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people:
The health of Aboriginal people is often tied to their cultural and social wellbeing. For most Aboriginal people it is extremely important to attend funerals and take part in the mourning process with their community. It is essential to show respect to the family, say goodbye and participate in ‘Sorry’ business. If unable to grieve appropriately, Aboriginal people can become physically ill. In addition to allowing the opportunity to grieve, Aboriginal people have significant cultural obligations to attend funerals. If a person does not attend a funeral and spend time with the family, it may be seen as not valuing family.232
In Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym), Taylor J noted the cultural significance of funeral attendance:
On 25 May 2024, the applicant was granted day bail to attend the funeral of one of his brothers. It was submitted that attending the funeral was very culturally significant for him. He handed himself back into court that same afternoon which, it was submitted, demonstrated his commitment to complying with bail when such opportunities are closely aligned to cultural obligations.233
The NSW Equality before the Law Bench Book refers to taking judicial notice of the cultural significance of funeral attendance and Sorry Business:
Reporting and residential conditions need to be realistic and not unduly oppressive — for example, a condition banning residence in a particular town, or requiring court permission to change, may be ruled as unduly oppressive if there is a death in the defendant’s family requiring their immediate attendance in that town. Judicial notice can be taken that with regard to the culture of First Nations people, funerals and ‘Sorry Business’ are exceptionally important, and the inability to attend funerals and sorry business can have a negative impact on social and emotional wellbeing, as detailed in the Bugmy Bar Book.234
Non-attendance may have a significant impact on social and emotional wellbeing. Other impacts of non-attendance include the following:
[T[he inability to attend the burial ceremony can cause great stress on Indigenous prisoners and offenders. Every opportunity to attend or secure some form of closure should be facilitated when deemed appropriate.235
For many Aboriginal people, failing to attend a funeral can be damaging to mental wellbeing. It may also be seen as a sign of disrespect for which there may be cultural consequences.236
[I]f attendance is required at a funeral because of the prisoner’s relationship to the deceased, failure to attend will cause distress and shame. In this regard it is important to understand that responsibility under Aboriginal customary law is often strict. The fact that a prisoner does not attend a funeral through no fault of their own (because they are in prison and have not been granted permission to attend) does not necessarily relieve them from the obligation to attend and the consequences that follow.237
It is known that the experience of bereavement itself means a higher risk for a range of negative physical, mental and social outcomes. Complicated grief or unresolved grief … further heightens this risk, with links to increased rates of cancer, heart disease, high blood pressure and suicidal thoughts … Hillin et al point out that mainstream research and health services have largely failed to understand and address the complexities of grief and loss for Aboriginal people, and its connection with health and well-being.238
In 2020, the Australian Human Rights Commission’s Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner received evidence that missing Sorry Business is one aspect of disconnection from culture for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women who are incarcerated,239 and may have a negative impact on reintegration following release:
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander perspectives on which relationships are important and central to our lives is poorly understood and the importance of Sorry Business is easily dismissed. This includes a lack of acknowledgement that there can be ramifications for missing Sorry Business that will make reintegration into the community unnecessarily more difficult.240
The Bugmy Bar Book chapter ‘Significance of Funeral Attendance and Sorry Business for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’241 assists decision-makers with applications by people who are incarcerated and seeking compassionate leave to attend funerals, or who are subject to conditions of bail or other orders restricting their ability to fulfil cultural obligations in relation to Sorry Business.
9.4.5 Homelessness
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are 15 times more likely to experience homelessness or be at risk of homelessness.242 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people make up 3.8% of the population243 and account for 20.4% of the homeless population.244 People experiencing homelessness face additional challenges accessing bail. Such challenges arise for a range of reasons including the assumption that everyone has housing.245
The Report of the Advisory Commission into the Incarceration Rates of Aboriginal people in South Australia observed:
While access to appropriate or stable accommodation is not legislated as a bail requirement, in practice, the requirement that a person have appropriate accommodation, or an appropriate address, has become a proxy for being satisfied that the person will attend court. This reflects a faulty assumption that if you don’t have an address, you shouldn’t be released. This false dichotomy is leading to people being detained needlessly. To dismantle the systemic racism in the bail system, these assumptions must be questioned and challenged.246
Western Australia’s Equal Justice Bench Book outlines some practical considerations for judicial officers to consider when an applicant has unstable housing:
If appropriate, you could enquire whether the Duty Lawyer or Aboriginal Court Officer might be able to assist an accused person who is experiencing homelessness to locate suitable accommodation.
If accommodation cannot be arranged, consider whether you can deal with the substantive charges immediately rather than adjourning a matter.
People who are homeless are likely to experience changes to their living situation during the time they are on bail. It would be helpful to enquire about their housing circumstances and any likely changes. It is quite burdensome for a person who is homeless to make applications to vary bail when their housing situation is constantly changing.
Where a person is experiencing, or likely to experience, homelessness during the bail period, it would be helpful to offer some flexibility in reporting requirements — for example, an option of reporting to two or more police stations depending on their circumstances (such as the location of services or addresses of other family members).
If a person who is experiencing homelessness is in custody, consider whether they have been referred to Bail Support Services (BSS) and ensure that all options have been considered and what supports/ transport the BSS can provide.247
The Bugmy Bar Book chapter ‘Homelessness’ gives a comprehensive summary of the impacts of homelessness.248
9.4.6 Bail and Customary Law Considerations: Commonwealth and NT Laws
Section 15AB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) sets out matters to be considered in bail applications in relation to a person charged with, or convicted of, an offence against a law of the Commonwealth or the Northern Territory. Subsection (1)(b) provides that a decision-maker
must not take into consideration any form of customary law or cultural practice as a reason for:
excusing, justifying, authorising, requiring or lessening the seriousness of the alleged criminal behaviour to which the alleged offence relates, or the criminal behaviour to which the offence relates; or
aggravating the seriousness of the alleged criminal behaviour to which the alleged offence relates, or the criminal behaviour to which the offence relates.249
Certain offences are excluded from this provision.250
Subsection (1)(b) does not, however, preclude the decision-maker from taking into account ‘customary law’ or ‘cultural background’ if it is not for the purpose of ‘excusing, justifying, authorising, requiring or lessening the seriousness of the alleged criminal behaviour’ or ‘aggravating the seriousness of the alleged criminal behaviour’. The decision-maker can determine on ordinary principles whether bail should be granted for family and cultural purposes such as attending a funeral or other significant ceremonies and cultural obligations.251
In Ebatarinja v The Queen,252 bail was sought so that the applicant could be subjected to traditional punishment. The Northern Territory Law Reform Committee observed:
The Court was satisfied that the defendant should be granted bail. It was accepted however, that the courts ought not to grant bail in order to facilitate an unlawful act but there was no evidence that any unlawful act was likely to occur. The defendant was found to hold an honest and genuine belief that Aboriginal magic could be used to punish him if he did not accept traditional punishment and that might affect his health if not released.253
In the case of Re Anthony,254 Martin CJ noted:
In respect of bail applications, without either approving or disapproving of particular traditional punishment, circumstances might arise in which it would be permissible and appropriate for a court to grant bail on terms that would allow lawful traditional punishment to occur. It is necessarily impossible to attempt to define the circumstances in which such a course would be permissible or appropriate, but I have in mind as an example minor physical punishment to which the offender is capable in law of consenting. If the court was satisfied that for cultural reasons such lawful punishment would be of benefit to the applicant, the victim, the victim’s family and the particular community, in my view it would be permissible for a court to structure orders in a way that would allow for the opportunity for such punishment to be inflicted.255
In Re Anthony, after receiving evidence from senior community members as to the form of traditional punishment proposed, the Court was satisfied that what was proposed as punishment carried a significant risk that the applicant would be subject to a level of harm that could not be consented to and would therefore be unlawful.256
Therefore, when taking into account traditional punishment as a factor to consider, granting bail will depend upon whether it is lawful conduct.257 The Northern Territory Law Reform Committee observed:
The ability of courts in the NT to take into consideration matters of customary law or cultural practice in sentencing and bail proceedings has been circumscribed by the amendments to the Crimes Act. No other jurisdiction has implemented similar reforms, nor has the Commonwealth sought to implement the same reforms in other Territories. In sentencing proceedings, Aboriginal defendants (amongst others) in the NT are subject to different considerations in arriving at sentence or a grant of bail than offenders in other jurisdictions.258
9.5 Sentencing
9.5.1 Introduction
Sentencing law has become increasingly complex and there are significant differences in sentencing law and approach across jurisdictions. States and territories have the benefit of sentencing bench books to guide judicial decision-making.259 There are also judicial resources with respect to sentencing and Commonwealth offences, such as the ‘Sentencing Commonwealth Offenders’ chapter of the Judicial Commission of New South Wales’s Sentencing Bench Book.260
The Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions has published Sentencing of Federal Offenders in Australia,261 providing helpful guidance for judicial officers and legal practitioners
The Pathways to Justice report recommended that ‘sentencing legislation should provide that, when sentencing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander offenders, courts take into account unique systemic and background factors affecting Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’.262
Some jurisdictions have specific provisions for considering Aboriginality and cultural issues, consistent with this recommendation. For example, in South Australia, s 22 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) enables the court to convene a ‘sentence conference’ for an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander person before the person is sentenced.
In Queensland, s 9 of the Penalties and Sentencing Act 1992 (Qld) requires that, when sentencing an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander person, the court must take into account any ‘cultural considerations, including the effect of systemic disadvantage and intergenerational trauma on the offender’.263 Queensland courts must also have regard to submissions made by a representative of a community justice group264 in the offender’s community that are relevant to sentencing the offender, including:
the offender’s relationship to the offender’s community; or
any cultural considerations, including the effect of systemic disadvantage and intergenerational trauma on the offender; or
any considerations relating to programs and services established for offenders in which the community justice group participates.265
When introducing this legislation, the Minister said that its purpose was ‘to get the courts to listen to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, to build bridges between these communities and the courts’.266 It was also said that it would be ‘expected that the advice of the community justice groups will lead to more appropriate sentencing options for offenders’ allowing for the ‘community to take a greater role in addressing offending behaviour in a culturally appropriate way’.267
In the Australian Capital Territory, the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) requires sentencing courts to take into account a person’s ‘cultural background’ if relevant and known to the court.268 Section 40A of this Act includes a person’s ‘cultural background’269 as a matter to be included in the content of pre-sentence reports (if stated in the court order for the report).270
It must be said that courts in every jurisdiction can take into account relevant evidence tendered in an offender’s subjective case (or other evidence, such as the content in court-ordered reports). This includes matters relevant to the offender’s cultural background and experiences of disadvantage and trauma, as well as evidence of the person’s strengths, including the strengths of their culture, family and community. The quality and depth of that evidence has a direct bearing upon the sentence option imposed and/or the length and structure of the sentence. Legal representatives have the responsibility to prepare and tender high-quality evidence to ensure the person’s whole story is before the court. Putting the best case forward at first instance is also important to protecting a client’s position on appeal where restrictions apply to introducing fresh evidence and submissions.
Substantive equality for First Nations people in sentencing has the capacity to be enhanced within existing legislation and principles across all states and territories. Achieving this requires legal practitioners and judicial officers to be open to learning and, at times, to be flexible in how they practise or deliver justice. The practical guidance provided in this part is drawn from the guiding themes set out at 9.1 Introduction and from the recommendations of leading research and reports.271 The following practices are discussed in more detail at 9.6 Enhancing Practice and 9.7 Therapeutic, Restorative and Solution-Focused Justice:
9.5.2 Sentencing First Nations Offenders — Systemic Factors
Whether sentencing courts should take into account systemic factors unique to First Nations people when sentencing First Nations offenders has been the subject of considerable consideration by courts, inquiries and academics.272
In the High Court, Brennan J in Neal v The Queen stated that the court when sentencing should have taken into account the ‘special problems’ experienced by Aboriginal people in the community:
The same sentencing principles are to be applied, of course, in every case, irrespective of the identity of a particular offender or his membership of an ethnic or other group. But in imposing sentences courts are bound to take into account, in accordance with those principles, all material facts including those facts which exist only by reason of the offender’s membership of an ethnic or other group. So much is essential to the even administration of criminal justice.273
In 1992, in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Wood J in R v Fernando274 identified the common law principles relating to sentencing First Nations offenders, setting out what are known as the Fernando principles:
The same sentencing principles are to be applied in every case irrespective of the identity of the particular offender or his membership of an ethnic or other group but that does not mean the sentencing court should ignore those facts which exist only by reason of the offender’s membership of such a group.
The relevance of the Aboriginality of an offender is not necessarily to mitigate punishment but rather to explain or throw light on the particular offence and the circumstances of the offender.
It is proper for the court to recognise that the problems of alcohol abuse and violence which to a very significant degree go hand in hand with Aboriginal communities are very real ones and their cure requires more subtle remedies than the criminal law can provide by way of imprisonment.
Notwithstanding the absence of any real body of evidence demonstrating that the imposition of significant terms of imprisonment provides any effective deterrent in either discouraging the abuse of alcohol by members of the Aboriginal society or their resort to violence when heavily affected by it, the courts must be very careful in the pursuit of their sentencing policies to not thereby deprive Aboriginals of the protection which it is assumed punishment provides. In short, a belief cannot be allowed to go about that serious violence by drunken persons within their society are treated by the law as occurrences of little moment.
While drunkenness is not normally an excuse or mitigating factor, where the abuse of alcohol by the person standing for sentence reflects the socio-economic circumstances and environment in which the offender has grown up, that can and should be taken into account as a mitigating factor. This involves the realistic recognition by the court of the endemic presence of alcohol within Aboriginal communities, and the grave social difficulties faced by those communities where poor self-image, absence of education and work opportunity and other demoralising factors have placed heavy stresses on them, reinforcing their resort to alcohol and compounding its worst effects.
That in sentencing persons of Aboriginal descent the court must avoid any hint of racism, paternalism or collective guilt yet must nevertheless assess realistically the objective seriousness of the crime within its local setting and by reference to the particular subjective circumstances of the offender.
That in sentencing an Aborigine who has come from a deprived background or is otherwise disadvantaged by reason of social or economic factors or who has little experience of European ways, a lengthy term of imprisonment may be particularly, even unduly, harsh when served in an environment which is foreign to him and which is dominated by inmates and prison officers of European background with little understanding of his culture and society or his own personality.
That in every sentencing exercise, while it is important to ensure that the punishment fits the crime and not to lose sight of the objective seriousness of the offence in the midst of what might otherwise be attractive subjective circumstances, full weight must be given to the competing public interest to rehabilitation of the offender and the avoidance of recidivism on his part.275
The Fernando principles were developed to ‘provide a framework for consideration of the issues of disadvantage often attending the subjective circumstances of individual Indigenous offenders’.276
In R v Fuller-Cust, Eames J referred to aspects of the Fernando principles as relevant and further observed, when considering the relevance of Aboriginality in sentencing in Victoria:
To ignore factors personal to the applicant, and his history, in which his Aboriginality was a factor, and to ignore his perception of the impact on his life of his Aboriginality, would be to sentence him as someone other than himself. Not only would that offend principles of individual sentencing which apply to all offenders but in this case it would fail to identify the reasons for his offending and, in turn, the issues which have to be addressed if rehabilitation efforts are to successfully be adopted so as to ensure that he does not re-offend and, in turn, to ensure the long-term safety of the public.277
In 2013, the High Court in Bugmy v The Queen did not accept that sentencing courts should take into account the unique systemic background factors on the basis that to do so was ‘antithetical to individualised justice’.278 The plurality (distinguishing this NSW case from the Canadian authorities279 relied upon by the appellant) held:
One evident point of distinction between the legislative principles governing the sentencing of offenders in Canada and those that apply in New South Wales is that s 5(1) of the [Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)] does not direct courts to give particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. The power of the Parliament of New South Wales to enact a direction of that kind does not arise for consideration in this appeal. Another point of distinction is the differing statements of the purposes of punishment under the Canadian and New South Wales statutes. There is no warrant, in sentencing an Aboriginal offender in New South Wales, to apply a method of analysis different from that which applies in sentencing a non-Aboriginal offender. Nor is there a warrant to take into account the high rate of incarceration of Aboriginal people when sentencing an Aboriginal offender. Were this a consideration, the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders would cease to involve individualised justice.280
The High Court confirmed that the sentencing court must take into account an offender’s experience of disadvantage in every sentence proceeding. In relation to the impact of adverse experiences, the Court stated:
The experience of growing up in an environment surrounded by alcohol abuse and violence may leave its mark on a person throughout life. Among other things, a background of that kind may compromise the person’s capacity to mature and to learn from experience. It is a feature of the person’s make-up and remains relevant to the determination of the appropriate sentence, notwithstanding that the person has a long history of offending.
Because the effects of profound childhood deprivation do not diminish with the passage of time and repeated offending, it is right to speak of giving ‘full weight’ to an offender’s deprived background in every sentencing decision.281
The Court further stated:
Giving weight to the conflicting purposes of punishment is what makes the exercise of the discretion so difficult. An offender’s childhood exposure to extreme violence and alcohol abuse may explain the offender’s recourse to violence when frustrated such that the offender’s moral culpability for the inability to control that impulse may be substantially reduced. However, the inability to control the violent response to frustration may increase the importance of protecting the community from the offender.282
Also in 2013, in Munda v Western Australia, the High Court affirmed the passage from Neal v The Queen quoted above,283 and cited the following passage from R v Fernando:
[I]n sentencing persons of Aboriginal descent the court must avoid any hint of racism, paternalism or collective guilt yet must nevertheless assess realistically the objective seriousness of the crime within its local setting and by reference to the particular subjective circumstances of the offender.284
The Court in Munda also said that ‘personal disadvantages affecting an individual offender may be, because of the circumstances in which they were engendered, so deep and so broad that they serve to shed light on matters such as, for example, an offender’s recidivism’.285 Further, where a crime is not premeditated, it could be argued that general deterrence has little rational claim upon the sentencing discretion and that this argument may have special force in the context of a person who has been exposed to prolonged and widespread social disadvantage.286
9.5.3 Causal Connection
There has been some divergence in the ways in which the Bugmy principles have been applied, in some respects, in different states and territories. One issue which has received particular attention is whether a causal connection between a person’s disadvantaged background and the person’s offending is required in order to enliven the Bugmy principles.
There is insufficient space in this chapter to detail the individual positions in relation to each jurisdiction. There are, however, a number of papers which address issues arising in the application of the Bugmy principles.287 Among these is the paper by Judge Beckett of the District Court of New South Wales, ‘The Bugmy Bar Book: Presenting Evidence of Disadvantage and Evidence Concerning the Significance of Culture on Sentence’.288 This paper helpfully summarises cases which demonstrate the prevailing view in New South Wales that it is not necessary to establish the existence of a causal connection with the offending before having regard to the Bugmy principles.
In relation to the ‘question of whether a causal link needs to be established between childhood deprivation and disadvantage and the commission of the offence’.289 Simpson AJA in R v MJ stated that this question was ‘apt to mislead’:
Where profound childhood deprivation and disadvantage has been established, to require that a causal link be established between that background and the commission of the offence is to misunderstand and undermine the ‘Bugmy principles’. It is only necessary to go to the joint judgment (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) in Bugmy to make the point. At [40] their Honours said:
‘The circumstance that an offender has been raised in a community surrounded by alcohol abuse and violence may mitigate the sentence because his or her moral culpability is likely to be less than the culpability of an offender whose formative years have not been marred in that way.’290
Her Honour also referred to Bugmy at [43] (extracted at 9.5.2 Sentencing First Nations Offenders — Systemic Factors) and stated:
Implicit in those observations is recognition that a childhood or adolescence marked by profound disadvantage may have an inhibitory effect on the development of values, on the acquisition of a moral compass, and on the capacity to make behavioural decisions in accordance with prevailing social norms. The relevant causal connection is between the dysfunctional background and the offender’s impaired socialisation and adjustment to, and conduct in accordance with, those social norms. To search for a causal connection between the dysfunctional background and the offence in question is to bypass the larger issue and to focus too narrowly on the offence. It ignores the compromise of the ‘capacity to mature and to learn from experience’: Bugmy at [43]. The plurality in the High Court were, as I understand [40] and [43] of the judgment, acknowledging the pervasive effect of profound deprivation, which is not confined to the commission of a single offence (or series of offences).291
And further:
To discount the effect of childhood disadvantage because no causal connection with the offence for which sentence is to be imposed is established is to ignore the subtleties and nuances of the considerations that the plurality in the High Court in Bugmy recognised. To ask whether there is a causal connection between a dysfunctional background and the offence for which sentence is to be passed is to ask the wrong question and potentially to mislead and distract from the essential question, which is the assessment of the offender’s moral culpability.292
The approach in R v MJ in relation to causal connection was endorsed by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in DS v The King.293
Victoria shares a similar position. In Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Herrmann, the Victorian Court of Appeal stated that ‘it may or may not be possible to establish a “nexus” or “realistic connection” between the offending and the relevant background circumstances’294 and explained:
[T]he ‘general’ approach enunciated in Bugmy is that the relevance of deprivation to sentencing does not depend on proof of such a nexus. As Victoria Legal Aid pointed out in its helpful submission as amicus curiae, ‘the impact of disadvantage is complex, multilayered, non-linear and not easily “diagnosed” or measured’. The High Court’s recognition that serious childhood deprivation is likely to make an offender less morally culpable than ‘an offender whose formative years were not marred in that way’ reflects the principle of equal justice.295
9.6 Enhancing Practice
The topics discussed below provide an opportunity for a deeper understanding of First Nations experiences and elevate the importance of culture, connection and community.
Embedding this guidance into practice when sentencing or appearing for First Nations people also provides greater potential for restorative outcomes for victims who wish to be involved in the process and enhancing community safety by tailoring sentencing outcomes which are based on a more comprehensive understanding of the person before the court.
9.6.1 Being Better Informed about Issues Often Faced by First Nations People
Understanding the ‘complex circumstances and conditions which shape First Nations peoples’ engagement with the legal system’ can better inform judicial decision-making (see 1.1.2 Why this Bench Book). Judicial officers who take time to educate themselves about First Nations history, culture and concepts are better placed to understand the whole person who stands before them to be sentenced. Non-Indigenous legal practitioners (prosecution and defence) should also undertake this education. There are many useful resources available to assist (see 9.16 Further Reading: 9.6 Enhancing Practice).
Enhancing knowledge about First Nations culture, history and concepts underpins a court’s and a practitioner’s capacity to practise in a culturally safe and trauma-informed way. Reading and reflecting on the content at 9.16 Further Reading: 9.6 Enhancing Practice is encouraged. Having a deeper understanding of the local First Nations communities where judicial officers sit should be supported and facilitated by judicial bodies and organisations (see 14 Judicial Practice).
In addition to enhancing education and practice of judicial officers, outcomes for First Nations people would also benefit from material, such as that identified above, being presented in sentence proceedings, where appropriate. This would be consistent with recommendation 6-3 of the Pathways to Justice report:
State and territory governments, in partnership with relevant Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander organisations and communities, should develop options for the presentation of information about unique systemic and background factors that have an impact on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in the courts of summary jurisdiction, including through Elders, community justice groups, community profiles and other means.296
In Bugmy v The Queen, the High Court said that taking judicial notice of the systemic background of deprivation of Aboriginal offenders may be ‘antithetical to individualised justice’.297 It is noted above at 9.4.1 Cultural Considerations that some jurisdictions have legislated to enable courts to take such matters into account. In jurisdictions where such legislation has not been enacted, it would nevertheless be open (as suggested by a number of stakeholders referred to in the Pathways to Justice report) for the court in individual cases to ‘take evidence into account [of] the unique systemic and background factors affecting Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander peoples’ and then proceed to review evidence as to the effect on that particular individual offender.298
9.6.2 Improving Evidence: Indigenous Experience Reports
The Pathways to Justice report recommended the introduction and use of Indigenous Experience Reports:
State and territory governments, in partnership with relevant Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander organisations, should develop and implement schemes that would facilitate the preparation of ‘Indigenous Experience Reports’ for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander offenders appearing for sentence in superior courts.299
The importance of these reports is summarised in detail at [6.115]–[6.164] of the Pathways to Justice report.300 Stakeholders identified that ‘submissions made on behalf of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander offenders progressing through mainstream courts were often rushed’,301 that courts do not have adequate information available to consider offenders’ backgrounds, including relevant cultural and historical factors,302 and that the lack of information was considered to be a widespread problem.303 The Victorian Aboriginal Legal Service (‘VALS’) submitted:
[T]here needed to be a mandated, community-led and culturally appropriate method to obtain such information that would assist the courts in finding alternative sentencing measures to prison. The method needed to directly address the impacts of colonisation and disadvantage experienced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. … such a process would ensure the courts are ‘playing a vital role’, not only in addressing the inequality of incarceration, but in ‘lowering prison rates for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’.304
In 2017, VALS initiated the Aboriginal Community Justice Report (‘ACJR’) program,305 an Aboriginal-designed and controlled project, which commenced in 2021. The program seeks to ‘provide sentencing courts with holistic information on an Aboriginal participant’s life story, community, culture, experience of the systemic impacts of colonisation and attitude to past actions and future plans’.306 The reports also provide the court with options for appropriate and individualised community-based sentence orders.307
An evaluation of the ACJR reports included interviews with judicial officers:
Judicial officers commented in interviews that the ACJR contributed to a ‘more informed and more appropriate’ sentence. One judicial officer noted that the sentence was reduced ‘because it gave me a richer understanding of Bugmy principles’. Or as one judge put it, ‘the ACJR breathed life into Bugmy’. This reduced the moral culpability of the defendant and gave the judicial officer a deeper understanding of the person’s needs. One judicial officer stated that the report gave them ‘more confidence in their decision’ and ‘clarified the path with regard to that decision’.308
Todd J in Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Jones309 detailed the contents and value of the ACJR reports:
[41] I turn now to the contents of that report. In the case of Bugmy v R, the High Court was careful to articulate the principle that sentencing an Aboriginal offender does not authorise the taking into account of an offender’s aboriginality per se, but rather should focus on the particular deprivations (which may or may not be derived from specific cultural circumstances) of the individual.
[42] In that case, the High Court also considered the Canadian case of R v Gladue, where the Canadian Court considered the sentence of an Aboriginal offender in the context of an amendment to Canadian sentencing legislation. That amendment required judges to take into consideration the principle that:
‘All available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.’
[43] No such legislative warrant is available to me, and I will sentence you according to the principles in the Sentencing Act and the common law, and in particular the cases of Fernando, Bugmy, Drake and Hermann.
[44] Often the evidentiary basis for making findings about the particular axes of deprivation that might give rise to the application of these sentencing principles for an Aboriginal person is unavailable; or, if available, derived from the disciplines of medicine or psychology.
[45] The information relied on for submissions about deprivation often appear in the form of background in a psychological or psychiatric report, completed by a professional with no cultural context for their subject, and often obtained after a very brief consultation. Diagnoses may or may not arise in that material, which may or may not create the evidentiary basis for particular legal considerations, such as those in the case of Verdins.
[46] The forensic report writing process is unable and unauthorised to investigate the broader, generational, historical context of an Aboriginal person’s circumstances.
[47] In applying the sentencing principles in such cases, the narrow nature of the evidence received by the court risks impoverishing the decision making on account of some of the same factors that have caused the deprivation in the first place: ignorance on the one hand and distrust on the other.
[48] In this case, however, I received an Aboriginal Community Justice Report which confronts this problem.
[49] This report has been provided as part of a pilot program over a five-year period, whereby reports, modelled on the Canadian Gladue reports, are commissioned and included in the sentencing process. It was researched and written by two Aboriginal women, who work within an Aboriginal-controlled Justice Unit of the Victorian Aboriginal Legal Service. The authors are employed by the University of Technology Sydney and supervised by Professor Thalia Anthony. The intention, as I understand it, is to create a report that can authoritatively analyse an Aboriginal person’s circumstances of deprivation and place this into a broader community, cultural and historical context.
[50] The first notable thing about the report is that it was written after 10 separate conferences with you, Mr Jones, over both video connection and in person. There was also consultation with your mum, Jemmes Handy, and with others.
[51] The history of your background of deprivation begins with a review of Barkindji history, to provide an understanding of the enduring and inherited trauma in Barkindji descendants today.
[52] This account starts with a description of Barkindji country, which is river country in the north west of Victoria, where there is evidence of 60,000 years of habitation. The report traces the decimation of the relationship between the Barkindji people and their country over the last five generations. The report details the different attacks on the Barkindji way of life, from the introduction of disease, to the imposition of discriminatory law imposed by European settlers, to discriminatory economic practices.
[53] The report also details the tenacity with which Barkindji people have retained their connection to culture, which is strongly expressed through art, family and knowledge of country. It is also a history of endurance and resilience.
[54] You, Mr Jones, participated in the process of the creation of that report, which in itself was a lengthy and very personal experience.
[55] The result is a detailed account of how your personal history, and the systemic racism imposed upon Barkindji people over the last five generations, merge. Just one example is how your whole life has been framed by housing insecurity and homelessness. While you have often had places to sleep, your presence in other people’s homes often causes conflict, and has left you feeling unwelcome and unwanted. The report writers observe that displacement is a recurring theme in your life and a distressing parallel to your Barkindji ancestors, who were subjected to direct and indirect dispersal due to colonial policies and violence.
[56] There is a rigour and solidity to this report; it gives me the evidentiary basis to accept that intergenerational trauma is relevant to both your circumstances and to the content of your offending now before me, and I take it into account in moderating my assessment of your moral culpability for your offending, and in applying more generally the Bugmy principles. I also take into account your willing and courageous participation in the report’s construction.
[57] Having regard to the content of the report, I have a much more informed appreciation of the matters personal to you, and I also have evidence of the profound and structural disadvantages you have endured, and which inform your responses to the world around you. I give these matters full weight in my sentencing decision.
[58] The summary and proposed interventions at the end of the report are a particularly useful guide, to both your past and your future.310
9.6.3 Including Strengths and Disadvantage
In an adversarial system, defence practitioners are tasked with preparing and adducing evidence in a person’s subjective case; this section is thus directed towards practitioners. However, judicial officers will be assisted by this content to inform judicial decision-making, for example, by considering reframing judgments to avoid a deficit narrative, better understand the significance of individual, family and community strengths, and actively look for and identify strengths within a person’s subjective case. This will assist when determining the weight to be applied to evidence of strengths and resilience when applying sentencing principles, making decisions about sentencing options and risk assessments, and devising conditions of community-based sentencing options.
With respect to relying on experiences of disadvantage, Bugmy v The Queen has placed a responsibility on legal representatives to provide evidence:
In any case in which it is sought to rely on an offender’s background of deprivation in mitigation of sentence, it is necessary to point to material tending to establish that background.311
Lawyers also have a responsibility to be mindful of avoiding a solely deficit narrative in the evidence prepared for and presentation of their case. Hopkins et al provide an explanation of what is meant by a deficit narrative:
Deficit-based discourse ‘is a mode of thinking that frames and represents Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in a narrative of negativity, deficiency and failure’. Discussions of the socio-economic disadvantage faced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples are not of themselves deficit-based discourse. Deficit-based discourse occurs when these discussions, which paradoxically are often aimed at alleviating disadvantage, become ‘reductionist narratives of failure and dysfunction’. In the words of Ambelin Kwaymullina, who belongs to the Palyku people:
‘To be clear, not every discourse that acknowledges Indigenous disadvantage is one of deficit. A deficit discourse is one that speaks of disadvantage as if that is all Aboriginal people are and which expressly or implicitly regards disadvantage as a function of Aboriginality.’
Expressed another way, deficit narratives present disadvantage as an inherent quality of being Indigenous, rather than a consequence of colonial oppression and structural forces bearing upon Indigenous peoples over multiple generations. Such presentations deny the truth of history [and] reinforce colonial ideologies … [rather than identifying] the strengths of culture and community, and recognising the myriad unique experiences of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, their resilience and resurgence. Inversely, highlighting the deficiencies of the system that benefits from its power and privilege over First Nations people can contribute to changing the system. This can open up critical discussions on carceralism, as a choice of those in power and prison abolition as a shift in power relations. Returning to the language of courts, the deficits of prisons and their risk of retraumatising First Nations people is largely unaddressed. Instead, the reliance is on the faults of individuals.312
Legal representatives should actively consider and ensure that evidence of the strengths of their client, their family, community and culture are put before the court. In contrast to a deficit discourse, a strengths-based discourse
offers a different language and frame for considering Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander experiences. This frame rests on the recognition of colonialism, as well as the historical and present-day structural forces shaping Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander lives, enabling a contextual strengths-based engagement with experience, including experiences of disadvantage. Features of a strengths-based approach and discourse include a focus on ‘assets’ and protective factors; the power of community, cultural connectedness and healing; and the adoption of decolonising approaches.313
Presenting evidence of strength is critical to ensure that the court has a full and accurate understanding of the client’s situation when assessing, for example, prospects of rehabilitation, likelihood of re-offending and community protection.
9.6.3.1 Social and Emotional Wellbeing (‘SEWB’) Model
The social and emotional wellbeing (‘SEWB’) model of care is discussed is depth in 1 Introduction and in the Significance of Culture report.314
The SEWB model, while developed in a First Nations health context, is useful for legal practitioners and judicial officers to better understand sources of strengths and the significance of connections. It is not suggested that this model be used as a framework for leading discussions with clients as this may be confronting for people who may have experienced disconnection and/or dispossession.
Non-Indigenous practitioners should undertake training and seek advice from First Nations people, working with their clients to build their capacity and meet their responsibility to communicate with their clients and their families in a culturally safe way.
The SEWB model can also be useful for informing (where possible and appropriate) cultural healing and/or treatment plans. Where possible and appropriate, healing and treatment plans should be written by, have input from or be reviewed by First Nations health professionals or other First Nations service providers.
9.6.4 Guidance: Layers of Evidence
Every case is different and particular evidence will need to be obtained in individual cases to ensure relevant matters are presented to the court.
The guidance below on setting out four ‘layers of evidence’ is not intended to be used as a pro forma for approaching the preparation of evidence but, rather, to support practice when considering how subjective evidence may be strengthened.
9.6.4.1 Layer 1: The Client’s Personal, Family and Community Story
Sources may include:
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Client’s narrative: oral evidence, recorded evidence, affidavit, statement, letter and/or a history in a psychological report, sentence assessment report or other report.
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Family members or other community members who can speak to the client’s early years and current circumstances: teachers, carers, doctors, counsellors, in the form of oral evidence, affidavits or statements.
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Personal records: e.g. counsellor notes, medical documents, child protection services records or school records.
It is always important, if possible and appropriate, to seek advice and support from family and First Nations people working with the client to identify if there is a First Nations organisation or service provider to obtain or assist with taking a statement or affidavit from a client about their story.
9.6.4.2 Layer 2: Evidence about the Community Where the Person Grew Up
This may include experiences of disadvantage and should also include evidence of strengths.
With respect to adverse experiences, Judge Yehia explained in R v Sharpley that the impact of widespread social disadvantage in a place where a person spent their formative years may be ‘relevant to the consideration of the relationship of these background matters to the assessment of the particular offender’s moral culpability and proper consideration of the principles of proportionality and equal justice’.315 It is critical to identify and elevate the evidence which demonstrates the strength and resilience of the family, community, culture and connections which support the client.
Sources may include:
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Evidence of the client, family and community members (similar to layer 1).
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Evidence in this layer may extend to people in the community who did not know the client as closely but may have known their family or the nature of the community at the relevant time: e.g. Elders, field officers, extended family, people who provided services and support (e.g. teachers, counsellors).
R v Sharpley316 provides an example of adducing evidence of challenges experienced by the broader community. In this case, evidence was adduced in two ways: Walgett Gamilaraay Community Working Party in 2005 (see judgment at [5] for a description of the evidence by the working party), and field officer, Mr Gary Trindall (description of evidence adduced from [9] in the judgment).
Evidence relating to the community where a person grew up and other systemic issues may also be drawn from published statistics, historical documents, submissions or other documents produced by community representatives.
9.6.4.3 Layer 3: Evidence Relating to the Client’s Current Support Network, Treatment, Positive Engagement and Protective Factors
Sources may include:
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Reports by treating or forensic psychiatrists or psychologists. It is important to be mindful of the cultural competency of the expert engaged and any assessment tools intended to be applied in the assessment. When briefing non-First Nations experts, it may be helpful to provide relevant extracts from the Significance of Culture report (or other relevant research). You may request that the expert develop treatment plans which have regard to the SEWB model of care (see 9.6.3.1 Social and Emotional Wellbeing (‘SEWB’) Model).
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General practitioners, community/cultural health and other services, social workers or case workers.
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Those involved in the client’s life who can speak to topics such as education, employment, community engagement and other activities.
The quality of the above evidence can be enhanced by assisting clients to connect to appropriate services. This is best achieved by obtaining advice from field officers or First Nations people supporting the person. Ideally, this is done very early so that the community connections can build and the benefits of the referrals are greater.
It is also important to ensure that all of the positive subjective material relating to the client’s support networks, cultural support and treatment is provided to any report writer (after obtaining instructions to do so) to improve the depth and quality of any report requested.
9.6.4.4 Layer 4: Credible and Reliable Research
Practitioners may rely upon the Bugmy Bar Book research (and other research) and expert reports by tendering the material (or extracts of it) in the subjective case. For detailed guidance on how research can be used to enhance a subjective case and be used in proceedings, see:
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Rebecca McMahon, ‘The Bar Book Project: Making Use of the Bar Book in Sentence and Section 32 Proceedings’ (Conference Paper, Legal Aid Criminal Law Conference 2019)
See also the papers by Judge Sophia Beckett:
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‘The Bar Book: Presenting Evidence of Disadvantage’ (Conference Paper, Public Defenders Annual Criminal Law Conference 2019, Updated 2021); and
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‘The Bar Book Project: The Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation’ (2021) 33(9) Judicial Officers’ Bulletin 91.
An example of a case relying on research, which pre-dates the introduction of the Bugmy Bar Book, is Kentwell v The Queen (No 2).317 Rothman J (with whom Bathurst CJ and McCallum J agreed) confirmed that there needs to be an evidentiary foundation before research can be relied upon:
The studies by Professor Baumeister, reference to which is contained in the judgment in Lewis, make clear that such extreme social exclusion will likely result in anti-social behaviour and most likely result in criminal offending. However, in each case, there must be evidence to suggest the application of these principles and the effect of the exclusion. In this case, the evidence in relation to the appellant of that factor is substantial.318
The uncontested background of the applicant relating to social exclusion in Kentwell came from the pre-sentence report:
[The applicant was] born in Broken Hill to Aboriginal parents and adopted out to a non-Aboriginal family at 12 months of age. The applicant described himself as ‘a black fella in a white fella’s world’ and had trouble in school due to his Aboriginality.
[He] grew up ignorant of his Aboriginal cultural heritage, drank alcohol because he felt out of place at school and has suffered from a drinking problem from the age of 15. He was asked to leave home (being the home of his adoptive parents) when he was 17 years of age due to his drinking and fighting.319
Rothman J applied the research as follows:
I proceeded in Lewis to rely upon studies in the United States of America relating to the effect on behaviour of social exclusion and discrimination. It is unnecessary to reiterate those comments or refer in detail again to the studies.
Those studies disclose, somewhat counter-intuitively, that social exclusion from the prevailing group has a direct impact and causes high levels of aggression, self-defeating behaviours, and reduced pro-social contributions to society as a whole, poor performance in intellectual spheres and impaired self-regulation. While intuitively, for those who have not themselves suffered such extreme social exclusion, the response to exclusion would be greater efforts to secure acceptance, the above studies make clear that the opposite occurs.
Thus, a person, such as the appellant, who has suffered extreme social exclusion on account of his race, even from the family who had adopted him, is likely to engage in self-defeating behaviours and suffer the effects to which earlier reference has been made. This is how the appellant has been affected.320
The Bugmy Bar Book maintains a summary of cases referring to its research which can assist courts and practitioners to consider how the research can inform judicial decision-making.
9.7 Therapeutic, Restorative and Solution-Focused Justice
The Pathways to Justice report recommended:
Where needed state and territory governments should establish specialist Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander sentencing courts. These courts should incorporate individualised case management, wraparound services, and be culturally competent, culturally safe and culturally appropriate.321
9.7.1 Specialist Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Sentencing Courts
The specialist Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander sentencing courts in Australia are set out in Table 10:322
9.7.2 Therapeutic Courts
A list of therapeutic or solution-focused courts around Australia is listed in Table 10.
The Justice Reform Initiative has prepared reports for every jurisdiction; these provide research and information about speciality courts, diversion and diversion programs: https://www.justicereforminitiative.org.au/reports.
There has been some judicial consideration of specialist courts. For example, the purpose and procedures of sentencing conferences and the Nunga Court in South Australia were explained by Gray J in R v Wanganeen.323 In Harlovich v Sebbens, Loukas-Karlsson J explained the aims and procedures of the Galambany Circle Sentencing Court.324
Read a first-hand reflection of the Walama List process from a proud Barkindji man and graduate of the Walama List: Story: A Barkindji Man’s Reflection on the Walama List.325
While some of the therapeutic courts in the criminal jurisdiction across Australia are legislated (such as various drug courts and mental health courts), many others are initiatives by existing courts establishing specialist lists and divisions and delivering justice through the use of existing powers.326 In other cases, courts are establishing lists which adopt therapeutic elements of specialist courts into mainstream courts.327
Mainstream courts have the capacity to adopt solution-focused approaches. Adopting practices consistent with the guiding themes (see 9.1 Introduction and 1 Introduction) and strategies for enhancing practice (9.6 Enhancing Practice) are achievable ways of bringing therapeutic and restorative elements to daily court practice.
Specialist courts invariably support participants to connect to the supports and services they need to address issues such as underlying trauma, mental health issues, drug and alcohol dependence, housing and engaging in education, work and other activities to heal and build their capacity re-engage positively with their families and communities. Participants return to court periodically to enable the judicial officer to monitor their progress and these proceedings can be an opportunity to offer encouragement. Representatives of the support services will often attend with the participant to report on the participant’s progress. Mainstream courts have the power to engage in this type of process through specific powers to defer sentencing for rehabilitation and other purposes328 or general adjournment powers.
Mainstream courts throughout Australia would benefit from further guidance and training and access to resources to support introducing solution-focused approaches.
In Aotearoa New Zealand, an initiative known as Te Ao Mārama329 was introduced in 202 by the Chief Judge of the District Court, his Honour Judge Heemi Taumaunu. Te Ao Mārama means ‘the world of light’. The New Zealand Ministry of Justice stated that Te Ao Mārama ‘signals a more enlightened approach to justice in the District Court’.330 Te Ao Mārama is a response to long-term calls for transformative change and concerns by victims, defendants and whānau331 that they have found court processes ‘confusing, alienating, disempowering and retraumatising’. A key aim of the process is to reduce the disproportionate over-representation of Māori people in the justice system.
The Te Ao Mārama Best Practice Framework refers to improving justice outcomes, including in mainstream courts, by following eight best practice approaches:
Enhance connections with local communities
Improve the quality of information judicial officers receive to inform their decisions
Improve processes for victims and complainants
Encourage people to feel heard in the courtroom
Establish alternative courtroom layouts
Use plain language
Tone down formalities
Adopt solution-focused judging approaches.332
A solution-focused judging approach asks ‘What has happened to this person to bring them to this point in their life?’ and then addresses those causes.333
The Te Ao Mārama initiative is a judicially led set of principles, partnering with iwi334 and communities to work with the court and justice sector agencies to ensure all court participants, including offenders, victims and whānau can better understand and participate in cases relating to them.
While there are effective and culturally safe services supporting people charged with offences, a further challenge for the criminal justice system is the availability of appropriate community-based services and supports, including those which are culturally safe. Supporting First Nations organisations to expand or design and deliver culturally safe mental health, rehabilitation, disability and other services and supports (including in regional and remote areas) would significantly enhance the effectiveness of therapeutic and mainstream courts and, in many cases, provide the basis for courts to impose community-based sentences as opposed to full-time custody.
9.8 Case Summaries: 9.2 Interactions with Police
Keywords
Arrest as a last resort — Lawful arrest may be improper — Summons should be used by police for minor offences — Evidence obtained in consequence of an impropriety — Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) (‘Evidence Act’) s 138
Procedural History
Appeal to quash a magistrate’s orders under s 109(a) of the Justices Act 1902 (NSW)
Facts
In February 1999, Constable Robins approached Mr Carr in regard to a minor incident. Mr Carr, who was intoxicated, refused to cooperate and swore at Constable Robins, saying, ‘Fuck you. I didn’t fucken do it, you can get fucked’. Constable Robins then arrested Mr Carr for offensive language. Mr Carr struggled and was further charged with resisting, assaulting and intimidating police. The magistrate held that the arrest was lawful but improper, and that the evidence relating to these charges was obtained in consequence of an impropriety under s 138 of the Evidence Act. The magistrate found that Constable Robins could have proceeded by way of summons or a field court attendance notice (‘FCAN’) instead of making an arrest. The Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’) appealed.
Issues
There were three issues on appeal. The first was whether the meaning of ‘improper’ in s 138 of the Evidence Act requires bad faith, abuse of power, or intentional wrongdoing by police. The second issue was whether Constable Robins’ arrest for minor offences improper because a summons or FCAN could have been issued. The third was whether the evidence of subsequent charges against Mr Robinson was obtained in consequence of improper arrest within the meaning of s 138(1)(b).
Held
Smart AJ dismissed the appeal and made no order as to costs.
His Honour rejected the DPP’s submission that impropriety requires ‘bad faith’ or ‘an abuse of power’. His Honour distinguished Ridgeway v The Queen335 as that case had a different factual context. As he explained (at [22]):
Ridgeway involved a serious drug offence. With minor offences, any impropriety is likely to be of a lesser order with lesser consequences. Nevertheless, it will be important. As the justices pointed out the inquiry is whether what was done (or not done) is inconsistent with minimum standards of acceptable police conduct in all the circumstances. The justices did not attempt to define what ‘improper’ meant.
Impropriety covers a broader range of conduct than illegality. His Honour agreed that ‘what is improper will vary from case to case and will be determined by reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of each case’ (at [27]).
His Honour agreed with the magistrate’s finding that Constable Robins’ decision to arrest was improper and ‘born of expediency’ because it was ‘far quicker’ to arrest a ‘drunk, hostile, aggressive swearing’ man (at [36]). His Honour reiterated that it is improper to arrest a person for a minor offence when the person presents no flight risk at [35]:
This Court in its appellate and trial divisions has been emphasising for many years that it is inappropriate for powers of arrest to be used for minor offences where the defendant’s name and address are known, there is no risk of him departing and there is no reason to believe that a summons will not be effective. Arrest is an additional punishment involving deprivation of freedom and frequently ignominy and fear. The consequences of the employment of the power of arrest unnecessarily and inappropriately and instead of issuing a summons are often anger on the part of the person arrested and an escalation of the situation leading to the person resisting arrest and assaulting the police. The pattern in this case is all too familiar. It is time that the statements of this Court were heeded.
In the present case, Constable Robins had been a police officer for five years. He knew Mr Carr as a long-term resident of Wellington and where he lived. There was no question as to Mr Carr’s identity and his usual place of residence. Constable Robins was aware that it was open to him to proceed by way of summons or a FCAN. His Honour criticised Constable Robins’ action, observing that he ‘escalated the incident and led to the alleged commission of further offences’ (at [37]).
Smart AJ agreed with the DPP’s submission that, even if the arrest was improper, the mere fact that Mr Carr’s resisting, assaulting and intimidating police happened after the arrest did not necessarily make the evidence of those acts ‘obtained’ for the purpose of s 138(1) of the Evidence Act (at [52]). However, his Honour noted that the present case concerned obtaining evidence of new offences precipitated by police impropriety. As his Honour explained at [63]:
There is a distinction between the commission of further offences by a defendant as a result of improper police conduct which precipitated them … and evidence improperly obtained as to past offences and unconnected with further offences …The person arrested may in a state of anger at his ill-advised arrest commit a serious crime … In such a case, the evidence of those subsequent acts would be admitted. On the other hand he may commit a relatively minor crime such as a mild assault or resist arrest. Further, he may, if moderately intoxicated, utter threats never intended to be carried out.
Smart AJ endorsed the magistrate’s finding, albeit with the caution that it was confined to the particular facts. His Honour stated at [67]–[68]:
The magistrate held (transcript at 12 of 19 May 2000):
‘I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the evidence that’s sought to be excluded is in consequence of the impropriety, and … I believe that the correct test to apply is to ask what would have happened if the impropriety, that is, the arrest, had not occurred. More importantly the reason that the defendant resisted and assaulted police … is a direct consequence of him being placed under arrest, there’s no suggestion he was violent before he was placed under arrest … and the words are only used and he’s only there because he’s been arrested and taken back to the police station. … Accordingly, I find that the evidence was obtained in consequence of an impropriety …
… this case is unique. I can’t see any other case where concrete physical evidence has sought [sic] to be excluded as a result of impropriety except for the search warrant cases that really relate to illegality … but … the same rules apply as for admissions or anything else really that happened back at the police station …’
Smart AJ held (at [82]) that the impropriety was serious:
The fact that a police officer has acted lawfully, honestly and with integrity does not prevent the impropriety being serious. In the present case the officer’s failure to consider the issue of a summons and his predisposition to FCANs for reasons of expediency was ill-advised and led predictably, to arrest and the deprivation of liberty of Mr Carr. That impropriety was serious.
Keywords
False imprisonment — Wrongful arrest — Arrest without warrant — Conditions precedent to exercise of power — Honest but mistaken belief in existence of power
Procedural History
Appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory (Franki J)
Facts
In August 1976, Inspector Broomby of the ACT Police Force arrested Sergeant Donaldson of the same force without a warrant, mistakenly relying on s 352 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (‘NSW Crimes Act’). Sergeant Donaldson was charged with several offences, including larceny. At the time of arrest, Inspector Broomby did not consider issuing a summons, as it was common practice within the ACT Police Force to commence criminal matters involving adults by way of arrest. Sergeant Donaldson sued Inspector Broomby in the Supreme Court, seeking compensation for false imprisonment and wrongful arrest. Franki J held the arrest to be unlawful, but Donaldson’s claim failed because he had not given the one-month notice required under s 563 of the NSW Crimes Act. Sergeant Donaldson then appealed.
Issues
The Court considered whether, if a police officer mistakenly relied on s 352 of the NSW Crimes Act to effect the arrest, the officer was entitled to the protection of s 563 of the NSW Crimes Act on the basis that the arrest was ‘reasonably supposed to have been done in pursuance of this Act’.
Held
The majority (Deane J, Kelly J agreeing, Fisher J dissenting) allowed the appeal and awarded $1000 in damages for wrongful arrest, with full costs.
The majority held that Sergeant Donaldson’s arrest by Inspector Broomby constituted false imprisonment and wrongful arrest. The only general power of arrest without a warrant Inspector Broomby could rely on was s 8A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). As Inspector Broomby did not have reasonable grounds to believe that proceedings by summons would be ineffective, the conditions required to exercise that power were not met. Therefore, the arrest without warrant was unlawful (at 527).
Deanne J (at 525–6) began his judgment by emphasising the intrusive nature of arrest:
Arrest is the deprivation of freedom. The ultimate instrument of arrest is force. The customary companions of arrest are ignominy and fear. A police power of arbitrary arrest is a negation of any true right to personal liberty. A police practice of arbitrary arrest is a hallmark of tyranny. It is plainly of critical importance to the existence and protection of personal liberty under the law that the circumstances in which a police officer may, without judicial warrant, arrest or detain an individual should be strictly confined, plainly stated and readily ascertainable.
Keywords
Arrest without warrant — Purpose of arrest — Intention to charge — Intention to bring a person before an authorised person — Arrest merely for purpose of asking questions or making investigations — Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) s 99
Procedural History
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales (McColl and Basten JJA, Emmett A-JA dissenting)
Facts
On 22 December 2013, Bradford James Robinson voluntarily entered the Sydney City Police Station regarding an alleged breach of an Apprehended Violence Order with the police. Upon his arrival, Constable Smith arrested Mr Robinson without a warrant. Mr Robinson participated in a voluntary interview and was later released without charge. He sued the State of New South Wales in the District Court, claiming damages for false imprisonment. The State argued that the arrest was lawful under s 99 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) (‘LEPRA’). Mr Robinson’s claim was dismissed at first instance, then succeeded in the Court of Appeal. The State sought special leave to appeal to the High Court.
Issues
The Court considered whether a police officer may lawfully arrest a person without a warrant under s 99 of the LEPRA when, at the time of the arrest, the officer has not formed an intention to take the person before an authorised officer to answer a charge for an offence.
Held
The majority (Bell, Gageler, Gordon and Edelman JJ; Kiefel CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ dissenting) dismissed the State’s appeal with costs.
The majority found that Constable Smith had no intention, at the time of arrest, of bringing Mr Robinson before an authorised officer to be dealt with according to law. Instead, Constable Smith intended to do so only if sufficient evidence later emerged to justify a charge. His decision to charge depended on what Mr Robinson said during the voluntary interview, showing that the arrest was made for investigative purposes rather than for the purpose of answering a charge. Consequently, the arrest was unlawful under s 99 of the LEPRA (at [116]).
The majority’s reasoning drew heavily on Jordan CJ’s decision in Bales v Parameter.336 The majority restated the ‘single criterion’ for arrest at [63]:
An arrest can only be for the purpose of taking the arrested person before a magistrate (or other authorised officer) to be dealt with according to law to answer a charge for an offence. An arrest merely for the purpose of asking questions or making investigations in order to see whether it would be proper or prudent to charge the arrested person with a crime is an arrest for an improper purpose and is unlawful.
The majority held that the powers conferred on police under s 99 of the LEPRA are exercisable only for the purpose of taking the person before a magistrate (or other authorised officer) to be dealt with according to law to answer a charge. The majority further noted that an arrest ‘merely for the purpose of questioning’ or ‘asking questions or making investigations’ is improper and therefore unlawful (at [93], [110]). The majority explained that this ‘single criterion’ for arrest has remained unchanged despite the enactment and amendment of the LEPRA (at [94]).
The majority clarified what compliance with s 99 requires:
Section 99(1) stipulates conditions for arrest without a warrant, namely that ‘the police officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the person is committing or has committed an offence’ and that ‘the police officer is satisfied that the arrest is reasonably necessary for any one or more’ of specified reasons. And a police officer who arrests a person under s 99 must, as soon as is reasonably practicable, take the person before an authorised officer to be dealt with according to law. That is a requirement that takes effect immediately upon arrest. To comply with the requirement in s 99(3) immediately upon arrest, a police officer must at the time of arrest have an intention to take the person, as soon as is reasonably practicable, before an authorised officer to be dealt with according to law to answer a charge for that offence. If there is no intention to comply with the requirement in s 99(3), the arrest is unlawful. And a requirement for the police officer to have an intention to bring a person before an authorised officer means, as a matter of substance, a requirement to have an intention to charge that person.
9.9 Case Summaries: 9.3 Court Bail
Keywords
Coroner’s inquest — Death in custody — First Nations woman — Bail offence — Unrepresented bail application — Bail Act 1977 (Vic) — Consideration of exceptional circumstances test to grant bail — Unacceptable risk test — Failure to administer proper medical care
Summary
Veronica Nelson, a Gunditjmara, Dja Dja Wurrung, Wiradjuri and Yorta Yorta woman, died in custody following an unsuccessful bail application for offences relating to theft from a shop and failure to appear at court while on bail. The bail laws in the Bail Act 1977 (Vic) operate discriminatorily as people who commit low-level offences that do not pose a threat to the community can be refused bail unless they can prove that there are exceptional circumstances. In Veronica’s bail application, there was also a failure to take into account (a mandatory consideration) her Aboriginality.
Facts
Ms Nelson was arrested on outstanding warrants relating to the indictable offence of theft of fragrances from a shop and for the summary offence of failing to appear on bail at the Magistrates’ Court.337
Under s 4AA(2)(c) of the Bail Act 1997 (Vic) (‘Bail Act’), which was brought in by amendments in 2018, Veronica had to prove there were exceptional circumstances required to justify a grant of bail as she had committed a sch 2 offence (a theft) while she was on bail for another offence related to a theft from a shop.338 Determining whether there are exceptional circumstances involves considering surrounding circumstances; this includes whether the accused is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander person.339 Even if exceptional circumstances have been proven to justify bail, then under s 4E of the Bail Act, bail must still be refused if the accused would pose an unacceptable risk of flight, further offending, endangering public safety or the administration of justice.340 Under s 3A of the Bail Act, issues that arise due to the person’s Aboriginality must be taken into account when determining bail. These include (non-exhaustively) the ongoing systemic discrimination against Aboriginal people, the importance of maintaining connection to culture, and any trauma or intergenerational trauma experienced.
A barrister, Mr Antos, met with Veronica but only for a maximum of six minutes,341 and she was left legally unrepresented in her bail application.342 Veronica submitted that she should be granted bail in order to care for her mother and brother who were ill.343 She was not granted bail as she was unable to establish exceptional circumstances to justify the grant of bail,344 and she was remanded in custody at the Dame Phyllis Frost Centre.345
Veronica suffered from opioid dependence and while in custody went into withdrawal after being prescribed a standard withdrawal pack by a doctor at the medical centre.346 While being very unwell, she was transferred from the medical centre cell to a mainstream accommodation unit.347 Veronica was repeatedly ignored despite using the intercom 49 times over 36 hours, reporting severe cramps, vomiting and distress.348 On 2 January 2020, between 2am and 4am, she used the intercom 11 times to request help for her worsening cramps and continued vomiting, and the medical staff and prison officers were dismissive of the state she was in.349 She was found dead on the floor of her cell later that morning due to complications of withdrawal from chronic opiate use.350
Held
The Coroner raised the fact that the prosecutor did not bring his attention to s 3A of the Bail Act which provides that a bail decision-maker must take into account any issues that arise in regard to the person’s Aboriginality when granting bail.351 This provision was described as a special measure to redress the historical and continuing disadvantage faced by Aboriginal people in the criminal justice system.352 Section 3A should centre Aboriginality in the determination of an application for bail, and proper weight should have been given to Veronica’s ‘kinship ties, the significance of her mother and brother’s ill health, her cultural connection to Country and community, and the unique disadvantages she experienced as an Aboriginal woman in the criminal justice system’.353 The prosecutor had information that Veronica was Aboriginal and would have known that s 3A of the Bail Act was a mandatory consideration, but he did not alert the bail decision-maker of this,354 and therefore ‘failed to properly consider Veronica’s Charter rights’.355
The Coroner discussed how the 2018 Bail Act amendments have resulted in low level, non-violent and objectively not serious offences (including repeated bail offences which present no risk to community safety) routinely resulting in remand as these offences attract the ‘exceptional circumstance’ test.356 Even if exceptional circumstances are met, it must be shown that the person does not present an unacceptable risk to the community.357 The unacceptable risk is not confined to risks of safety but also to the risk of failing to meet bail, and this means that non-violent and objectively not serious offences that don’t have potential to endanger the community are captured.358 The Coroner determined that this has discriminatory effects for socially disadvantaged groups, stating:
By categorising the ‘unacceptable risk’ in these broad ways, ‘needs’ have become equated with ‘risk’ with discriminatory effects for people already experiencing social disadvantage. If an accused is homeless, suffering from mental illness or drug or alcohol dependence (or a combination of similar factors), they will present to the court as an increased risk of failing to appear and of committing further offences. They are more likely to be refused bail notwithstanding that they may not present with the kind of alleged offending of greatest concern to the community.
The fact that Veronica was legally unrepresented affected her bail application outcome, and the six minutes she had to meet with the barrister, Mr Antos, was not enough time for him to perform the necessary tasks to appropriately advise her.359 His conduct fell short of the standard expected of a legal practitioner,360 and suggests that he was not alert to her vulnerability as an Aboriginal woman in custody.361
The discriminatory operation of the bail laws, as well as the failure to take into consideration that Veronica was an Aboriginal woman when determining the bail application, meant she was placed in an environment of state control that failed in its obligation to protect her life. The inquest found that Veronica’s death was preventable as there was a ‘very high change’ she would have survived if she had been transferred to a hospital for proper medical care.362
Keywords
Bail — Where the applicant is a 33-year-old Aboriginal woman with mental health issues — Where unlikely that a term of full-time imprisonment would be imposed if convicted — Reference to the Bugmy Bar Book chapter ‘Impacts of Imprisonment and Remand in Custody’
Summary
An Aboriginal woman with a history of mental health and substance abuse issues was granted bail after being charged with stalk and intimidate and being armed with intent to commit an indictable offence. It was found that she did not pose an ‘unacceptable risk’ under s 19(1) of the Bail Act 2013 (NSW) (‘Bail Act’) and that her underlying issues would be better treated outside the custodial system.
Facts
The applicant, a 33-year-old Aboriginal woman, pleaded not guilty to offences of stalking and intimidating contrary to s 13(1) of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW), and being armed with intent to commit an indictable offence, contrary to s 114(1)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).363 The applicant made a bail application to the Court.364 The Crown opposed this application for release on bail on the basis that the applicant posed an unacceptable risk of non-appearance and that she would commit another serious offence.365
The applicant had breached bail in the past on four occasions and had a history of non-compliance with court orders.366 The applicant was involved in an incident where without provocation, she chased the complainant down a stairwell while being armed with a knife that was being thrust towards the complainant.367 Following the incident, the police put the applicant in hospital and she was later admitted to Dubbo Mental Health Unit as an inpatient.368
Under s 19(1) of the Bail Act, bail must be refused if there is an unacceptable risk.369 Section 18(1) of the Bail Act provides an exhaustive list of mandatory factors that must be taken into account when assessing bail.370
Held
Yehia J affirmed that no grant of bail is ‘risk free’ and that ‘as the offender’s liberty is at stake, a tenuous suspicion or fear of the worst possibility if the offender is released will not be sufficient’.371
Yehia J considered the matters pursuant to s 18(1) of the Bail Act and noted that the applicant, from a young age, had been a victim of domestic violence and had suffered from mental health issues and substance abuse.372 The Justice Health Report outlined that there was a significant risk that the applicant was at risk of relapse of substance abuse if she did not receive proper treatment and recommended that she re-engage with the Dubbo Aboriginal Medical Service and the Dubbo Community Mental Health Drug and Alcohol Service.373 It was considered that the applicant had a lengthy criminal record which demonstrated non-compliance with court orders, and she had one prior offence of being armed with intent from 15 years ago.374
Yehia J noted that an assessment of whether a risk is unacceptable includes consideration of whether the risk can be mitigated by bail conditions.375 Her Honour referred to research in the Bugmy Bar Book and NSW Inmate Health Surveys on the effect that imprisonment has on the physical and mental health of incarcerated individuals and how incarceration can increase the risk of further reoffending:
The family and community impacts of incarceration are more pronounced for Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander Peoples, particularly women.376 Loss of culture and disconnection from Country and community due to imprisonment may have adverse impacts on the social and emotional well-being of Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander Peoples incarcerated.377
Even short periods of incarceration, including remand, can have a wide-ranging detrimental impact and may be linked with subsequent contact with the criminal justice system.378 … [P]eople who receive non-custodial penalties are significantly less likely to be re-convicted, even within the next 12 months, than those who receive sentences of imprisonment.379
…
The 2009 New South Wales Inmate Health Survey found that First Nations Peoples in prison ‘were more likely to have ever attempted suicide than non-Aboriginal inmates and Aboriginal men were more likely to have ever self-harmed’.380
It was affirmed that the impact of incarceration on First Nations women should never be under-estimated.381 Bail was granted as ‘[the] applicant’s underlying issues will be better treated and managed outside of the custodial environment. Such treatment and care will better serve the protection of the community’.382
9.10 Case Summaries: 9.4 Improved Access to Court Bail
Keywords
Bail application — Youth justice — Institutionalisation risk — Cultural support — Therapeutic sentencing — Rehabilitation — Indigenous offender — Supervision — Conditions — Special circumstances — Young offender
Summary
The applicant sought bail after breaching his conditions following a sentence for multiple offences.383 The prosecution opposed bail, citing a history of reoffending, while the applicant’s legal team argued special circumstances, including the risk of institutionalisation, his cultural and community support, and his willingness to engage in rehabilitation.384 The Court found that the applicant’s background and proposed support plan, which included 24/7 supervision and additional assistance, mitigated the risk of reoffending, and the circumstances were deemed exceptional enough to justify granting bail.385 Bail was granted on the condition that the applicant appear at court weekly for a bail progress report.386
Facts
The present matter involved an applicant, a young person, seeking bail while awaiting sentencing for multiple offences, including vehicle theft and aggravated robbery.387 After being released on bail in June 2024, the applicant breached his bail conditions and faced additional charges, leading to his detention.388 The prosecution opposed bail, citing the applicant’s history of reoffending and the risk he posed to the community. However, the applicant argued that factors such as his risk of institutionalisation due to long-term care and detention, his cultural and community support, and his willingness to engage in rehabilitation programs such as the Supreme Court Pilot Circle Sentencing Program should be considered.389 The Court needed to determine whether these factors, including the proposed support and supervision plan, constituted special or exceptional circumstances to justify granting bail.
Procedural History
The applicant applied for bail after breaching bail conditions in June 2024, following his sentence in January 2024 for multiple offences. The court adjourned the application for assessment by the Elders Panel for the Supreme Court Pilot Circle Sentencing Program, with sentencing scheduled for 2025.390 The prosecution opposed bail, citing reoffending risks, while the applicant’s legal team argued special circumstances.391
Held
The Court found several factors that supported granting bail to the applicant, including the risk of institutionalisation, which was deemed a significant concern, especially for young offenders.392 Despite the breach of bail, the Court recognised the applicant’s difficult background and the potential for rehabilitation through cultural and community support programs.393 The proposed bail plan, which included 24/7 supervision at Narrabundah House and additional support from Keystone Australia, was seen as a structured environment to aid his transition into adulthood. While the applicant’s history of offending was serious, the Court determined that the proposed support system could mitigate the risk of further criminal behaviour, making the circumstances special or exceptional enough to grant bail.394 Bail was granted on the condition that the applicant report to court weekly for a bail progress report.395
Useful Quotes
On the need to carefully select bail conditions which are conducive to rehabilitation (Taylor J at [14]):
With a high level of supervision and support that I am satisfied is available, the applicant can develop life skills, observe role models and strengthen his connection to culture and community … Bearing in mind the youth justice principles and the need to give primary consideration to the best interests of the child, providing the applicant the opportunity to demonstrate his capacity to comply with bail conditions is conducive to his rehabilitation.
Systemic failings operate to reduce moral culpability (at [9]):
The risk of him being institutionalised represents a failing of the youth justice system and, in his case, the care and protection system. Those same circumstances operate to substantially reduce the moral culpability of the applicant when he comes to be sentenced for the offences to which he has now pleaded guilty.
On recognition of the systemic failures that contribute to young people moving from the care system into the youth justice system and, ultimately, the criminal justice system (at [14]):
There is a well-trodden pathway that leads directly form the care and protection system to the youth justice system and finally to the criminal justice system.
On institutionalisation as a systemic failing (at [9]):
Indeed, given the substantial period the applicant has spent over the course of his young life in the Director-General’s care, his risk of institutionalisation, in my view, ought to be considered an outrageous failing.
Keywords
Criminal law — Jurisdiction, practice and procedure — Judgment and punishment — Sentence — Offender completed first stages of residential rehabilitation program — Offender offered extension of time with rehabilitation program — Substantive sentence proceedings already adjourned once — Whether adjournment of sentence until after completion of program is appropriate — Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 27 — Griffiths remand — Whether s 27 displaced common law power to impose Griffiths remand — Griffiths remand imposed
Summary
Dean Ivan Welsh pleaded guilty to multiple offences, including aggravated burglary, burglary, and vehicle theft, committed on the night of 10 June 2022.396 He and two co-offenders entered three homes, taking personal items and vehicles.397 Welsh was later apprehended driving one of the stolen vehicles.398 At the time of sentencing, Welsh was participating in a rehabilitation program for drug and alcohol issues at The Glen, a rehabilitation centre.399 The Court adjourned sentencing to 13 May 2024, allowing him time to complete the program.400 The decision emphasises the importance of rehabilitation and cultural healing, providing a possible model for others to follow where sentences could be influenced by an offender’s rehabilitation progress, particularly if it addresses underlying causes of criminality.
Procedural History
Mr Welsh had numerous sentencing hearings, with the first on 14 July 2023. At that time, Welsh was in custody for unrelated offences, and his non-parole period expired on 25 August 2023.401 On 3 August 2023, Welsh’s counsel requested an adjournment to allow him to participate in a 12-week rehabilitation program at The Glen, scheduled to begin on 25 August 2023. The Court granted the adjournment.402 Following this, Welsh was granted parole on 22 August 2023, and the Court allowed him to be released on bail and attend the rehabilitation program.403 On 10 November 2023, Welsh appeared before the Court again, presenting positive reports on his progress in the program. The Court, acknowledging his rehabilitation efforts, adjourned the sentencing proceedings to 13 May 2024, continuing his bail with conditions that he reside at the rehabilitation centre.404
Facts
Mr Welsh pleaded guilty to several offences, including aggravated burglary, burglary, taking a motor vehicle without consent, and driving a motor vehicle without consent, all under the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT).405 These crimes occurred on the night of 10 June 2022, during a series of burglaries in which Welsh and two co-offenders entered three homes between 3:30am and 5:00am, stealing personal items and car keys, which they used to steal vehicles.406 One of the offenders was armed with a handgun during the first burglary; in subsequent offences, entry was gained by cutting security doors or kicking open external doors. Welsh was later apprehended driving one of the stolen vehicles.407
The offender had been granted parole for unrelated offences and was participating in a rehabilitation program at The Glen, focusing on drug and alcohol issues and cultural healing.408 His counsel requested an adjournment to allow him to complete the program before sentencing. The prosecution supported this request, acknowledging that full-time imprisonment would undermine his rehabilitation progress.409 As a result, the Court adjourned the proceedings to 13 May 2024, continuing Welsh’s bail and rehabilitation program.410
Held
The Court adjourned Welsh’s sentencing to 13 May 2024, allowing him to complete his rehabilitation program at The Glen. It noted that he had made positive progress in addressing issues related to addiction, anger management and cultural healing.411 The Court considered that full-time imprisonment would hinder his rehabilitation and opted for a Griffiths remand, continuing Welsh’s bail under conditions that required his residence at the centre.412 If Welsh complied with the conditions, the Court could consider a more lenient sentence; otherwise, a harsher sentence would be imposed.413
Useful Quotes
Acknowledging re-connection with Country as a form of healing and rehabilitation (Baker J at [10]):
As Vanessa Edwige and Dr Paul Gray report in Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report commissioned by the Bugmy Bar Book Committee, Public Defenders New South Wales, 2021), connection to culture is a powerful protective factor that promotes resilience, self-esteem, self-worth and ultimately, rehabilitation (see especially at [212]–[214]). See similarly HA (a pseudonym) v R [2021] VSCA 64 at [58]–[59], where the Court noted that ‘[r]econnection of an Aboriginal offender with culture and Country can constitute a pivotal factor diverting such a person from entrenched offending behaviour’.
Keywords
Criminal law — Sentencing — Dishonesty offences — Aggravated burglary; Burglary; Taking motor vehicles without consent; Drive motor vehicle without consent; Damage property; Drive while disqualified Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) ss 312, 45A, 318; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 116(3); Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) ss 32(1)(a), 22(1)(a)
Summary
Dean Ivan Welsh pleaded guilty to multiple offences, including aggravated burglary and vehicle theft, committed in June 2022.414 Despite a lengthy criminal history and breach of conditional liberty, Welsh demonstrated significant rehabilitation by completing a residential program, securing employment, and seeking counselling.415 The key issue was whether his rehabilitation efforts warranted a suspended sentence rather than full-time custody. The Court recognised his progress, particularly through culturally sensitive rehabilitation, and imposed a suspended sentence with strict conditions, emphasising that any future offences would likely lead to full-time custody.416 This decision followed a previous case, Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT) v Welsh (No 2).417
Procedural History
The matter was first listed for sentencing while Mr Welsh was in custody for unrelated offences (14 July 2023).418 His counsel sought an adjournment to allow completion of a rehabilitation program, which was granted after parole was approved (22 August 2023).419 Further hearings were held to assess his progress in the program; following positive reports, the Court adjourned the proceedings for Mr Welsh to complete the program before sentencing (10 November 2023).420
Facts
Mr Welsh pleaded guilty to multiple offences, including aggravated burglary, burglary, taking and driving motor vehicles without consent, and damage to property.421 These offences were committed in the early hours of 10 June 2022, when Welsh, along with two accomplices, engaged in a series of burglaries and thefts from residences in the Australian Capital Territory. During these offences, the offenders stole wallets, car keys and vehicles, including a silver Mercedes Benz and a white Volkswagen. Some of the offences were captured on CCTV, and Welsh was later arrested in June 2022 after the stolen vehicles were tracked.422
At the time of the offending, Welsh was on conditional liberty for previous criminal offences.423 He had a lengthy criminal history, including breaches of court orders, such as an intensive correction order imposed in 2021 for property-related offences.424 Despite this, Welsh showed significant rehabilitation efforts after being accepted into a residential rehabilitation program, The Glen, in New South Wales.425 He completed the program, secured employment, and proactively sought counselling.426 The prosecution did not oppose a suspended sentence, recognising Welsh’s commitment to rehabilitation, which the court acknowledged as a key factor in sentencing.427
The issue in contention in the current case was whether Welsh should be sentenced to full-time custody given his prior criminal history and breach of conditional liberty, or whether a suspended sentence should be imposed considering his demonstrated rehabilitation.428
Held
Baker J acknowledged Mr Welsh’s significant progress in rehabilitation, particularly through his participation in the Glen program, which played a crucial role in his journey.429 The judge emphasised the importance of culturally sensitive programs for Indigenous offenders and highlighted the support Mr Welsh received from his family and community services.430 Despite his past criminal history, Baker J noted that Mr Welsh’s continued rehabilitation would be ensured through suspended sentences, which would be subject to strict conditions.431 The Court ultimately imposed a combination of custodial sentences, all of which were suspended on the condition of good behaviour.432
Baker J also stated that any future offences would likely result in full-time custody, but Mr Welsh’s demonstrated commitment to change provided confidence in his ability to continue on his rehabilitative path.433
Useful Quotes
On the need for culturally sensitive rehabilitation programs:
[S]trong cultural supports and programs in communities that help facilitate the building of healthy communities ‘will facilitate the successful reintegration of Indigenous offenders once they leave custody, while also reducing the likelihood of Indigenous people commencing a criminal trajectory’.434
Keywords
Sentence — Crown — Appeal — Plea of guilty — Plea accepted by judge — Accused remanded for sentence in 12 months on good behaviour bond — Whether convicted — Whether sentenced — Bond — Power to grant — Competence of appeal — Powers of court on appeal — Whether court in error — Justices Act 1902 (NSW) s 51A — Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 556A, 558 — Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) ss 2, 5D
Summary
The applicant was initially placed on probation with sentencing deferred for 12 months after pleading guilty to three offences. The Attorney-General appealed, arguing that the deferment constituted an inadequate sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeal subsequently imposed a six-year prison term with a three-year non-parole period. The applicant sought special leave to appeal, contending that no formal sentence had been pronounced and that the Attorney-General lacked the right to appeal a sentencing deferral.
The High Court considered the legitimacy of deferring sentencing to assess rehabilitation and affirmed that such deferrals are a valid exercise of judicial discretion. It held that deferrals allow courts to evaluate an offender’s rehabilitation progress before imposing a final sentence, ensuring a more tailored and just approach. The Court clarified that deferrals must be grounded in clear evidence of an offender’s potential for rehabilitation and must align with sentencing objectives such as proportionality, deterrence and justice. This case established the principle of the Griffiths remand, which has since become an important mechanism in Australian sentencing jurisprudence.
Procedural History
The applicant pleaded guilty to three separate offences, including two counts of breaking, entering and stealing, and one count of being an accessory after the fact, and was committed to the District Court for sentencing (20 September 1974). The judge deferred sentencing for 12 months, placing the applicant under the supervision of Probation and Parole (20 September 1974). The Attorney-General subsequently appealed, arguing the sentence was inadequate. The Court of Criminal Appeal ruled the deferment was effectively a sentence, which could be appealed. It found the sentencing process was improper and imposed a six-year prison sentence with a three-year non-parole period. The applicant sought special leave to appeal the Court of Criminal Appeal’s decision.
Facts
The applicant was charged with three offences under the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW): two counts of breaking and entering with intent to steal and one count of being an accessory after the fact.435 He pleaded guilty to all charges and was committed to the District Court for sentencing.436 On 20 September 1974, the District Court heard evidence about the applicant’s criminal history, and the applicant entered into a recognisance agreement to be of good behaviour until 19 September 1975.437 Afterward, the applicant was released but later returned to custody.438 The Attorney-General appealed the sentence, and the Court of Criminal Appeal intervened, imposing a six-year sentence with a three-year non-parole period.439
The applicant contended that no sentence had been pronounced, and thus the Attorney-General had no right to appeal.440 He also argued that the trial judge had not properly convicted him, and that the Court of Criminal Appeal had overstepped its jurisdiction by imposing a new sentence without error or departure from principle by the trial judge.441
The applicant sought special leave to appeal the orders of the Court of Criminal Appeal, arguing that remanding him for sentencing was not equivalent to a conviction and that the Attorney-General could not appeal a remand.442
Held
The High Court delivered five separate judgments, all in agreement that that sentencing could be deferred to allow an offender the opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation.
The practice of deferring sentencing to assess an offender’s rehabilitation prospects was recognised as a legitimate exercise of judicial discretion. It was emphasised that such deferrals must be used judiciously, ensuring they do not undermine the gravity of the offence or public confidence in the sentencing process. Deferring sentencing for rehabilitation purposes was considered beneficial, as it allows the court to gather evidence of the offender’s rehabilitation, which can inform the final sentence. The deferral provides practical insight into the success of an offender’s rehabilitation efforts, enabling a more tailored and appropriate sentence. However, it was cautioned that such adjournments should only occur where there is clear evidence of a likelihood of successful rehabilitation, relevant to the achievement of sentencing objectives. This approach, commonly referred to as a Griffiths remand, enables courts to balance considerations of justice, deterrence and rehabilitation effectively.
The High Court also considered broader sentencing principles, including the need for consistency in sentencing to ensure equal justice, the proper exercise of judicial discretion, and the circumstances under which appellate courts may intervene in sentencing decisions. The Court underscored the necessity of balancing proportionality, deterrence and rehabilitation in sentencing, while ensuring that manifest injustice or inconsistency does not arise, as such outcomes could undermine public confidence in the legal system.
Keywords
Bail application — Applicant charged with drug trafficking offences — Addiction — Exceptional circumstances test — Whether unacceptable risk — Applicant identifies as Aboriginal — Bail Act 1977 (Vic) s 3A — Bail reform.
Summary
The applicant was charged with multiple drug trafficking and possession offences. After being denied bail in the Magistrates’ Court, she applied to the Supreme Court, arguing exceptional circumstances.443 The Supreme Court considered her role as the primary caregiver for five children, potential delays in the complex case, and the availability of culturally appropriate support services.444 The Court also applied s 3A of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic) (‘Bail Act’), addressing the systemic overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in the criminal justice system.445 Ultimately, Incerti J granted bail, finding that these factors, particularly in light of the applicant’s Aboriginality and limited criminal history, established exceptional circumstances justifying release.446
Procedural History
Kellyenne Males was charged with multiple offences between February 2021 and July 2024.447 She was initially charged and granted bail on 4 July and 23 July 2024.448 However, on 30 September 2024, bail was refused by a magistrate at Bendigo due to a failure to demonstrate exceptional circumstances.449 Subsequently, she applied for bail in the Supreme Court of Victoria, where the application was heard on 12 December, and bail granted.450
Facts
The applicant, Kellyenne Males, a 40-year-old Aboriginal woman, faces multiple charges including trafficking a drug of dependence in a commercial quantity, possessing prohibited substances, and dealing with property suspected of being the proceeds of crime.451 The alleged offences occurred between February 2021 and July 2024, with evidence derived from the applicant’s seized mobile phone indicating her involvement in distributing illicit substances.452 Further, her brother was implicated as a driver, and police searches of her residence uncovered substantial quantities of controlled substances.453 The applicant sought bail, asserting exceptional circumstances based on her role as a primary caregiver for five children, the systemic disadvantages impacting Aboriginal individuals within the criminal justice system as outlined in s 3A of the Bail Act, and her limited prior criminal history.454
Held
Incerti J found that the applicant had established exceptional circumstances justifying the grant of bail.455 This determination was based on a combination of factors, including her role as the primary caregiver for her five children, the inherent delays associated with complex legal matters, the availability of culturally appropriate support services, and her limited criminal history.456 The Court emphasised the application of s 3A of the Bail Act, requiring consideration of systemic factors impacting Aboriginal people within the criminal justice system, and considered Ms Males’ circumstances through this lens.457 While acknowledging the seriousness of the charges, the Judge determined that these combined factors, particularly when viewed in the context of the applicant’s Aboriginality, warranted a finding of exceptional circumstances.458
Useful Quotes
Incerti J acknowledged the consideration of keeping families together and accounting for the offender’s care-giving duties (at [45]):
[I]ncarceration has a lasting impact on the families and children of the offender. The incarceration of a parent may impact negatively on the physical and mental health of the children of an offender, their development, education and employment outcomes. I reject the submission that Ms Males’ children are doing fine while their mother is on remand. The children of incarcerated persons are the ‘invisible victims’ of the criminal justice system.
The offender’s separation from family was considered in the context of the systemic removal of Aboriginal children from their homes (at [45]):
When I consider the historic separation of Aboriginal families, along with Ms Males’ own difficult family upbringing, I see no good reason to contribute to her continued incarceration at this stage. I therefore consider that there are exceptional circumstances justifying the grant of bail.
Keywords
Bail application — Conditional bail — Indictable offence — Indigenous applicant — Aggravated entering someone’s dwelling — Show cause requirement — Lengthy period on remand if detained — Applicant had a three-month old child — Factors relevant in granting bail — Cycle of disadvantage in Indigenous communities
Summary
The applicant, a First Nations man who had a three-month old child, was granted bail for an indictable offence of entering someone’s dwelling, as it was reasoned that the separation of First Nations families through detainment of family members in prison can cause further disadvantage in First Nations communities. Risks associated with bail were mitigated through bail conditions requiring the applicant to engage with family life and continue medical treatment with the Aboriginal Medical Service.
Facts
A First Nations man, 32 years of age, was facing a series of charges and was refused bail for an indictable offence of aggravated entering a dwelling knowing there were people there.459 If detained, the applicant would likely have a lengthy period on remand awaiting a trial date in the District Court.460
The applicant was facing a ‘show cause’ requirement and was required to show why his detention was not justified.461 A matter raised by the applicant to support the finding of shown cause was the birth of the applicant’s first child, who was three months old, as detainment would cause separation with his child.462
Held
McCallum J found that if bail was refused, the applicant would likely see very little of the child.463 This child was considered to be a motivator for him to comply with conditional bail.464 Her Honour highlighted how the separation of the Indigenous applicant from his child through detainment would likely perpetuate the cycle of disadvantage and deprivation in Indigenous communities (at [3]):
[T]he matter is an indictable matter which will have to be committed to the District Court and there is a likelihood of a lengthy period on remand awaiting the trial date. During that period the applicant would in all likelihood see very little of the child if bail is refused. That is a factor which seems to me to be likely to perpetuate the cycle of disadvantage and deprivation notoriously faced in indigenous communities and, as a matter of evidence in the material before me, specifically faced in the family of this applicant. If the Court can reasonably impose conditions which are calculated to break that cycle, in my view it should. That is a strong factor in my finding cause shown.
While there was a risk identified that the applicant could commit a serious offence if released on bail due to ‘matters in his history’, this could be mitigated through requirements that the applicant engage with family life and continue to engage with medical treatment through the Aboriginal Medical Service.465 Conditional bail was granted.466
Keywords
Criminal law — Bail application — Applicant charged with violent offending — Addiction — Access to Koori Court — Show compelling reason test — Whether unacceptable risk — Applicant identifies as Aboriginal — Bail Act 1977 (Vic) s 3A — Bail reform
Summary
An Aboriginal woman was granted bail after committing an assault on two occasions, as her disadvantage as an Aboriginal person who had mental health problems and had suffered trauma satisfied the ‘compelling reason’ to grant bail test under s 4AA of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic) (‘Bail Act’). There was found to be no ‘unacceptable risk’ to the safety of other persons, as any risk caused by the applicant’s mental health conditions could be mitigated to an acceptable level by ensuring that the applicant engaged with mental health services and the Aboriginal Medical Service.
Facts
The applicant, a 35-year-old Aboriginal woman with Yorta Yorta and Yolgnu heritage,467 was charged with offences including recklessly causing injury, contravening an Interim Personal Safety Intervention Order, committing an unlawful assault, assaulting a police officer, attempting armed robbery, and assaulting with weapon.468 The charges were from two incidents. On one occasion, the applicant threw a glass bottle and brick at the victim, ran at them with a metal pole, and hit an officer with a garment.469 On another occasion, the applicant accosted someone on the street by asking for money and striking them with a metal pole.470 The applicant had been separated from her mother as a child, was a victim of sexual abuse as a child, and struggled with substance abuse and mental health problems.471 The applicant had a criminal history of offending for 10 years; however, most of her earlier charges were dismissed or resolved without conviction.472
Procedural History
As the applicant was charged with armed robbery, according to s 4AA of the Bail Act she had to show that there was a ‘compelling reason’ for the grant of bail.473 Even if there is a compelling reason shown for the grant of bail, the Court must still refuse bail if there is an ‘unacceptable risk’ of granting bail.474 In determining whether there is an ‘unacceptable risk’ in granting bail, s 3A of the Bail Act requires the Court to ‘take into account issues that arise due to a person’s Aboriginality’ which involves taking into account the systemic over-representation of Indigenous people in the criminal justice system, the risk of custody to the welfare of Indigenous people, and the importance of maintaining cultural connection and kindship.475 The specific circumstances of the applicant must also be considered, including their mental health and their experiences in childhood.476 The availability of support and whether there are culturally appropriate programs to reduce the risk are also relevant considerations.477
The applicant was refused bail in the Melbourne Magistrates’ Court on the basis that she posed an unacceptable risk of endangering the safety or welfare of any person, despite successfully demonstrating compelling reasons for the grant of bail.478
Held
On appeal, Incerti J in the Supreme Court of Victoria granted the applicant bail with conditions. The applicant’s background as an Indigenous person who had grown up with trauma and mental health issues, as well as being a descendent of the Stolen Generations which had ‘lasting impacts’, meant that the ‘compelling reason’ test was satisfied (at [49]):
I take into account that discrimination has pervaded the lives of Aboriginal people and that incarceration has a cyclical impact on their social and emotional wellbeing. I have also taken into account the challenging circumstances that Ms McLaughlin has faced in her life, especially an involvement with foster care from a very young age and an upbringing riddled with trauma. Additionally, her offending appears to coincide with a deterioration in her mental health, which provides yet another compelling reason for placing her with supports rather than behind bars. Ms McLaughlin is also a direct descendant of the Stolen Generation, and it is important to acknowledge the impact this may have on her. For example, a recent study of the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare has explored the lasting impacts on the descendants of the Stolen Generation as compared to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people without any experience of being removed, which included a finding that descendants are 1.5 times as likely to have been arrested in the last five years and 1.3 times as likely to have poor mental health.
The applicant had never served an imprisonment term and had no recorded convictions, which was another compelling factor in granting bail.479
In determining whether the applicant posed an unacceptable risk of endangering the safety of a person, Incerti J found that a significant contributor to the risk posed by the applicant was her mental health.480 However, it was identified that the provision of support services can be a ‘circuit-breaker’ and ‘protective force’, reducing the risk to an acceptable degree.481 It was found that this risk could be mitigated by including a bail condition to attend an appointment with a mental health clinician at her local neighbourhood justice centre and attend a medical appointment with the Victorian Aboriginal Health Service.482 In granting bail, it was reasoned that the provision of services which addressed the applicant’s mental health would protect the applicant and community more than incarceration (at [56]):
In this case, treatment for Ms McLaughlin’s mental health and substance abuse are critical to community safety and protection. The proposed conditions provide a realistic pathway to address these concerns. Access to the [neighbourhood justice centre] and the other support services is more likely to provide short term and ongoing benefits and protection to the applicant and the community compared to further time on remand.
Keywords
Bail — Application for review — Exceptional circumstances — Presumptions — Protection of alleged victim — Exceptional circumstances did not justify grant of bail — Bail refused
Summary
The respondent, an Aboriginal man, was refused bail for the serious indictable offence of committing an indecent assault of a child, as he did not meet the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test under s 9D of the Bail Act 1978 (NSW) (‘Bail Act’). There was only slight consideration of his background as an Aboriginal person and while the potential option for culturally appropriate supervision was contemplated, there was no availability. Weight was placed on the lack of police supervision to monitor the respondent’s behaviour if he stayed on house arrest, and the risks to the safety of the victim meant that exceptional circumstances were not made out.
Facts
The respondent was charged with a serious indictable offence which was aggravated breaking, entering and committing an indecent sexual assault of a child, aged 14.483 As the respondent, at the time of the alleged offence, was subject to a good behaviour bond and had been previously convicted of a serious personal violence offence, under s 9D of the Bail Act, the Court was required to refuse bail unless exceptional circumstances justified a grant of bail.484
Procedural History
The Director of Public Prosecutions, on behalf of the Crown, sought a review of bail granted by a single judge of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales.485
Held
The Court (Rothman, Fullerton and Beech-Jones JJ) delivered very short reasons, reserving full reasons.486
Exceptional circumstances may arise by ‘a combination of factors or a particular factor which takes the circumstances of the offender and the grant of bail out of the ordinary’.487 The person seeking bail bears the evidential burden to establish that there are exceptional circumstances.488
For consideration of possible exceptional circumstances, weight was given to the fact that the conditions of bail proposed in the hearing would have the effect of placing the respondent under house arrest at a location that was significantly distant from the victim’s residence.489 The respondent did not have a driver’s licence allowing him to legally travel to the victim;490 however, he did have a history of illegal driving.491
The respondent’s background as an Aboriginal person with traditional ties to his community also warranted consideration as an exceptional circumstance, yet there was no substantial consideration or reasons given as to why or why not his cultural background would form an exceptional circumstance.492 Consideration of connection to his community was framed as meaning that he would be less likely to escape from the area. The Court stated at [34]:
Thirdly, there are significant interests that warrant his liberty, including the distance from legal advisors. He also has, by his background and community ties, significant attachment to the community such that it is not likely that he would flee the jurisdiction. In addition, the respondent is a person of Aboriginal background whose extended family and kinship, and other traditional ties, warrant significant consideration in the determination of whether or not to grant bail.
The possibly of culturally appropriate supervision as an alternative to remand in custody was mentioned as a potential option; however, this was dismissed as an option as there was no culturally appropriate supervision proposed or available.493 The Court stated at [35]:
In the cases of Aboriginal accused, particularly where the applicant for bail is young, alternative culturally appropriate supervision, where available, (with an emphasis on cultural awareness and overcoming the renowned anti-social effects of discrimination and/or an abused or disempowered upbringing), should be explored as a preferred option to a remand in gaol.
There was significant weight placed on the fact that the circumstances of the offence involved the abuse of alcohol and/or drugs, indicating that alcohol consumption remained a part of the respondent’s life, and this had risk factors for the protection of the victim.494 Attention was given to the location of the respondent’s residence and how it would not allow for law enforcement to monitor the respondent’s abstention from alcohol or the possibility of the respondent travelling to the victim’s location.495
These considerations meant that there were not exceptional circumstances under 9D of the Bail Act to justify the grant of bail and bail was refused.496
Keywords
Criminal law — Procedure — Bail — Revocation, variation, review and appeal
Summary
John Trevor Webb was charged with threatening a person involved in a criminal investigation and possessing cannabis plants and initially had his bail application denied by the Magistrates Court.497 As a ‘prescribed applicant’ under the Bail Act 1985 (SA) (‘Bail Act’), he was required to show ‘special circumstances’.498 On appeal, the Supreme Court granted Mr Webb bail, recognising the seriousness of the charges but determining that the combination of factors, particularly the delay before trial and family impact, constituted ‘special circumstances’.499 The Court stressed the need to assess whether denying bail would cause consequences beyond what Parliament intended, particularly regarding the over-representation of Aboriginal people in custody.500 This case highlights the importance of considering personal and family circumstances in bail decisions, reinforcing that ‘special circumstances’ can include factors such as trial delays and the impact on vulnerable family members.501
Procedural History
At first instance, a bail application was made in the Magistrates Court of South Australia (December 2018). This application was denied. The current hearing was an appeal for review of that application in the Supreme Court of South Australia.
Facts
Mr Webb was charged with threatening a person involved in a criminal investigation and possession of cannabis plants.502 Due to the nature of the threatening charge, he was classified as a ‘prescribed applicant’ under the Bail Act, requiring him to demonstrate ‘special circumstances’ to be granted bail.503 A magistrate initially refused bail, and Mr Webb sought a review.504
Mr Webb sought to demonstrate numerous ‘special circumstances’, including the potential 18-month delay before trial, his minimal prior criminal history, his responsibility as the primary caregiver for his two young children, and the strain his incarceration placed on his grandparents, who help with the children’s care.505 His grandfather, Mulla Sumner, testified about the difficulties he and his wife faced in caring for the children while also managing their own health issues and financial burdens.506 Additionally, it was also considered favourably that Mr Webb had ongoing employment. Finally, the Court considered the over-representation of Aboriginal people in custody, noting that Mr Webb is a Ngarrindjeri man.507
Held
The Court ultimately granted Mr Webb’s application for bail.
While acknowledging the seriousness of the charges, the Court determined that the combination of factors, particularly the significant delay before trial and the impact of his incarceration on his young children and elderly grandparents, constituted ‘special circumstances’ sufficient to warrant his release on bail.508 In making this determination, the Court acknowledged the need to assess whether Mr Webb’s circumstances placed him ‘outside of the contemplated risk to the community’ and whether the denial of bail would result in consequences beyond the contemplation of Parliament.509
Useful Quotes
On the relevance of Aboriginality to bail decisions and the need to contextualise Indigenous status within the broader context of over-incarceration of First Nations people (Hinten J at [30]):
Returning momentarily to generalities, even if being cautious to avoid cultural bias and being culturally sensitive and understanding, nonetheless in all the circumstances it is appropriate that an Aboriginal person be denied bail, then it is the duty of the court to make such order. Where the question is finely balanced, however, the statistics regarding the overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in custody will likely tip the scales in favour of granting bail.
On the primacy of a consideration of care-giving responsibilities in bail applications (at [31]):
I am particularly influenced by the fact that Mr Webb is the primary caregiver of his two young sons, the importance to them of their father being around, the inability of their mothers to assume greater responsibility for their care, and the hardship that would be caused to Mr Sumner and his wife if they were left to shoulder the burden for the children. I am also influenced by the likely period of time that Mr Webb would spend in custody awaiting trial …
On cultural ties and bail conditions (especially flight risk) (at [32]):
I do not consider Mr Webb a flight risk … I am satisfied that Mr Webb’s cultural ties are strong and that cultural influences in the person of his grandfather and his uncle will provide added reason for him to comply with the terms of any bail agreement he enters into in addition to providing an added level of comfort and protection for the community.
9.11 Case Summaries: 9.5 Sentencing
Keywords
Appeal — Sentence — Relevance of deprived background — Application of R v Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58 — Mitigatory effect of social deprivation — Aboriginality
Procedural History
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales (Hoeben JA, Johnson and Schmidt JJ)
Facts
On 7 January 2011 at the Broken Hill Correctional Centre, the appellant, William Bugmy, who was on remand, became agitated when told that his visitors might not arrive before visiting hours ended. After Senior Correctional Officer Gould declined to extend visiting hours, Mr Bugmy threatened, ‘I’ll split you open, you cunt’, and continued making threats. When two other officers arrived, he threw pool balls at them, and then at Mr Gould, striking him twice in the back and once in the left eye. The last blow caused permanent blindness in Mr Gould’s left eye and serious facial injuries. Mr Bugmy then climbed onto the roof and continued throwing pool balls. He later surrendered, and expressed satisfaction at having injured the officer.
Mr Bugmy pleaded guilty in the District Court of New South Wales to two counts of assaulting a correctional officer under s 60A(1) and one count of causing grievous bodily harm with intent under s 33(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of eight months’ imprisonment for the s 60A offences, and six years for the s 33(1)(b) offence, with a non-parole period of four years, commencing 8 April 2011. The judge ordered supervised parole including possible residential treatment for substance abuse.
The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal, arguing that the sentence was manifestly inadequate. The Court allowed the appeal, and increased the sentence for the s 33(1)(b) offence to a non-parole period of five years and a total term of seven and a half years. It did so without determining whether the sentence was manifestly inadequate or considering the residual discretion to dismiss the appeal.
Mr Bugmy’s background was marked by extreme social deprivation in Wilcannia, exposure to alcohol abuse and violence from a young age, minimal education, early onset of alcohol and drug use, and a long history of violent offending. Psychiatric evidence showed auditory hallucinations, probable primary psychotic symptoms, reactive depression, and risk of self-harm.
Issues
The appeal to the High Court raised two main issues. The first was whether the Court of Criminal Appeal was entitled to vary the sentence imposed by the District Court without first finding that the sentence was manifestly inadequate, and whether it was required to consider the ‘residual discretion’ to dismiss the Crown’s appeal even if error was established. The second issue was whether the Court of Criminal Appeal was correct in suggesting that the relevance of an Aboriginal offender’s background of social deprivation diminishes with time and repeated offending, and whether such background should continue to mitigate moral culpability irrespective of age or criminal history.
Held
The appeal was upheld unanimously. The High Court set aside the orders of the Court of Criminal Appeal and remitted the Director’s appeal to that Court.
The High Court held that the Court of Criminal Appeal erred in re-sentencing without first determining that the sentence was manifestly inadequate. The power to substitute a new sentence under s 5D of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) is only enlivened where the appellate court finds either specific error or manifest inadequacy in the sentence, and the Court failed to do so. The Court also failed to consider the residual discretion to dismiss the Director’s appeal even if error were shown.
On the second issue, the High Court reaffirmed that an offender’s background of social deprivation, including that experienced by Aboriginal offenders, does not lose its mitigating force with time or repeated incarceration. Such deprivation may permanently affect an offender’s capacity to control violent impulses and remains relevant to moral culpability, although it may increase the need for community protection. However, the Court rejected the argument that Australian courts should adopt the approach of the Canadian cases R v Gladue510 and R v Ipeelee,511 or take into account the general rate of Aboriginal incarceration. Sentencing must remain an individualised process, applying the same principles to all offenders while recognising personal circumstances as part of the factual matrix. As the majority (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) explained:
[36] One evident point of distinction between the legislative principles governing the sentencing of offenders in Canada and those that apply in New South Wales is that s 5(1) of the [Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)] does not direct courts to give particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. The power of the Parliament of New South Wales to enact a direction of that kind does not arise for consideration in this appeal. Another point of distinction is the differing statements of the purposes of punishment under the Canadian and New South Wales statutes. There is no warrant, in sentencing an Aboriginal offender in New South Wales, to apply a method of analysis different from that which applies in sentencing a non-Aboriginal offender. Nor is there a warrant to take into account the high rate of incarceration of Aboriginal people when sentencing an Aboriginal offender. Were this a consideration, the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders would cease to involve individualised justice.
[37] An Aboriginal offender’s deprived background may mitigate the sentence that would otherwise be appropriate for the offence in the same way that the deprived background of a non-Aboriginal offender may mitigate that offender’s sentence. In this respect, Simpson J has correctly explained [in Kennedy v The Queen] the significance of the statements in Fernando:
‘Properly understood, Fernando is a decision, not about sentencing Aboriginals, but about the recognition, in sentencing decisions, of social disadvantage that frequently (no matter what the ethnicity of the offender) precedes the commission of crime.’
[38] The propositions stated in Fernando are largely directed to the significance of the circumstance that the offender was intoxicated at the time of the offence. As Wood J explained, drunkenness does not usually operate by way of excuse or to mitigate an offender’s conduct. However, his Honour recognised that there are Aboriginal communities in which alcohol abuse and alcohol-related violence go hand in hand. His Honour considered that where an offender’s abuse of alcohol is a reflection of the environment in which he or she was raised it should be taken into account as a mitigating factor. To do so, he said, is to acknowledge the endemic presence of alcohol in Aboriginal communities and:
‘the grave social difficulties faced by those communities where poor self-image, absence of education and work opportunity and other demoralising factors have placed heavy stresses on them, reinforcing their resort to alcohol and compounding its worst effects.’
[39] The other respect in which Wood J proposed that an offender’s Aboriginality may be relevant to the sentencing determination is in a case in which because of the offender’s background or lack of experience of European ways a lengthy term of imprisonment might be particularly burdensome. In each of these respects, the propositions enunciated in Fernando conform with the statement of sentencing principle by Brennan J in Neal [v The Queen]:
‘The same sentencing principles are to be applied, of course, in every case, irrespective of the identity of a particular offender or his membership of an ethnic or other group. But in imposing sentences courts are bound to take into account, in accordance with those principles, all material facts including those facts which exist only by reason of the offender’s membership of an ethnic or other group. So much is essential to the even administration of criminal justice. That done, however, the weight to be attributed to the factors material in a particular case, whether of aggravation or mitigation, is ordinarily a matter for the court exercising the sentencing discretion of first instance or for the Court of Criminal Appeal.’
[40] Of course, not all Aboriginal offenders come from backgrounds characterised by the abuse of alcohol and alcohol-fuelled violence. However, Wood J was right to recognise both that those problems are endemic in some Aboriginal communities, and the reasons which tend to perpetuate them. The circumstance that an offender has been raised in a community surrounded by alcohol abuse and violence may mitigate the sentence because his or her moral culpability is likely to be less than the culpability of an offender whose formative years have not been marred in that way.
[41] Mr Fernando was a resident of an Aboriginal community located near Walgett in far-western New South Wales. The propositions stated in his case are particularly directed to the circumstances of offenders living in Aboriginal communities. Aboriginal Australians who live in an urban environment do not lose their Aboriginal identity and they, too, may be subject to the grave social difficulties discussed in Fernando. Nonetheless, the appellant’s submission that courts should take judicial notice of the systemic background of deprivation of Aboriginal offenders cannot be accepted. It, too, is antithetical to individualised justice. Aboriginal Australians as a group are subject to social and economic disadvantage measured across a range of indices, but to recognise this is to say nothing about a particular Aboriginal offender. In any case in which it is sought to rely on an offender’s background of deprivation in mitigation of sentence, it is necessary to point to material tending to establish that background.
[42] It will be recalled that in the Court of Criminal Appeal the prosecution submitted that the evidence of the appellant’s deprived background lost much of its force when viewed against the background of his previous offences. On the hearing of the appeal in this Court the Director did not maintain that submission. The Director acknowledges that the effects of profound deprivation do not diminish over time and he submits that they are to be given full weight in the determination of the appropriate sentence in every case.
[43] The Director’s submission should be accepted. The experience of growing up in an environment surrounded by alcohol abuse and violence may leave its mark on a person throughout life. Among other things, a background of that kind may compromise the person’s capacity to mature and to learn from experience. It is a feature of the person’s make-up and remains relevant to the determination of the appropriate sentence, notwithstanding that the person has a long history of offending.
[44] Because the effects of profound childhood deprivation do not diminish with the passage of time and repeated offending, it is right to speak of giving ‘full weight’ to an offender’s deprived background in every sentencing decision. However, this is not to suggest, as the appellant’s submissions were apt to do, that an offender’s deprived background has the same (mitigatory) relevance for all of the purposes of punishment. Giving weight to the conflicting purposes of punishment is what makes the exercise of the discretion so difficult. An offender’s childhood exposure to extreme violence and alcohol abuse may explain the offender’s recourse to violence when frustrated such that the offender’s moral culpability for the inability to control that impulse may be substantially reduced. However, the inability to control the violent response to frustration may increase the importance of protecting the community from the offender.
Gageler J emphasised (at [56]) that sentencing requires an individualised assessment of how an offender’s experience of social deprivation affects their culpability:
As to whether there is, with the passage of time, a diminution in the extent to which it is appropriate for a sentencing judge to take into account the effects of social deprivation in an offender’s youth and background, I am unable to accept either the Court of Criminal Appeal’s categorical statement that there must be, or the Director’s categorical concession in the appeal to this Court that there is not. Consistently with the statement of sentencing principle by Brennan J in Neal v The Queen, the weight to be afforded to the effects of social deprivation in an offender’s youth and background is in each case for individual assessment.
Keywords
Appeal — Sentence — Murder — Rape — Aboriginality — Profound childhood deprivation and trauma — Personality disorder — Reduced moral culpability — Causal link between deprived background and offending
Procedural History
Crown appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Hollingworth J)
Facts
On 16 January 2019, Codey Herrmann, aged 20, violently attacked, raped and murdered Aiia Maasarwe, a 21-year-old international student, in Bundoora, Melbourne. Mr Herrmann struck her on the head with a metal pipe, dragged her from the footpath, raped her, then struck her repeatedly, causing fatal head injuries. He later set fire to her body and clothing to destroy evidence. The attack was random, unprovoked, and extremely brutal, committed against a stranger late at night. Herrmann pleaded guilty to murder and rape. He had no prior convictions or history of violence. The sentencing judge, Hollingworth J, described the crimes as ‘very serious examples of offences which are themselves extremely serious’, finding that Herrmann acted with a clear intention to kill. Herrmann was sentenced to 36 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 30 years. Expert evidence from Dr Andrew Carroll, a forensic psychiatrist, showed Herrmann suffered from a severe personality disorder caused by profound childhood deprivation and trauma, including neglect, substance abuse in the home, and abandonment. Dr Carroll found a causal link between these factors and the offending, describing the killing as an ‘angry type of sexual homicide’ driven by suppressed rage. Although his moral culpability was reduced, the judge noted the seriousness of the crimes and the continuing need for community protection.
Issues
Three issues were considered. The first was whether the sentence of 36 years’ imprisonment with a 30-year non-parole period for the rape and murder counts was manifestly inadequate, given the extreme brutality of the offences and the need for denunciation, deterrence and protection of the community. The second issue was whether the sentencing judge gave excessive weight to Herrmann’s childhood deprivation, Aboriginal heritage, and personality disorder, resulting in an unduly lenient assessment of moral culpability. The third was whether the judge double-counted mitigation by applying the principles of both Bugmy v The Queen512 and R v Verdins513 to reduce culpability.
Held
The Crown appeal was dismissed unanimously. The Victorian Court of Appeal held that the sentence imposed by Hollingworth J was within the range reasonably open to the sentencing judge.
The Court (Maxwell P, Kaye, Niall, T Forrest and Emerton JJA) considered that the sentence represented severe punishment in light of the assessment of the offender’s reduced moral culpability (at [17]–[19]):
As will appear, the expert evidence of Associate Professor Andrew Carroll, a forensic psychiatrist, established that CH’s severe personality disorder was the direct result of his childhood deprivation, and that there was a clear causal connection between his impaired mental functioning and the offending. In our respectful view, her Honour was fully justified in viewing CH as less morally culpable for this atrocious conduct than a person who had not suffered such deprivation and impairment.
The Director’s emphasis on protection of the community rested on what was said to be the risk of reoffending which CH would present in the future, such that unsupervised release could not be contemplated. As will appear, however, the expert evidence identified a number of factors indicating ‘favourable prospects’ for CH’s rehabilitation ‘if effective rehabilitative treatments are made available to him’.
The community is entitled to assume — and expect — that those treatments will be made available, and as soon as practicable. Minimising the risk of CH reoffending following the completion of his sentence demands nothing less. Crucially, however, this was not a case where the sentencing judge could have concluded that CH’s condition was untreatable or, therefore, that he would necessarily be a risk to the public even after decades in custody.
In the issue of double-counted mitigation by applying Bugmy and Verdins, the Court found (at [83]–[84]):
Each frame of reference had its own explanatory work to do, enhancing the judge’s understanding of both the offender and the offences. As CH’s counsel submitted in this Court, the impact of his childhood deprivation was not limited to the development of the personality disorder. His teenage years followed a ‘pattern of pervasive under-attainment, unemployment, early exit from the educational system and homelessness’. Such unremittingly negative experiences both reflected and reinforced CH’s perception of what his counsel described as his ‘generally futile and hopeless position in the world’.
It follows, in our view, that notions of ‘double counting’ and ‘overlap’ are unhelpful. Sentencing is in no meaningful sense a ‘counting’ exercise, in which matters of aggravation or (in this context) mitigation are somehow ‘added up’. Once each such matter has been identified, the judge must draw them all together in order to arrive at a single assessment of the offending and the offender. That is an exercise of judgment, informed by experience.
Keywords
Sentencing — Malicious wounding — Use of knife — Relevance of Aboriginality — Socio-economic factors — Alcohol — Competing aggravating and mitigating factors
Procedural History
Sentence in the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Wood J)
Facts
In February 1991, Mr Fernando, a 48-year-old Aboriginal man, pleaded guilty to a charge of malicious wounding after stabbing Ms Kennedy, a long-time friend and sometime de facto partner a number of times. When Ms Kennedy entered the bedroom at around 6am, Mr Fernando shouted words to the effect of ‘I’m going to kill you’ and wounded her with a knife. He later claimed he had no recollection of his actions and pleaded guilty to malicious wounding with a knife. Mr Fernando lived in Walgett and was born on the Namoi Reserve at Walgett. He had low levels of education and had experienced separation from family and exposure to alcohol during childhood. He had an extensive criminal record, including a number of offences involving alcohol. He had assaulted the same victim previously and was on a good behaviour bond at the time of the offence. Expert reports revealed indications of organic brain damage from chronic alcohol abuse, together with indications of an unstable personality with reduced impulse control.
Issues
There were three issues before the Court. The first was whether and to what extent the offender’s Aboriginality, socio-economic disadvantage, alcohol dependence and possible organic brain injury mitigate culpability at sentence. The second issue was whether the aggravating factors, such as prior assaults on the same victim and offending while on a good behaviour bond, outweigh the mitigating factors. The third was whether the sentence should be structured per R v Moffitt (1990) 20 NSWLR 114 — with a substantially reduced minimum term and an extended additional (parole) term — to balance the needs of denunciation, community protection, and rehabilitation.
Held
Wood J sentenced Mr Fernando to four years of imprisonment, with a non-parole period of nine months.
His Honour held that, although the offence was objectively serious due to the use of a knife, prior assaults on the same victim and breach of a good behaviour bond, it was also impulsive and unpremeditated, committed under heavy intoxication. His Honour emphasised that Aboriginality does not excuse or automatically reduce punishment, but it may explain the offender’s background, environment, and limited moral culpability.
Wood J affirmed that, while imprisonment was necessary to mark the seriousness of domestic violence and deter similar conduct, the sentence must reflect powerful subjective factors such as deprivation, alcoholism, remorse and the offender’s wish to rehabilitate.
His Honour, at 62–3, enunciated the following principles in relation to the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders:
The same sentencing principles are to be applied in every case irrespective of the identity of a particular offender or his membership of an ethnic or other group but that does not mean that the sentencing court should ignore those facts which exist only by reason of the offenders’ membership of such a group.
The relevance of the Aboriginality of an offender is not necessarily to mitigate punishment but rather to explain or throw light on the particular offence and the circumstances of the offender.
It is proper for the court to recognise that the problems of alcohol abuse and violence which to a very significant degree go hand in hand within Aboriginal communities are very real ones and their cure requires more subtle remedies than the criminal law can provide by way of imprisonment.
Notwithstanding the absence of any real body of evidence demonstrating that the imposition of significant terms of imprisonment provides any effective deterrent in either discouraging the abuse of alcohol by members of the Aboriginal society or their resort to violence when heavily affected by it, the courts must be very careful in the pursuit of their sentencing policies to not thereby deprive Aboriginals of the protection which it is assumed punishment provides. In short, a belief cannot be allowed to go about that serious violence by drunken persons within their society are treated by the law as occurrences of little moment.
While drunkenness is not normally an excuse or mitigating factor, where the abuse of alcohol by the person standing for sentence reflects the socio-economic circumstances and environment in which the offender has grown up, that can and should be taken into account as a mitigating factor. This involves the realistic recognition by the court of the endemic presence of alcohol within Aboriginal communities, and the grave social difficulties faced by those communities where poor self-image, absence of education and work opportunity and other demoralising factors have placed heavy stresses on them, reinforcing their resort to alcohol and compounding its worst effects.
That in sentencing persons of Aboriginal descent the court must avoid any hint of racism, paternalism or collective guilt yet must nevertheless assess realistically the objective seriousness of the crime within its local setting and by reference to the particular subjective circumstances of the offender.
That in sentencing an Aborigine who has come from a deprived background or is otherwise disadvantaged by reason of social or economic factors or who has little experience of European ways, a lengthy term of imprisonment may be particularly, even unduly, harsh when served in an environment which is foreign to him and which is dominated by inmates and prison officers of European background with little understanding of his culture and society or his own personality.
That in every sentencing exercise, while it is important to ensure that the punishment fits the crime and not to lose sight of the objective seriousness of the offence in the midst of what might otherwise be attractive subjective circumstances, full weight must be given to the competing public interest to rehabilitation of the offender and the avoidance of recidivism on his part.
Keywords
Sentence — Serious offender — Rape and related offences — Prior convictions — Aboriginal offender who spent childhood in care and suffered abuse
Procedural History
Appeal from an order of the County Court at Ballarat (Judge Forrest)
Facts
Clem Fuller-Cust, an Aboriginal man, pleaded guilty in the County Court at Ballarat to nine sexual and violent offences arising from two separate incidents involving two women. Across the two episodes, he admitted five counts of rape, two counts of indecent assault, one count of false imprisonment, and one count of recklessly causing injury. Mr Fuller-Cust had spent much of his childhood in institutional and foster care, during which he experienced abuse. He also had prior convictions for similar sexual offences. In sentencing, the County Court judge acknowledged but gave limited weight to the applicant’s history of disadvantage and abuse. The sentence focused on the gravity of the offences and the need for community protection. The judge treated the two episodes as distinct criminal enterprises and ordered that the sentences operate cumulatively to reflect their separate nature. The applicant was sentenced to a total of 20 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 17 years. Mr Fuller-Cust made an appeal against the severity of the sentence.
Issues
There were three main issues on appeal. The first was whether the sentencing judge wrongly treated every count as a ‘relevant offence’ so as to invoke the serious-offender provisions in ss 6D and 6E of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) (‘Sentencing Act’) by including counts for false imprisonment and recklessly causing injury, and indecent assaults without the required findings. The second issue was whether the sentencing judge misstated and misapplied the law of concurrency or cumulation by treating total cumulation between episodes as the ‘normal rule’ rather than starting from the prima facie rule of concurrency and the totality principle. The third issue was, given those errors and the insufficient evaluation of mitigating factors, whether the sentencing judge imposed an aggregate period and non-parole period that were excessive or ‘crushing’.
Held
The appeal was upheld unanimously. The applicant was re-sentenced to 17 years and three months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 14 years.
Batt JA (O’Bryan AJA agreeing) held that the sentencing judge erred in two ways. First, the judge erred by treating every count as a ‘relevant offence’ and applying the serious-offender regime in ss 6D and 6E of the Sentencing Act to all counts, although false imprisonment and recklessly causing injury are not sch 1 offences and indecent assault is only ‘relevant’ if the statutory aggravating factors are proved to the s 6C(2) standard. Second, the judge misstated the law by describing total cumulation between episodes as the ‘normal rule’. The prima facie position is concurrency under s 16(1), with only such cumulation as reflects distinct criminality and totality.
Batt JA also considered Mr Fuller-Cust’s background in re-sentencing. As his Honour commented at [60]:
So far as the applicant’s Aboriginality is concerned, the law, as I understand it, is that the same sentencing principles apply to an Aboriginal offender as to any other offender, but there may be particular matters which a court must take into account in applying those principles which are mitigating factors applicable to the particular offender, including disadvantages associated with the offender’s membership of the Aboriginal race: Neal v The Queen; R v Rogers and Murray; and R v Fernando.514
Eames JA concurred with Batt JA on the appeal and added that a lower non-parole period is appropriate. His Honour considered that greater weight should be given to Mr Fuller-Cust’s subjective circumstances as they were legitimately relevant to moral culpability, to the weight to be given to general and specific deterrence, and to prospects of rehabilitation. As his Honour explained at [78]–[80]:
Sentencing principles are the same for all Victorians. Race is not a basis for discrimination in the sentencing process. Nothing I say in these reasons should be taken as suggesting that Aboriginal offenders should be sentenced more leniently than non-Aboriginal persons on account of their race. The offences committed by the applicant, and admitted by him, are extremely serious — as I shall discuss. That is not to say, however, that considerations and factors of race may not be taken into account on sentencing, where they are relevant.
To ignore factors personal to the applicant, and his history, in which his Aboriginality was a factor, and to ignore his perception of the impact on his life of his Aboriginality, would be to sentence him as someone other than himself. Not only would that offend principles of individual sentencing which apply to all offenders but in this case it would fail to identify the reasons for his offending and, in turn, the issues which have to be addressed if rehabilitation efforts are to successfully be adopted so as to ensure that he does not re-offend and, in turn, to ensure the long-term safety of the public.
To have regard to the fact of the applicant’s Aboriginality would not mean that any factor would necessarily emerge by virtue of his race which was relevant to sentencing, but it would mean that a proper concentration would be given to his antecedents which would render it more likely that any relevant factor for sentencing which did arise from his Aboriginality would be identified, and not be overlooked. Exactly the same approach should be adopted when considering the individual situation of any offender, so that any issue relevant to that offender’s situation which might arise by virtue of the offender’s race or history would not be overlooked by a simplistic assumption that equal treatment of offenders means that differences in their individual circumstances related to their race should be ignored.
His Honour further clarified the role of Aboriginality in sentencing at [86]–[88]:
In a paper on sentencing of Aboriginal offenders Toohey J made the important observation that Aboriginality was not always an advantage for an offender on sentencing. His Honour noted:
‘The relevance of Aboriginality is not necessary to mitigate; rather, it is to explain or throw light on the circumstances of an offence. In so doing it may point the way to an appropriate penalty. Aboriginality may in some cases mean little more than the conditions in which the offender lives. In other cases it may be the very reason why the offence was committed.’
Toohey J continued:
‘The suggestion, sometimes made, that Aboriginality should be included among mitigating factors to be given some formal recognition is the more suspect. It carries overtones of patronage and superiority …. It is demeaning to Aborigines to suggest that somehow their Aboriginality is necessarily a mitigating consideration. Rather it is, to echo the words of Professor Rowley, “a matter of justice” (Rowley, A Matter of Justice, 1978). Aboriginality may sometimes be a circumstance of aggravation in the sense that an Aboriginal community may regard an offence as more serious than would a non-Aboriginal community. Bringing liquor into the community is one example. But any sentence must be subject to the over-arching notion of proportionality …’
It may follow, therefore, that when applying the sentencing principles which are common to all Victorians different outcomes may result for an Aboriginal offender simply because mitigating factors in the background of the offender, or circumstances of the offence, occurred or had an impact peculiarly so because of the Aboriginality of the offender.
Keywords
Crown appeal — Sexual intercourse with a 10-year-old child — Sentence was manifestly inadequate — Specific deterrence, protection of society and denunciation — Judicial Information Research System (‘JIRS’) statistics — Residual discretion — Causal link between deprived background and offending
Procedural History
Crown appeal from a decision of the District Court of New South Wales (Grant DCJ)
Facts
On 19 May 2023, the respondent, MJ, was sentenced in the District Court to three years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of two years, for one count of sexual intercourse with a child aged 10, contrary to s 66C(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (‘Crimes Act’). A further offence under s 66DD(a) of the Crimes Act was taken into account on a Form 1. The sentence incorporated a 25% reduction to reflect the respondent’s early guilty plea and was ordered to commence on 11 September 2022. The offending took place on 21 February 2022 and involved the 10-year-old daughter of the respondent’s partner. On the same day, the respondent was arrested for unrelated domestic violence offences against his partner. For those offences, he had already been sentenced in the Local Court to 40 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 22 months, commencing on 21 February 2022. The Director of Public Prosecutions, acting under s 5D of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), appealed the sentence on the ground that it was manifestly inadequate. Counsel for the respondent conceded that the sentence was manifestly inadequate in terms of its degree of concurrency with the domestic violence sentences but did not accept that the sentence itself was manifestly inadequate.
Issues
There were three issues on appeal. The first was whether the sentence of three years’ imprisonment (non-parole period two years) for sexual intercourse with a 10-year-old child was manifestly inadequate, both in quantum and in its degree of concurrency with existing sentences for unrelated domestic violence offences. The second issue was whether the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to specific deterrence, denunciation and protection of the community, contrary to the requirement that the sentence reflect the gravity of the offence. The third issue was whether the respondent’s deprived background and mental health issues could properly be linked to the offending, and whether a causal connection must be established before such background is given weight in mitigation
Held
The Crown appeal was upheld unanimously. The sentence ordered by the District Court was quashed. The respondent was re-sentenced to six years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of four years.
Price J (Simpson AJA and Davies J agreeing) explained at [81]:
Whilst it was open to [the sentencing judge] to find that the respondent’s ‘early social and economic deprivations’ reduced the respondent’s moral culpability and moderated the weight to be given to general deterrence, it did not follow that specific deterrence, denunciation and protection of the community were to be overlooked. Nor did it follow that no weight was to be given to general deterrence. All of these sentencing principles are relevant to cases of sexual assault upon young children. As the High Court explained in Bugmy:
‘Because the effects of profound childhood deprivation do not diminish with the passage of time and repeated offending, it is right to speak of giving “full weight” to an offender’s deprived background in every sentencing decision. However, this is not to suggest, as the appellant’s submissions were apt to do, that an offender’s deprived background has the same (mitigatory) relevance for all of the purposes of punishment. Giving weight to the conflicting purposes of punishment is what makes the exercise of the discretion so difficult.’ (Emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
In considering the principle of totality, the sentencing judge overlooked the fundamental obligation of ensuring that the sentence imposed was ‘a just and appropriate measure of the criminality involved’. Before accepting the respondent’s counsel’s submission as to the commencement date of the sentence, the sentencing judge should have stepped back and taken time to review what would be the total effective sentence.
Price J (Simpson AJA and Davies J agreeing) commented at [95]–[96]:
In my view, the degree to which the existing sentence for the domestic violence offences could comprehend the criminality of the sexual assault was significantly limited. The domestic violence offences were discrete and independent criminal acts against a separate victim. The only common factor was that each of the victims lived in the same home. The sharing of a residential environment, in my view, could play very little, if any, part in assessing the extent to which a sentence for domestic violence offences could comprehend the criminality of the serious sexual offending.
I do not wish to appear unduly critical of the judge, who has a large criminal caseload and is hardworking. His Honour is to be lauded for his efforts in delivering ex tempore sentencing remarks. However, the task of sentencing the respondent was complicated by the existing sentence. In my respectful opinion, before accepting the submission as to the commencement date of the sentence, his Honour should have stepped back and taken time to review what would be the total effective sentence and consider whether it was ‘just and appropriate’ if it was to commence on 11 September 2022.
On re-sentencing, the Court assessed the offence as above mid-range in seriousness. Specific deterrence and retribution were given greater weight due to the Form 1 offence. A causal link was found between the respondent’s deprived background and the offending, reducing his moral culpability. His mental health further moderated general deterrence. Price J explained:
[135] However, this Court in DR [v The Queen] did not find that Bugmy factors are not to be taken into account unless a causal link has been established. The focus of the Court was on the assessment of moral culpability and Bellew J explained that an offender’s disadvantaged background ‘must be given full weight’ in determining an appropriate sentence even though no causal link had been established. RA Hulme J observed at [4]:
‘The existence of such a link might be arguable but reasonable minds may differ. In the end, the effect upon the actual sentence imposed may not be significant.’
[136] In any event, I consider that a causal link has been established on the evidence. The respondent was exposed to violence and drug use by his uncle. He was shown how to smoke cannabis when he was 7 years old, which became a regular habit from the age of 13. His drug use progressed to methamphetamines. His engagement with antisocial peers increased in his teenage years and his education did not extend beyond Year 9. His criminal history reveals offences of violence and damage to property when he was 15.
[137] The respondent’s loss of his mother at the age of 3, the time spent on the local Mission, and his exposure to violence and drug use during his formative years are circumstances of profound disadvantage which permit me to find (particularly given that the circumstances of sexual offending involved drug use) that the respondent’s moral culpability is reduced. This does not mean he bears no moral culpability for the offence, nor does it mean that his drug use has been taken into account as a mitigating factor …
[138] The respondent did not submit either in this Court or before the judge that there was a causal relationship between his mental health and his offending behaviour. The submission was confined to his subjective case.
[139] I take into account the respondent’s age and mental health. He was born on 20 July 1983 and is now 40 years old. The material placed before the judge … disclosed that in 2017, he had been suffering from untreated psychosis on a background of illicit drug use. Mr Sheehan opined that while ‘somewhat unclear’, the evidence supported a diagnosis of Drug Induced Psychosis (in partial remission), with a possible diagnosis of Schizophrenia (in partial remission). Mr Sheehan expressed the opinion that the criteria for paraphilic disorder was not met but the evidence supported a diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder. While serving his sentence, the respondent has been taking Olanzapine and has neither heard voices nor been paranoid.
[140] The respondent’s reduced moral culpability and mental health moderates the weight that I give to general deterrence.
The question of whether a link needs to be established between childhood deprivation and disadvantage and the commission of the offence is apt to mislead, as Simpson AJA explained at [2]–[3]:
I wish to comment briefly on the application of what have come to be known as ‘Bugmy principles’ … Price J has discussed some of the authorities in which the question of whether a causal link needs to be established between childhood deprivation and disadvantage and the commission of the offence for which sentence is to be passed has been raised.
In my opinion that question is apt to mislead. Where profound childhood deprivation and disadvantage has been established, to require that a causal link be established between that background and the commission of the offence is to misunderstand and undermine the ‘Bugmy principles’. It is only necessary to go to the joint judgment (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) in Bugmy to make the point. At [40] their Honours said:
‘The circumstance that an offender has been raised in a community surrounded by alcohol abuse and violence may mitigate the sentence because his or her moral culpability is likely to be less than the culpability of an offender whose formative years have not been marred in that way.’
Simpson AJA further noted at [15]:
To discount the effect of childhood disadvantage because no causal connection with the offence for which sentence is to be imposed is established is to ignore the subtleties and nuances of the considerations that the plurality in the High Court in Bugmy recognised. To ask whether there is a causal connection between a dysfunctional background and the offence for which sentence is to be passed is to ask the wrong question and potentially to mislead and distract from the essential question, which is the assessment of the offender’s moral culpability.
Keywords
Aggravated break and enter — Sentence — Aboriginality — Intoxication
Procedural history
Sentence in the District Court of New South Wales (Yehia DCJ)
Facts
Brett Sharpley, a 19-year-old Aboriginal man from the Namoi Mission near Walgett, grew up amid entrenched social and economic disadvantage. His upbringing was marked by alcohol abuse, domestic violence, poor schooling, and limited access to opportunities. Both his parents were alcoholics, and he began drinking at 13 and using cannabis at 16. He was expelled from school and had poor literacy and numeracy skills. On 11 December 2013, Mr Sharpley and his cousin Brandon Sharpley broke into the Gourmet Food Takeaway Shop in Walgett around 12:40am, kicking open the storeroom door and stealing a carton of Lift soft drink worth $18. About an hour later, they returned with two juveniles, MH and JT, and stole several cartons of Powerade drinks valued at about $40 each. The offences were recorded on CCTV, and a subsequent police search found matching clothing and a Powerade box at Sharpley’s home. He later attended the Walgett Police Station voluntarily, admitted his involvement, and confirmed the identities of his co-offenders. At the time, he was intoxicated, having consumed Bundaberg rum since 10am, and remained under a good behaviour bond from the Children’s Court for an earlier assault on his father.
Issues
There were two central issues before the Court. The first was whether, in light of the offender’s youth, Aboriginal background, intoxication, and deprived upbringing, a term of imprisonment was the only appropriate sentence for two counts of aggravated break, enter and steal under s 112(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The second issue was whether the principles in R v Fernando515 and Bugmy v The Queen516 should apply to mitigate the offender’s sentence. The Court also needed to determine how considerations of rehabilitation, general and specific deterrence, and moral culpability should be balanced, given the offender’s personal circumstances and the low objective seriousness of the offences.
Held
Judge Yehia SC held that, while the offences of aggravated break, enter and steal carry serious maximum penalties and ordinarily warrant imprisonment, the particular circumstances of this case placed the offending at the very low end of objective seriousness. Her Honour found that the offender’s background of profound social deprivation, youth, intoxication, remorse and good prospects of rehabilitation significantly reduced his moral culpability. Applying the Fernando and Bugmy principles, her Honour recognised that the offender’s disadvantaged upbringing and exposure to entrenched alcohol abuse and violence justified giving less weight to general deterrence and greater emphasis to rehabilitation.
Her Honour also found that s 5 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) (‘Sentencing Act’) requires imprisonment to be a last resort, and was not satisfied that no penalty other than imprisonment was appropriate. Accordingly, the offender was convicted on both counts. On the first count, he was sentenced to a two-year good behaviour bond under s 9 of the Sentencing Act, subject to supervision and reporting conditions. On the second count, he was ordered to perform 100 hours of community service work under s 86 of the same Act.
Her Honour concluded that rehabilitation, not incarceration, best served both the offender’s interests and the protection of the community, stating (at [72]) that ‘the protection and advancement of the community is met by the successful rehabilitation of this offender’.
9.12 Further Reading: 9.1 Introduction
9.12.1 Bench Books
There is guidance about these issues in the National Domestic and Family Violence Bench Book517 the Queensland Equal Treatment Benchbook518 the Judicial Commission of New South Wales’s Equality before the Law Bench Book519 and many studies and reports including the Royal Commission into Family Violence.
9.12.2 Books
Tujague, Nicole (Kabi Kabi) and Kelleigh Ryan (Kabi Kabi), Cultural Safety in Trauma-Informed Practice from a First Nations Perspective: Billabongs of Knowledge (Palgrave Macmillan, 2023)
This book provides an accessible resource for conducting culturally safe and trauma-informed practice with First Nation’s peoples in Australia. Designed by and for Australian Indigenous peoples, it explores psychological trauma and healing, and the clinical and cultural implications of the impacts of colonisation, through an Indigenous lens. It has been described as essential reading for Indigenous practitioners and service providers to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.
Nicole Tujague and Kelleigh Ryan are both Kabi Kabi women who, through this book, aim to provide practical support and actionable insights for practitioners in health and social sciences, fostering a deeper understanding of the effects of trauma on First Nations Peoples. See page 54 for a discussion on the need for adopting a trauma lens to ensuring cultural safety, particularly given the gap in the extant literature.
9.12.3 Reports/Discussion Papers
Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017)
This report was tabled in Parliament by the Attorney-General on 28 March 2018. It contains 35 recommendations designed to reduce the disproportionate rate of incarceration of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and to improve community safety.
Recommendation 7-1 deals with community-based sentences. It advocates for community-based sentencing options to be developed in collaboration with relevant Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander organisations by
expanding the geographic reach of community-based sentencing options, particularly in regional and remote areas;
providing community-based sentencing options that are culturally appropriate; and
making community-based sentencing options accessible to offenders with complex needs, to reduce reoffending.520
Page 23 discusses the importance of achieving substantive equality before the law, as distinct from formal equality. Substantive equality recognises that ‘rights, entitlements, opportunities and access are not equally distributed throughout society and that a one size fits all approach will not achieve equality’. This involves considering unique systemic factors faced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander offenders, and ensuring that sentencing, diversion and support programs are consistent nationwide and culturally appropriate.
Dudgeon, Pat (Bardi), Helen Milroy (Palyku) and Roz Walker, Working Together: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Mental Health and Wellbeing Principles and Practice (Report, 2nd ed, 2014)
Professor Helen Milroy, a Palyku woman, Professor Pat Dudgeon, a Bardi woman, and Roz Walker explain the impact of trauma and intergenerational trauma on First Nations people.521
Edwige, Vanessa (Ngarabal) and Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, 2021)
The Bugmy Bar Book Committee commissioned this report ‘to collate research regarding the significance of culture to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and the significant benefits of connecting to culture, family and community as part of culturally appropriate treatment and care to promote wellbeing, rehabilitation and healing’.522
The report outlines the importance of culture to rehabilitation and healing. It explores meanings of social and emotional wellbeing of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people; explains the relationship between healing and culture, including in relation to recidivism and recovery, and in terms of cultural safety in service provision; and identifies the impacts of imprisonment on individuals with cognitive or psychiatric disabilities, and on imprisoned people’s children and families.
Edwige, a Ngarabal woman, and Gray, a Wiradjuri man, refer to Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency guidance which provides that, to ensure culturally safe and respectful practice, health practitioners must:
Acknowledge colonisation and systemic racism, social, cultural, behavioural and economic factors which impact individual and community health;
Acknowledge and address individual racism, their own biases, assumptions, stereotypes and prejudices and provide care that is holistic, free of bias and racism;
Recognise the importance of self-determined decision making, partnership and collaboration in health care which is driven by the individual, family and community;
Foster a safe working environment through leadership to support the rights and dignity of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and colleagues.523
These guidelines are equally applicable to the provision of legal services by legal professionals and judicial officers.
Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Trauma-Informed Courts: Guidance for Trauma-Informed Judicial Practices (Report, 2022)
The Judicial Commission of New South Wales has developed an essential guide for judicial officers to provide insight into the unique traumas that may be experienced by vulnerable groups required to engage in court processes. The guide provides trauma-informed information in relation to victims of domestic and family violence, First Nations people, and people with disabilities. The guide asserts that trauma-informed practice in the courts can provide the following benefits: ‘defuse the stressful courtroom environment’, ‘minimise the risk of participants being re-traumatised’, ‘recognise the effects of overwhelming stress [on traumatised witnesses’, and ‘enhance the likelihood that fair processes and justice will be achieved’.524 The guide goes on to consider the six core principles of properly employing trauma-informed practices: safety; trustworthiness and transparency; peer support; collaboration and mutuality; empowerment, voice and choice; cultural, historic and gender issues.525
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991)
The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody examined 99 deaths of Aboriginal people that occurred in custody between January 1980 and May 1989. The Commission investigated and reported on the manner and circumstances of each death, as well as conducting broader investigations into the social, cultural and legal factors that may have contributed to the deaths.
The Final Report, released in April 1991, concluded that First Nations peoples had a higher chance of dying in custody simply because they had a higher chance of being in custody. A central finding was that continuing conditions of over-representation of First Nations peoples in prisons had their ‘origins in structural, systemic injustice to a disadvantaged minority rather than in a propensity in this group to increased criminality’. In other words, what differs is not the behaviour of First Nations peoples compared to non-Indigenous people, but the discriminatory and violent ways in which they are treated. The Commission’s 339 recommendations fall into two main categories:
-
those focused on improving the interaction of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples at first contact with police and the justice system; and
-
those addressing policies such as health, education and self-determination in recognition of the broader social issues that lead to higher rates of incarceration.
Chapter 1.6 in vol 1 deals with reducing the number of Aboriginal people in custody and diversion from custody.
9.12.4 Other Resources
Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Web Page) <https://bugmybarbook.org.au/>
The Bugmy Bar Book is an evidence-based resource tailored to judicial officers, legal practitioners, health professionals and services, that publishes chapters informed by multi-disciplinary research drawn from Law Reform Commission reports, parliamentary and other government reports, discipline-specific reports (including First Nations opinion and research) about the impact(s) of adverse experiences including trauma, socio-economic inequality and structural disadvantage, and strengths-based resources. These research chapters provide an evidence base for lawyers and courts to inform themselves of the experiences of people who come into contact with the criminal justice system.526
The publications include information that is specific to First Nations people, including experiences of the Stolen Generations, cultural dispossession and the significance of funeral attendance and Sorry Business.
The Bugmy Bar Book also publishes expert opinions and research relating to strengths-based approaches to rehabilitation and wellbeing.527
Gerry, Felicity, ‘Why Being Trauma Informed Is an Issue for Court Integrity’ Legalwise Insights (Blog Post, 14 July 2022)
Professor Felicity Gerry’s article discusses the importance of being trauma informed in a broader sense and the impact on court integrity. Recognising that trauma is present not only in victims and witnesses but also in court users, defendants and lawyers poses unique challenges to court processes. Professor Gerry calls for ‘further reform as a whole of justice approach as a question of integrity’.
The Healing Foundation (Web Page) <https://healingfoundation.org.au/>
The Healing Foundation provides accessible resources concerning intergenerational trauma and healing from First Nations perspectives. The Foundation explains the experience of intergenerational trauma as follows:
If Stolen Generations survivors don’t have the opportunity to heal from trauma, they’re likely to live in a state of distress, which can lead to a range of negative outcomes for themselves and their descendants.
Their children may experience difficulties with attachment, disconnection from their extended families and culture and high levels of stress from family and community members who are dealing with the impacts of trauma. This can create developmental issues for children, who are particularly susceptible to distress at a young age. This creates a cycle of trauma, where the impact is passed from one generation to the next.528
9.13 Further Reading: 9.2 Interactions with Police
9.13.1 Bench Books
Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, National Domestic and Family Violence Bench Book (August 2025)
This bench book was developed in response to a recommendation by the Australian Law Reform Commission,529 and is complementary to efforts under the National Plan to End Violence against Women and Children 2022–2032.530 It serves as a ‘central resource for judicial officers considering legal issues relevant to domestic and family violence related cases’,531 which aims to improve consistency in judicial decision-making processes and improve court experiences for victims of cases involving domestic and family violence. By providing background research, links to related resources and practical guidelines, the bench book ‘[harmonises] the treatment of [domestic and family violence related cases] across jurisdictions along broad principles’.532
Chapter 3.1.11 discusses methods of systems abuse and litigation tactics that perpetrators of domestic and family violence may adopt to ‘gain an advantage over or to harass, intimidate, discredit or otherwise control the other party’.533 One such tactic is termed ‘burning off’ and occurs where the perpetrator makes multiple applications under different systems with the goal of depleting the victim’s financial resources and emotional wellbeing, and diminishing their capacity to maintain employment or to care for children.
Chapter 4.4.10 highlights the social and cultural backdrop in understanding why ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait women are at a greater risk of all forms of violence and related death than other Australian women’.534 Kinship structures and community histories can inform the distinct manifestation of abusive behaviours in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities. They also inform the reasons why Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women may hesitate to seek help. These reasons may include fear of retribution, fear of their child being removed, distrust of police, fear that the perpetrator will die in custody, or fear of shaming by other members in their local community.
Supreme Court of Queensland, Equal Treatment Benchbook (Supreme Court Library Queensland, 2nd ed, 2016)
The Equal Treatment Benchbook is a judicial resource to inform judges of the diverse and unique challenges faced by vulnerable groups with a view of achieving equal treatment of all court users. It emphasises that:
The equal treatment of all persons, regardless of any particular characteristics, is assisted by an understanding of the differences between different groups. Unless judges have this understanding, there is the possibility that in some cases, the equal treatment of different persons before the court will not be achieved.535
Page 109 discusses the ways incidences of family and intimate partner violence can be compounded by cultural factors for First Nations women. This section refers to R v Kina for the Queensland Court of Appeal’s recognition of complex factors which hindered the defendant’s ability to effectively communicate with her legal representatives:
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her Aboriginality;
-
the battered woman syndrome; and
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the shameful (to her) nature of the events which characterised her relationship with the deceased.536
9.13.2 Books
Cunneen, Chris, ‘Criminalisation and Policing in Indigenous Communities’ in Larissa Behrendt (Eualayai/Gamilaroi), Chris Cunneen, Terri Libesman and Nicole Watson (Birri Gubba and Munanjali) (eds), Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Relations (Oxford University Press, 2019)
In this book, Professor Cunneen, Dr Terri Libesman and Distinguished Professor Larissa Behrendt, a Eualayai/Gamilaroi woman, discuss the major issues faced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people under the Anglo-Australian legal system.
This chapter by Professor Cunneen focuses on how criminalisation processes of policing and the criminal law affect Indigenous Australians and reflects on contemporary Indigenous policing and governance. It highlights key issues including policing responses to minor offences, barriers in complying with bail conditions, use of excessive force by police, and high levels of deaths in custody. Professor Cunneen also provides an overview of community patrols and Aboriginal community justice mechanisms, arguing that the success of these programs is hindered by the struggle for Indigenous autonomy.
Libesman, Terri, ‘Dispossession and Colonisation’ in Larissa Behrendt (Eualayai/Gamilaroi), Chris Cunneen, Terri Libesman and Nicole Watson (Birri Gubba and Munanjali) (eds), Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Relations (Oxford University Press, 2019)
In this book, Professor Cunneen, Dr Terri Libesman and Distinguished Professor Larissa Behrendt, a Eualayai/Gamilaroi woman, discuss the major issues faced by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people under the Anglo-Australian legal system.
The chapter by Terri Libesman, ‘Dispossession and Colonisation’, discusses how Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have been treated under law while being denied norms under the rule of law as a consequence of the ‘Protection’ era. This includes frontier war evidence, the role of police, and the failure of the courts to recognise Aboriginal laws and customs. Australian colonial governments’ response to Aboriginal resistance, including Governor Hunter’s orders to send out armed parties and Governor Macquarie’s ban on Aboriginal meetings, reveals further breaches of the rule of law.
The chapter goes on to discuss the 1789 smallpox outbreak in Port Jackson, declarations of martial law, and dispersal of Aboriginal people by police as ‘[indicators] of the level of fear generated among the colonists by conflict over land’. Case studies of the massacre at Waterloo Creek in New South Wales and the lethal use of force by the Queensland Mounted Police against Aboriginal people, reveal further instances of frontier violence. Relevantly, the involvement of police is described as follows:
The police in Australia carried out paramilitary functions which in other colonial countries were carried out by the military. The role of police at the frontier and in implementing ‘Protection’ and assimilation policies, which involved child removal and forcing people off their lands, has had an enduring impact on many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ perceptions of police and, more broadly, the failure of the rule of law.537
9.13.3 Journal Articles
Blagg, Henry and Thalia Anthony, ‘‘‘If Those Old Women Catch You, You’re Going to Cop It”: Night Patrols, Indigenous Women, and Place Based Sovereignty in Outback Australia’ (2014) 8(1) African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies 103
Night patrols are a uniquely Indigenous Australian form of community self-policing. Patrols do not fit neatly into established paradigms of ‘policing’ emanating from the Global North. They are not part of the apparatus of the state police. Nor do they offer commodified private security services and, unlike mainstream police, they cannot legitimately call on a reservoir of coercive powers to ensure compliance.
In this article, Professors Blagg and Anthony sketch out what they describe as the ‘contested space’ of Indigenous self-policing, as represented by patrols, through a postcolonial lens, paying particular attention to the role of Indigenous women’s agency in creating, nurturing and sustaining night patrol work within an Indigenous ethics of care and notions of wellbeing.
9.13.4 Reports/Discussion Papers
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare and Closing the Gap Clearinghouse, ‘The Role of Community Patrols in Improving Safety in Indigenous Communities’ (Resource Sheet No 20, July 2013)
This paper summarises the key evidence in support of community patrols. It also summarises some of the evidence on best practices for effective integration of community patrols alongside police in crime prevention
This paper argues that community patrols have the potential to increase Indigenous community safety. They can assist in reducing crime rates and alcohol-related harm and empower the local community. The most successful community patrols tend to enjoy community involvement and ownership and strong collaboration with police and a network of community services.
Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017)
This report was tabled in Parliament by the Attorney-General on 28 March 2018. It contains 35 recommendations designed to reduce the disproportionate rate of incarceration of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and improve community safety.
Cooper, Trudi, Margaret Sims, John Scott, Pamela Henry, Elaine Barclay and Terence Love, Evaluation of Indigenous Justice Programs: Project D — Safe Aboriginal Youth Patrol Programs in New South Wales and Northbridge Policy and Juvenile Aid Group in Western Australia (Attorney General’s Department (Cth), Final Report, 2014).
This report, commissioned by the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department, reviewed the Safe Aboriginal Youth Patrol programs in New South Wales and the Northbridge Policy project in Western Australia. These were both designed to deliver community and night patrol services for young people. The report examined whether the programs should be replicated and outlined evidence of each program’s outcomes.
The report found that the patrols were highly valued by young people and the Indigenous community, and this offered opportunities to strengthen youth work and community development. It was also concluded that the strengths and weaknesses of the two models are complementary to some extent, which may support the development of a new model for community and night patrols.
National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families, Bringing Them Home (Report, 1997)
The Bringing Them Home Report examines the laws, practices and policies which resulted in the forcible removal of Indigenous children from their families, exploring both the officially authorised use of force and illegal use of force. Chapter 2 of the report details the role of police officers in the enforcement of ‘protection’ legislation of the early 20th century.
Justice Reform Initiative, Alternatives to Incarceration Reports (April 2021 – February 2024)
These reports, each of them focusing on one state or territory, highlight evidence-based alternatives to incarceration which aim to mitigate individuals’ contact with the criminal justice system in the first place or reduce rates of recidivism. These alternatives include:
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early intervention and prevention programs;
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alternative policing and first-responder models;
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First Nations place-based approaches;
-
bail support programs;
-
alternative detention models, including international therapeutic models for children;
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alternative and specialist court processes, including in-court diversionary programs, Community and Neighbourhood Justice Courts and First Nations Courts; and
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post-release and diversionary community-led programs, including intensive post-release support programs and First Nations–led post-release services.
In all states except Queensland, the Justice Reform Initiative recommends that the government establish a ‘Breaking the Cycle’ fund committed to implementing the alternative programs listed above and boosting any existing ones. It also recommends that a proportion of each state’s fund should be dedicated to funding First Nations–led organisations, citing the need to address the overrepresentation of First Nations people in the justice system. The percentage of this minimum allocation should be determined according to what is needed to reach each state’s Closing the Gap Implementation Plan.538 Though the report for Queensland does not refer to a dedicated fund, it recognises the need for a ‘significant funding shift’539 in support of community-led programs outside the justice system, noting that ‘[w]e cannot imprison our way to a safer society’.540
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991) vol 1 [1.4.14]–[1.5.2]
The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (‘RCIADIC’) examined 99 deaths of Aboriginal people that occurred in custody between January 1980 and May 1989. The Commission investigated and reported on the manner and circumstances of each death, as well as broader investigations into the social, cultural and legal factors that may have contributed to the deaths.
The Final Report, released in April 1991, concluded that First Nations peoples had a higher chance of dying in custody simply because they had a higher chance of being in custody. A central finding was that continuing conditions of over-representation of First Nations peoples in prisons had their ‘origins in structural, systemic injustice to a disadvantaged minority rather than in a propensity in this group to increased criminality’. In other words, what differs is not the behaviour of First Nations peoples compared to non-Indigenous people, but the discriminatory and violent ways in which they are treated. The report’s 339 recommendations fall into two main categories:
-
those focused on improving the interaction of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples at first contact with police and the justice system; and
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those addressing policies such as health, education and self-determination, in recognition of the broader social issues leading to higher rates of incarceration.
Paragraphs [1.4.14] to [1.5.2] of the report discuss the historical context and consequent relationship between Aboriginal people and the police, describing it as one of ‘deep animosity and often hatred’.541
Royal Commission into Family Violence (Final Report, March 2016)
The Royal Commission was established in 2015 after a number of family violence–related deaths in Victoria, most notably, the death of Luke Batty. The role of the Commission was to find ways to:
-
prevent family violence;
-
improve support for victim-survivors; and
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hold perpetrators to account.
The Commission investigated criminal law, corrections and courts, the role of support services, the health system and alcohol and drug treatment services, as well as those of refuges, housing and education, and tools available to police. It made a total of 227 recommendations.
The issue of misidentification of the primary aggressor in police practice in cases involving family violence in discussed in vol 3 on pages 37–8 of the report. Recommendation 41 is:
Victoria Police amend the Victoria Police Code of Practice for the Investigation of Family Violence to ensure it provides suitable guidance on identifying family violence primary aggressors … This includes:
procedures for amending the Law Enforcement Assistance Program (LEAP) when a service provider or a Support and Safety Hub subsequently informs Victoria Police that a person is not the primary aggressor
provision of details of specialist support available to assist in identifying the primary aggressor.542
Yoorrook Justice Commission, Yoorrook for Justice: Report into Victoria’s Child Protection and Criminal Justice Systems (Report, August 2023)
The Yoorrook Justice Commission, set up by agreement between the First Peoples’ Assembly of Victoria and the Victoria Government, operates as the first and only truth-telling commission in Australia. The Commission was established to share and record evidence of the ongoing impact of colonisation and injustices committed against First Peoples in Victoria across all areas of life.
The report, Victoria’s Children Protection and Criminal Justice Systems, defined over-policing as ‘the unjustified, disproportionate and unreasonable use of police powers against First Peoples or other racial groups’.543 The report identified a number of ways that over-policing affects Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, including:
The report identified various ways that over-policing affects Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people:
racial profiling: police seeking out, stopping, questioning, searching or detaining a person because of their Aboriginality
misuse of police discretion: choosing to charge and prosecute an Aboriginal person instead of cautioning or supporting diversion, choosing to arrest instead of charging via summons or choosing to remand people in custody instead of supporting bail
inappropriate use of police as first responders: using the criminal law and police to respond to conduct associated with social inequality such as intoxication, drug use and mental illness.544
Weatherburn, Don, Michael Doyle, Teagan Weatherall and Joanna Wang, ‘Towards a Theory of Indigenous Contact with the Criminal Justice System’ (Research Report No 32, Australian Institute of Criminology, 22 May 2024)
The report identifies and evaluates factors which may increase an individual’s risk of arrest, with a view of outlining a preliminary theory of Indigenous arrest. The report contemplates universal risk factors (e.g. age, gender) and risk factors which disproportionately affect the Indigenous population compared to the non-Indigenous population (e.g. post-traumatic stress). For young Aboriginal men, the adverse impacts of age and gender as universal risk factors are exacerbated by the ‘shared oral history of indiscriminate murder, forced removal, abduction, harassment and police brutality’.545 This highlights the centrality of the historic context in properly understanding the relationship between police and Aboriginal people.
9.14 Further Reading: 9.3 Court Bail and 9.4 Improved Access to Court Bail
9.14.1 Resources for Judicial Officers and Lawyers
Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Web Page) <https://bugmybarbook.org.au/>
The Bugmy Bar Book is an evidence-based resource tailored to judicial officers, legal practitioners, health professionals and services, that publishes chapters informed by multi-disciplinary research drawn from Law Reform Commission reports, parliamentary and other government reports, discipline-specific reports (including First Nations opinion and research) about the impact(s) of adverse experiences including trauma, socio-economic inequality and structural disadvantage, and strengths-based resources. These research chapters provide an evidence base for lawyers and courts to inform themselves of the experiences of people who come into contact with the criminal justice system.546
Chapters of note include:
-
‘Impacts of Imprisonment and Remand in Custody’ — The chapter recognises the adverse effects of incarceration on individuals’ health and wellbeing, connection to culture and sense of community. The chapter identifies that a lack of appropriate access to healthcare in prison exacerbates these effects. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are regularly deprived of access to culturally safe healthcare in prison, particularly for Aboriginal women, with staff discriminatorily disregarding their requests and failing to provide adequate quality of care.547
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‘Significance of Funeral Attendance and Sorry Business for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ — The chapter reports that failure to attend funerals and participate in Sorry Business is detrimental to an Aboriginal person’s social and emotional wellbeing,548 and has presented associations with suicide.549 Findings from the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody recognise the need to extend kinship and family obligations of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples beyond their immediate family.550
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‘Homelessness’ — The chapter discusses how experiences of homelessness interact with the criminal justice system, particularly as both a cause and consequence of incarceration.551 It is noted that disproportionate rates of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people experiencing homelessness must be understood by reference to systemic barriers and exclusion they face in areas such as education, employment and incarceration rates.552 The chapter recommends a holistic approach to address homelessness, particularly with respect to young people as an especially vulnerable group.553
Fryer-Smith, Stephanie, Aboriginal Benchbook for Western Australian Courts (Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, 2nd ed, 2008) ch 6.1
The Aboriginal Benchbook for Western Australian Courts was commissioned by the National Indigenous Cultural Awareness Committee of the Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration. It was developed in response to concerns about the over-representation of Aboriginal people in the Australian criminal justice system. The bench book relates to judicial officers presiding over criminal matters involving Aboriginal people in Western Australia. Its discussion of pre-trial, criminal proceeding and sentencing matters makes it a practical resource for judicial officers, and it aims to be a template for adaptation in other Australian jurisdictions. Chapter 6.1 discusses bail issues.
Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Equality before the Law Bench Book (April 2025) 2.3.2
The Equality before the Law Bench Book outlines practical considerations in relation to bail for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, including that they must not be subject to more stringent tests in relation to bail, or more stringent bail conditions than would be applied for non-Indigenous people, and that paternalism is not appropriate.554 It recommends that bail should be assessed in the following way:
Assess bail and bail conditions not just based on police views but also on the views of the defence and respected members of the local Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community and/or the Local Court Aboriginal Client Service Specialist (if there is one) about the particular person’s ties to the community and likelihood of absconding, and about culturally-appropriate options in relation to bail conditions. Community-based support, for example, might provide a viable option as family-based support.555
Magistrates Court of Queensland, Bail Benchbook (2024) ch 24
Chapter 24 of the Queensland Magistrates Court’s Bail Benchbook (titled ‘Indigenous Defendants’) provides guidance for decision-makers about ss 15, 16 and 34C of the Bail Act 1980 (Qld). Those sections provide that the Court may take into account submissions from community justice groups (‘CJGs’) in relation to the applicant and any risk factors, and may allow the CJGs to inspect the Court file.556
Supreme Court of Western Australia, Equal Justice Bench Book (September 2021)
The Equal Justice Bench Book provides guidance to judicial officers in Western Australia in fulfilling their professional obligation to administer the law with respect and courtesy, and without bias or paternalistic attitudes. It is premised on the recognition that equal justice requires an understanding that different people are affected by the law in different ways. Identifying the unique circumstances that are experienced by groups of different backgrounds — whether this be on the basis of gender, culture, disability, etc — is a crucial step. Chapter 11 discusses considerations relevant to Aboriginal people and relevant services for judicial officers.
Department of Justice and Community Safety (Vic), ‘Bail Considerations for Aboriginal People’ (Guide, 25 March 2024)
This guide outlines the practical steps and considerations for bail decision-makers in applying s 3A of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic). It details the steps to follow:
Ask whether the applicant is an Aboriginal person and connect them to relevant support services.
Take into account issues that arise due to the person’s Aboriginality [in order to] support more culturally appropriate bail decisions.
Identify and record the considerations you took into account if you refuse bail to an Aboriginal person.557
Page 8 gives a detailed explanation of each of the mandatory, but non-exhaustive, considerations listed in s 3A(1). The resource also provides a flowchart of steps to be followed (on page 9), and a summary table of possible sources of information and/or evidence on s 3A matters (on page 10).
The Law Society of New South Wales, Working with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Clients: Resources for Solicitors in NSW (Resource, September 2021)
This resource is intended to assist legal practitioners acting for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander clients to fulfil their professional obligations and to facilitate effective communication. The practical advice contained in the resource highlights the importance of providing culturally safe and trauma-informed services, as well as the need to coordinate with Aboriginal community service providers. Particular cultural practices highlighted in the resource include Sorry Business, men’s business and women’s business, and kinship relationships.
9.14.2 Books
Longman, Craig and Alison Whittaker (Gomeroi), ‘Practitioner Perspective: Chasing Professionalism — The Practitioner Role in Responding to First Nations Deaths in Custody’ in Marg Camilleri and Alistair Harkness (eds), Australian Courts: Controversies, Challenges and Change (Palgrave Macmillan, 2023) 264
In this piece, Professor Longman and Gomeroi legal researcher Alison Whittaker discuss First Nations deaths in custody, particularly highlighting the role of coroner’s courts and inquests into deaths in custody. The authors call for lawyers to ‘remain self-aware that the experience that First Nation families have in living under a colonial legal system gives them a greater understanding and expertise in how the law actually ‘works’ upon First Nation communities than their lawyer’.558
9.14.3 Reports/Discussion Papers
Office of the Inspector of Custodial Services (WA), Funeral Attendances by Incarcerated People in Western Australia (Report, September 2013) 2 [1.4]–[1.5]
This report examined the Department of Corrective Services’ policies and practices on funeral attendance, which revealed a further issue in regard to the Department’s financial accountability. It was concluded that the Department’s analysis of the changes to funeral attendance policies was inadequate and failed to consider the impacts on Aboriginal people. Paragraphs [1.4]–[1.5] recognise the centrality of funeral attendance and participation in the mourning process in Aboriginal culture, which is closely tied to their cultural and social wellbeing.
Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991) vol 1, ch 5
The Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (RCIADIC) examined 99 deaths of Aboriginal people that occurred in custody between January 1980 and May 1989. The Commission investigated and reported on the manner and circumstances of each death, as well as broader investigations into the social, cultural and legal factors that may have contributed to the deaths.
The Final Report, released in April 1991, concluded that First Nations peoples had a higher chance of dying in custody simply because they had a higher chance of being in custody. A central finding was that continuing conditions of over-representation of First Nations peoples in prisons had their ‘origins in structural, systemic injustice to a disadvantaged minority rather than in a propensity in this group to increased criminality’. In other words, what differs is not the behaviour of First Nations peoples compared to non-Indigenous people, but the discriminatory and violent ways in which they are treated. The report’s 339 recommendations fall into two main categories:
-
those focused on improving the interaction of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples at first contact with police and the justice system; and
-
those addressing policies such as health, education and self-determination, in recognition of the broader social issues leading to higher rates of incarceration.
Volume 1 ch 5 addresses the disproportionate numbers of Aboriginal people in custody which led to the establishment of the Royal Commission. The chapter draws comparisons between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal deaths in custody and concludes with recommendation 41:
That statistics and other information on Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal deaths in prison, police custody and juvenile detention centres, and related matters, be monitored nationally on an ongoing basis. I suggest that responsibility for this be established within the Australian Institute of Criminology and that all custodial agencies co-operate with the Institute to enable it to carry out the responsibility.559
9.15 Further Reading: 9.5 Sentencing
9.15.1 Resources for Judicial Officers and Practitioners
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth), Sentencing of Federal Offenders in Australia: A Guide for Practitioners (7th ed, 2024)
Sentencing of Federal Offenders in Australia provides helpful guidance for judicial officers and legal practitioners. It summarises the key Commonwealth legislative provisions and leading authorities on sentencing offenders at the federal level.
Sentencing Bench Books
States and territories have the benefit of sentencing bench books to guide judicial decision-making:
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Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Sentencing Bench Book (2025);
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Judicial College of Victoria, Victorian Sentencing Manual (Bench Book, 4th ed, 2025); and
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Supreme Court of Queensland, Benchbook on Sentencing (Supreme Court Library Queensland, 2017).
Yehia, Justice Dina, The Essential Guide to Sentencing in NSW (LexisNexis, 2023)
This guide contains a paper (‘Sentencing Aboriginal Offenders’) by Justice Yehia of the Supreme Court of New South Wales with a comprehensive summary of cases relevant to sentencing Aboriginal offenders.
9.15.2 Reports/Discussion Papers
Beckett, Judge Sophie, Jennifer Wheeler and Lauren Stefanou, ‘The Bugmy Bar Book: Presenting Evidence of Disadvantage and Evidence Concerning the Significance of Culture on Sentence’ (Paper, October 2021)
In this paper, Judge Beckett discusses the issues involved in presenting evidence of an offender’s disadvantage and evidence on the significance of culture in sentencing matters. In recognising the relationship between an individual’s background of disadvantage and sentencing principles, her Honour discusses practical constraints on the application of Bugmy v The Queen560 (see pages 11–16). For practitioners, her Honour urges the need to exercise caution when presenting evidence of an offender’s disadvantage. Her Honour also provides an overview of the aims, content and application of two key resources: the Bugmy Bar Book561 and the Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation report.562
Manuell SC, Janet, ‘The Fernando Principles: The Sentencing of Indigenous Offenders in NSW’ (Discussion Paper, NSW Sentencing Council, December 2009) 10 [25]
This paper includes a comprehensive analysis of NSW cases that followed R v Fernando563 and observes that a reason for the uneven application of the principles in New South Wales was that the principles were being applied in the context of the very different objective and subjective circumstances of each offender.
9.15.3 Judicial Commentary
Haesler SC, Judge Andrew, ‘Applying Bugmy: An Address to the NSW Legal Aid Commission’s Aboriginal Services Branch’ (Conference Paper, Legal Aid Aboriginal Cultural Competency Branch Training for Legal Practitioners Day, 31 July 2018)
This paper by Judge Haesler provides an appraisal of the state of incarceration in Australia and how the principles in Bugmy v The Queen564 should be applied in sentencing proceedings. His Honour gives practical advice to practitioners about the content and quality of material that should be adduced before the court (see pages 21–4). Regarding the role of sentencing judges, his Honour notes the following: ‘A sentencing court needs to have some idea about the offender’s subjective circumstances. If it is to be submitted that their moral culpability is to be diminished that submission must be given content in the material before the court’.565
Macaulay, Justice Cameron, ‘Socially Disadvantaged Accused: How (Or Should) Courts Take This into Account?’ (Speech, Deakin University, 28 August 2024)
Justice Macaulay’s speech provides commentary on the intersection between ‘social disadvantage’ of offenders as a sentencing consideration, referring to the state of the law before and after the landmark case Bugmy v The Queen.566 His Honour provides a brief overview of the purposes and philosophies behind sentencing, commenting that the observed evolution of sentencing approaches is primarily led by judges, rather than something prescribed by the legislature. The speech highlights outstanding issues and challenges in the practical application of Bugmy that it is helpful for judges to be aware of, such as the ambiguous threshold for ‘profound’ deprivation.
Norrish QC, Judge Stephen, ‘Sentencing Aboriginal Offenders: “Striving for Equality before the Law”’ (Conference Paper, Legal Aid Commission Workshop, 1 August 2017)
Judge Norrish’s conference paper is addressed to lawyers and primarily discusses how advocates can support judicial officers in achieving just sentencing outcomes for Indigenous offenders (see pages 13–14). His Honour describes the role of judicial officers in the sentencing exercise, including the discretion involved, the multitude and complexity of factors to be considered, and concepts of ‘equal justice’ and ‘individualised justice’ (see pages 3–6). See pages 11–12 for an overview of other mechanisms which can support judges in achieving equal treatment for Indigenous offenders.
Norrish QC, Judge Stephen, ‘Sentencing Indigenous Offenders: Not Enough “Judicial Notice”?’ (Conference Paper, Judicial Conference of Australia Colloquium, 13 October 2013)
In this conference paper, Judge Norrish discusses the importance of taking judicial notice of the individual facts of a sentencing case, referring to Bugmy v The Queen567 and Munda v Western Australia.568 His Honour’s thorough discussion of judicial notice in sentencing Aboriginal offenders provides guidance on why and how the doctrine can be applied. This is central to recognising the issues specifically faced by Aboriginal people (see pages 28–34) and achieving ‘equal justice’ outcomes (see pages 23–25). Judicial officers should also take note of the limitations that may arise in practice (see pages 40–45) and the mechanisms available to assist them in sentencing exercises (see pages 45–56).
Rothman AM, Justice Stephen, ‘Disadvantage and Crime: The Impact of Bugmy and Munda on Sentencing Aboriginal and Other Offenders’ (Speech, Public Defenders Annual Criminal Law Conference, 18 March 2018)
In this speech, Justice Rothman discusses how principles in Bugmy v The Queen569 and Munda v Western Australia570 should inform practitioners and judicial officers in sentencing matters involving Aboriginal defendants. His Honour provides an overview of the principles of equal justice and psychological perspectives on discrimination and social exclusion. This theoretical discussion supports his Honour’s practical advice in the conclusion of the speech, summarised as follows:
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Practitioners must provide specific evidence of the accused’s background, rather than relying solely on the mere fact of their Aboriginality, and demonstrate how these factors have impacted the offender’s conduct or moral culpability.
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Judicial officers can then take these effects into account, emphasising individualised sentencing over a ‘group discount’ approach.
9.16 Further Reading: 9.6 Enhancing Practice
9.16.1 Resources for Judicial Officers and Legal Practitioners
Beckett, Judge Sophie, ‘The Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation’ (2021) 33(9) Judicial Officers Bulletin 91
This judicial note by Judge Beckett provides an overview of the expert report by Vanessa Edwige and Dr Paul Gray,571 which is a supplementary resource to the Bugmy Bar Book. The report discusses the relationship between First Nations offenders’ connection to culture and reduced recidivism. Her Honour concludes that the report demonstrates the importance of developing culturally appropriate, trauma-informed and community-connected rehabilitation programs for First Nations offenders.
Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Web Page) <https://bugmybarbook.org.au/>
The Bugmy Bar Book is an evidence-based resource tailored to judicial officers, legal practitioners, health professionals and services, that publishes chapters informed by multi-disciplinary research drawn from Law Reform Commission reports, parliamentary and other government reports, discipline-specific reports (including First Nations opinion and research) about the impact(s) of adverse experiences including trauma, socio-economic inequality and structural disadvantage, and strengths-based resources. These research chapters provide an evidence base for lawyers and courts to inform themselves of the experiences of people who come into contact with the criminal justice system.572
The publications include information that is specific to First Nations people, including experiences of the Stolen Generations, cultural dispossession and the significance of funeral attendance and Sorry Business.
The Bugmy Bar Book also publishes expert opinions and research relating to strengths-based approaches to rehabilitation and wellbeing.573
The Bugmy Bar Book resources provide an educative function through the chapters specifically about Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, and expert reports about issues which commonly arise in the context of criminal proceedings:
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‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Stolen Generations and Descendants’ (Chapter, April 2025)
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‘Cultural Dispossession and Cultural Resilience: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples Experiences of Colonising Practices’ (Chapter, April 2025)
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‘Significance of Funeral Attendance and Sorry Business for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ (Chapter, May 2023)
Coroners Court of Queensland, Sorry Business: A Guide to Cultural Competency and Engagement Between the Coroners Court of Queensland and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People (Guide, 2019)
This guide published by the Coroners Court of Queensland provides a framework for identifying and addressing issues that may arise when the death of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander person falls within the jurisdiction of the Coroners Act 2003 (Qld). It highlights the significance of death in Aboriginal communities and in Torres Strait Islander communities. It identifies relevant cultural considerations in regard to conducting autopsy examinations and handling the deceased person’s body and belongings. The guide also provides practical guidance on the conduct of the coronial inquest and the preparation of findings.
Please note the link takes the reader to the Inquest into the deaths of Master Carr and Jaylen. The Guide is published at Annexure B of the Findings.
Gerry QC, Felicity, ‘Why Being Trauma Informed Is an Issue for Court Integrity’, Legalwise Insights (Blog Post, 14 July 2022) <https://legalwiseseminars.com.au/insights/why-being-trauma-informed-is-an-issue-for-court-integrity>
Professor Felicity Gerry’s article discusses the importance of being trauma informed in a broader sense and the impact on court integrity. Recognising that trauma is present not only in victims and witnesses but also in court users, defendants and lawyers poses unique challenges to court processes. Professor Gerry calls for ‘further reform as a whole of justice approach as a question of integrity’.
The Judicial College of Victoria has developed resources intended to inform judicial officers about Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander culture, and legal issues concerning community. See in particular:
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‘First Peoples’, Judicial College of Victoria (Web Page) <https://judicialcollege.vic.edu.au/resources/first-peoples>;
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Diana Eades, ‘Judicial Understandings of Aboriginality and Language Use’ (2016) 12(4) The Judicial Review: Selected Conference Papers, Journal of the Judicial Commission of New South Wales 471–490; and
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Judicial College of Victoria, The Aboriginal English in the Courts Project (Guide).
Kamminga, Jody et al, Decision-Making, Emotion and Behaviour Regulation in 18–25 Year Olds: A Neurodevelopmental Perspective (Report, 2025)
This report provides a neurodevelopmental overview of the ages 18 to 25 years, a period referred to as ‘young adulthood’. This period has unique psychosocial considerations that are distinct from the teenage and adult years. The report highlights the importance of sustained effort to provide a safe, relational and enriching environment into young adulthood, particularly in the context of the adverse childhood experiences and cumulative disadvantage that shape brain development and function. The authors emphasise the importance of nurturing care, and highlight the negative impacts of physical containment and control as it relates to incarceration.
This perspective is relevant to all young adults, but the authors particularly note the unique social, cultural, political and historical context of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, and the ongoing impacts of colonisation, including over-representation in justice systems.
McMahon, Rebecca, ‘The Bar Book Project: Making Use of the Bugmy Bar Book in Sentence and Section 32 Proceedings’ (2026)
This paper provides an overview of the Bugmy Bar Book resource. It guides practitioners in how the resource can be used in everyday practice with a focus on sentence and applications pursuant to s 32 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW).
Shields AM, Dr Robyn (Bunjalung) and Dr Andrew Ellis, Impacts of Institutionalisation (Report, 2024)
This report was commissioned by the Bugmy Bar Book Project Committee. It is a psychiatric report about institutionalisation and its impacts, addressing detention and custodial as well as out-of-home care settings. The report includes reference to research and opinion about particular impacts on First Nations peoples.
To prepare this report, the authors conducted a thorough review of the institutionalisation literature as it applies in the context of detention, custodial and out-of-home care settings. They used this in conjunction with their combined training, study and experiences of working in institutions, including psychiatric hospitals for adults and children, adult prisons and youth detention facilities, and working with people subject to community restrictions.
State and Territory Bench Books
Bench books of particular relevance are set out in Table 11.
|
Jurisdiction |
Resource |
|---|---|
|
NSW |
Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Equality before the Law Bench Book (April 2025) |
|
Qld |
Supreme Court of Queensland, Equal Treatment Benchbook (Supreme Court Library Queensland, 2016) |
|
WA |
Stephanie Fryer-Smith, Aboriginal Benchbook for Western Australian Courts (Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, 2nd ed, July 2008) |
State and Territory Best Practice Guidelines
Best practice guidelines of particular relevance are set out in Table 12.
9.16.2 Journal Articles
Hopkins, Anthony, Thalia Anthony, Lorana Bartels, Sinea Allen and Emma Henke, ‘Indigenous Experience Reports: Addressing Silence and Deficit Discourse in Sentencing’ (2023) 46(2) UNSW Law Journal 61
This article examines all 149 sentences delivered in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory between 2009 and 2019 in which the defendant’s Indigenous status was identifiable. The authors consider the extent and nature of Courts’ engagement with Indigenous experience, finding a prevailing silence and limited evidence of strengths-based approaches. The authors argue that listening to First Nations voices in sentencing can provide a counterpoint to deficit discourses and a holistic understanding of the individual and their background, including the ongoing relevance of colonisation in their lives. The use of Indigenous Experience Reports to enable this listening may also promote strengths-based considerations and challenge the efficacy of carceral options.
9.16.3 Reports/Discussion Papers
Edwige, Vanessa (Ngarabal) and Dr Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, 2021)
This report is by Vanessa Edwige, a Ngarabal woman and registered psychologist, and Dr Paul Gray, a Wiradjuri man and Associate Professor at the UTS Jumbunna Institute of Indigenous Education and Research. Both authors are directors of the Australian Indigenous Psychologists Association (AIPA).
The report builds upon the work of the Bugmy Bar Book to date in establishing the link between experiences of disadvantage and contact with the criminal justice process, and citing recognised roads to rehabilitation and healing. The authors express their expert opinions and present a significant body of evidence which establishes that, for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, rehabilitation approaches which are culturally appropriate and connected to community are more effective in building both individual and community resilience, which, over time, can reduce repeated contact with the criminal process.
The evidence cited indicates that rehabilitation programs delivered by those who understand and acknowledge the experiences of First Nations communities — in particular, Indigenous-led and Indigenous-delivered initiatives, consistent with the principle of self-determination — are best suited for this purpose. See also the Summary of Judgments Referring to the Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation Report (2024).
Victorian Aboriginal Legal Service, Aboriginal Community Justice Reports Program (Preliminary Findings, November 2023)
This preliminary report reflects the state of the Aboriginal Community Justice Reports (‘ACJR’) program as at 14 November 2023. The ACJR program is the first evaluated Aboriginal report initiative in Australia. This preliminary report constitutes the initial phase of the evaluation in order to build on the lessons and strengths established over the program’s first two years.
9.16.4 Other Resources
The below resources include information about Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander experiences of health and wellbeing. This list is not exhaustive, but may include useful information to enhance judicial officers’ and legal practitioners’ understanding of social and cultural factors.
Australian Indigenous HealthInfoNet (Web Page) <https://healthinfonet.ecu.edu.au/>
The Healing Foundation (Web Page) <https://healingfoundation.org.au/>
Transforming Indigenous Mental Health and Wellbeing (Web Page) <https://timhwb.org.au/>
WellMob (Web Page) <https://wellmob.org.au/>
1The administration of criminal law is predominantly governed by states and territories and a number of bench books and other leading texts written for those jurisdictions include content which is specific to First Nations. These are collected in the Further Resources section of this chapter at 9.12 Further Reading: 9.1 Introduction.
2Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 23.
3Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 23.
4Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 23, quoting Australian Human Rights Commission, ‘Equality and Non-Discrimination’ (Declaration Dialogue Series, Paper No 5, July 2013) 8.
5Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 23.
6Sally Dowling, Damian Beaufils (Gundungurra) and Andrew Gay, Improving the Wellbeing and Safety of First Nations Complainants and Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System (Report, July 2023) 21 [39].
7Vanessa Edwige (Ngarabal) and Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2021).
8Vanessa Edwige (Ngarabal) and Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2021) 10 [43], quoting Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, The National Scheme’s Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health and Cultural Safety Strategy 2020–2025 (Report, 2020) 9.
9Nicole Tujague (Kabi Kabi) and Kelleigh Ryan (Kabi Kabi), Cultural Safety in Trauma-Informed Practice from a First Nations Perspective: Billabongs of Knowledge (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022) 54.
10Felicity Gerry, ‘Why Being Trauma Informed Is an Issue for Court Integrity’ Legalwise Insights (Blog Post, 14 July 2022) <https://legalwiseseminars.com.au/insights/why-being-trauma-informed-is-an-issue-for-court-integrity>.
11Vanessa Edwige (Ngarabal) and Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2021) 25 [103], quoting Pat Dudgeon (Bardi and Gija) et al, Effective Strategies to Strengthen the Mental Health and Wellbeing of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander People (Issues Paper No 12, Closing the Gap Clearinghouse, November 2014) 15.
12See, eg, Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Trauma-Informed Courts: Guidance for Trauma-Informed Judicial Practices (Report, 2022).
13Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, Guide to Judicial Conduct (3rd rev ed, December 2023) 19 [4.2].
14Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, Guide to Judicial Conduct (3rd rev ed, December 2023) 19 [4.2]; William Isdale and Sarah Fulton, ‘Without Fear or Favour: The ALRC’s New Report on Judicial Impartiality and the Law on Bias’, Australian Law Reform Commission (Web Page, 3 August 2022) <https://www.alrc.gov.au/news/without-fear-or-favour/>.
15Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991) vol 1, [1.6.5]–[1.6.6].
16Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 14.
17Just Reinvest NSW, Redefining Reinvestment (Web Page, 28 February 2026) <https://www.justreinvest.org.au>.
18Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991) vol 1, [1.4.17].
19Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991) vol 1, [1.5.2]. Awareness and understanding of the impacts of colonisation and systemic racism, and the role police have played, is a critical aspect of being trauma informed and improving cultural safety in decision-making.
20See, eg, Lyndall Ryan et al, Colonial Frontier Massacres in Australia, 1788–1930 (Web Page, 2024) <https://c21ch.newcastle.edu.au/colonialmassacres/introduction.php>.
21National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families, Bringing Them Home (Report, 1997).
22See, eg, Amy Nethery, “‘A Modern-Day Concentration Camp’: Using History to Make Sense of Australian Immigration Detention Centres’ in Klaus Neumann and Gwenda Tavan (eds), Does History Matter? Making and Debating Citizenship, Immigration and Refugee Policy in Australia and New Zealand (ANU Press, 2009) 65, 73–5; Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, Regional Report of Inquiry in New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania (Report, 1991) pt 5 ch 15; Anna Doukakis, The Aboriginal People, Parliament and ‘Protection’ in New South Wales, 1856–1916 (Federation Press, 2006).
23See, eg, First Nations National Constitutional Convention, Uluru Statement from the Heart (26 May 2017) <https://ulurustatement.org/the-statement/view-the-statement/>.
24Thalia Anthony, Gemma Sentance (Wiradjuri) and Lorana Bartels, ‘Transcending Colonial Legacies: From Criminal Justice to Indigenous Women’s Healing’ in Lily George, Adele Norris, Antje Deckert, Juan Tauri (eds), Neo-Colonial Justice and the Mass Imprisonment of Indigenous Women (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020) 103, 111, citing SNAICC et al, Family Matters (Report, 2017); Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Child Protection Australia, 2017–18 (Report, March 2019).
25Andrew Hemming, Francine Feld and Thalia Anthony, Criminal Procedure in Australia (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 2024) 22 [1.30].
26Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991); Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017); Justice Reform Initiative, Alternatives to Incarceration in the Australian Capital Territory (Report, February 2024); Yoorrook Justice Commission, Yoorrook for Justice: Report into Victoria’s Child Protection and Criminal Justice Systems (Report, August 2023); Office of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, ‘Indigenous Deaths in Custody, 1989–1996’ (1997) 2(2) Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 310; Select Committee on the High Level of First Nations People in Custody and Oversight and Review of Deaths in Custody, Parliament of New South Wales, The High Level of First Nations People in Custody and Oversight and Overview of Deaths in Custody (Report, April 2021); Heather Agius, Larissa Behrendt (Eualayai/Gamilaroi), Chris Larkin, Leanne Liddle, Tracey McIntosh, Jonathan Rudin, Major Sumner and Scott Wilson, Advisory Commission into the Incarceration Rates of Aboriginal Peoples in South Australia (Report, February 2023).
27Don Weatherburn et al, ‘Towards a Theory of Indigenous Contact with the Criminal Justice System’ (Research Report No 32, Australian Institute of Criminology, May 2024) 5 (citations omitted).
28Yoorrook Justice Commission, Yoorrook for Justice: Report into Victoria’s Child Protection and Criminal Justice Systems (Report, August 2023) 253.
29Yoorrook Justice Commission, Yoorrook for Justice: Report into Victoria’s Child Protection and Criminal Justice Systems (Report, August 2023) 253 (emphasis added).
30Australian Bureau of Statistics, Prisoners in Australia (Web Page, 11 December 2025) <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/crime-and-justice/prisoners-australia/latest-release#aboriginal-and-torres-strait-islander-prisoners>.
31Don Weatherburn et al, ‘Towards a Theory of Indigenous Contact with the Criminal Justice System’ (Research Report No 32, Australian Institute of Criminology, May 2024) 8.
32Don Weatherburn et al, ‘Towards a Theory of Indigenous Contact with the Criminal Justice System’ (Research Report No 32, Australian Institute of Criminology, May 2024) 8 (citations omitted).
33Don Weatherburn et al, ‘Towards a Theory of Indigenous Contact with the Criminal Justice System’ (Research Report No 32, Australian Institute of Criminology, May 2024) 32 (citations omitted).
34Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 454 [14.28].
35Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth); Australian Federal Police Regulations 2018 (Cth); Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).
36Crimes Act 1914 (Cth); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT); Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW); Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulation 2016 (NSW); Police Administration Act 1978 (NT); Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT); Police Administration Regulations 1994 (NT); Police General Orders 2007 (NT); Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA); Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA); Summary Offences Regulations 2016 (SA); Criminal Code 1924 (Tas); Police Powers (Public Safety) Act 2005 (Tas); Tasmania Police Manual; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), Police Act 2013 (Vic); Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA); Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA); Protective Custody Act 2000 (WA); Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA); Police Force Regulations 1979 (WA).
37See, eg, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23H; Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulation 2016 (NSW) ss 28(1)(d), 37; Police Administration Regulations 1994 (NT) reg 19B; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 420; Summary Offences Regulations 2016 (SA) s 33C; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 464AAB, 464FA; Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) s 10B(f); Police Force Regulations 1979 (WA) reg 703; Tasmania Police Manual 7.5.
38Don Weatherburn et al, ‘Towards a Theory of Indigenous Contact with the Criminal Justice System’ (Research Report No 32, Australian Institute of Criminology, May 2024) 2.
39Sacha Kendall et al, ‘Aboriginal Mothers Are Incarcerated at Alarming Rates — and Their Mental and Physical Health Suffers’, The Conversation (online, 22 May 2019) <https://theconversation.com/aboriginal-mothers-are-incarcerated-at-alarming-rates-and-their-mental-and-physical-health-suffers-116827>.
40Don Weatherburn et al, ‘Towards a Theory of Indigenous Contact with the Criminal Justice System’ (Research Report No 32, Australian Institute of Criminology, May 2024) 7.
41Don Weatherburn et al, ‘Towards a Theory of Indigenous Contact with the Criminal Justice System’ (Research Report No 32, Australian Institute of Criminology, May 2024) 5–6.
42Don Weatherburn et al, ‘Towards a Theory of Indigenous Contact with the Criminal Justice System’ (Research Report No 32, Australian Institute of Criminology, May 2024) vii.
43International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 172 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 9.
44Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss3V–3ZX; Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) pts 8–10; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 456AA–470; Police Administration Act 1978 (NT) ss 121–43; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 271; Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) pt 12; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) ch 14-18A; Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) s 27.
45Robinson v New South Wales [2018] NSWCA 231, [273] (Emmett AJA).
46Donaldson v Broomby (1982) 60 FLR 124, 126 (Deane J).
47See DPP (NSW) v Carr [2002] NSWSC 194, [35]; New South Wales v Robinson [2019] HCA 46.
48DPP (NSW) v Carr [2002] NSWSC 194.
49DPP (NSW) v Carr [2002] NSWSC 194, [35] (Smart JA).
50Andrew Hemming, Francine Feld and Thalia Anthony, Criminal Procedure in Australia (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 2024) 39 [2.3].
51Yoorrook Justice Commission, Yoorrook for Justice: Report into Victoria’s Child Protection and Criminal Justice Systems (Report, August 2023) 264.
52Yoorrook Justice Commission, Yoorrook for Justice: Report into Victoria’s Child Protection and Criminal Justice Systems (Report, August 2023) 264, citing Aboriginal Justice Caucus, Submission No 74 to Yoorrook Justice Commission, Report to the Yoorrook Justice Commission, Systemic Injustice in the Criminal Justice and Child Protection Systems (12 January 2023) 57.
53Yoorrook Justice Commission, Yoorrook for Justice: Report into Victoria’s Child Protection and Criminal Justice Systems (Report, August 2023) 264–9.
54Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95, 99 (Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey and McHugh JJ).
55Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95, 129 (Gaudron J).
56Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95, 129 (Gaudron J).
57Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 89A.
58Phillip Boulten SC, ‘The Attack on the Right to Silence’ [2013] (Autumn) Bar News: Journal of the NSW Bar Association 41, 43.
59Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 84.
60Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 85.
61Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 90.
62Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulation 2016 (NSW) Reg 28.
63Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities Act 2002 (NSW) s 123.
64Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities Act 2002 (NSW) s 128.
65Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulation 2016 (NSW) Reg 28.
66Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulation 2016 (NSW) Reg 30.
67Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulation 2016 (NSW) Reg 31.
68Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulation 2016 (NSW) Reg 36.
69Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulation 2016 (NSW) Reg 36.
70Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulation 2016 (NSW) Reg 38.
71Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulation 2016 (NSW) Reg 37.
72See, eg, Custody Notification Service requirements in all States and Territories for example: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23DB, s 23H; Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) s 112; Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulation 2016 (NSW) Clause 37; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 464AAB, s 464FA; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 420, s 433; Queensland Digital Electronic Recording of Interviews and Evidence Manual (QLD) 3.8, 3.16, 3.19; Western Australian Commissioners Operating Policies and Procedures (COPPS); Western Australia Police policy Questioning Children and People with Special Needs; Tasmania Police Manual 7.5; Police General Orders (NT) Q2.
73Maicee Harrison and Justin Trounson, ‘An Investigation of the Key Factors Leading to the Wrongful Conviction of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ (2021) 24(3–4) Journal of Australian Indigenous Issues 20. See also Kent Roach, ‘The Wrongful Convictions of Indigenous People in Australia and Canada’ (2015) 17(2) Flinders Law Journal 203; Joseph MacFarlane and Greg Stratton, ‘Marginalisation, Managerialism and Wrongful Conviction in Australia’ (2016) 27(3) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 303.
74Maicee Harrison and Justin Trounson, ‘An Investigation of the Key Factors Leading to the Wrongful Conviction of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ (2021) 24(3–4) Journal of Australian Indigenous Issues 20, 20.
75Lisanne Adam and Celine van Golde, ‘Police Practice and False Confessions: A Search for the Implementation of Investigative Interviewing in Australia’ (2020) 45(1) Alternative Law Journal 52.
76Lisanne Adam and Celine van Golde, ‘Police Practice and False Confessions: A Search for the Implementation of Investigative Interviewing in Australia’ (2020) 45(1) Alternative Law Journal 52, 54.
77R v Anunga (1976) 11 ALR 412.
78R v Anunga (1976) 11 ALR 412, 415.
79R v Anunga (1976) 11 ALR 412, 414–15 (Forster J).
80Northern Territory Police, General Order Q2: Questioning People Who Have Difficulties with the English Language — The Anunga Guidelines (1998).
81Queensland Police Service, Digital Electronic Recording of Interviews and Evidence Manual (Issue 33 Public Edition, September 2025) 18.
82‘Commissioner’s Operating Policies and Procedures: Prisons’, Corrective Services (WA) (Web Page, 30 May 2025) <https://www.wa.gov.au/organisation/department-of-justice/corrective-services/commissioners-operating-policies-and-procedures-prisons>.
83R v BL [2015] NTSC 85.
84R v BL [2015] NTSC 85.
85R v BL [2015] NTSC 85, [36]–[56].
86R v BL [2015] NTSC 85, [66]–[74].
87R v BL [2015] NTSC 85, [63]–[65].
88R v BL [2015] NTSC 85, [75]–[80].
89R v BL [2015] NTSC 85, [33]–[34] (Blokland J) (citations omitted).
90See, eg, R v Thompson (No 2) [2025] NTSC 18; R v Bonson [2019] NTSC 22; R v BM [2015] NTSC 73; Undalghumen v Western Australia [2024] WASC 468; Murray v Feast [2023] WASC 273; Western Australia v Simon [2019] WADC 178; Webb v The Queen (1994) 13 WAR 257; DPP (Vic) v Natale (Ruling) [2018] VSC 339; R v Trinh [2002] QSC 471.
91See Hon Justice Dean Mildren, ‘Redressing the Imbalance Against Aboriginals in the Criminal Justice System’ (1997) Criminal Law Journal 7, 21–2.
92Law Society Northern Territory, Indigenous Protocols for Lawyers (2nd ed, 2015).
93Judicial Council on Cultural Diversity, Recommended National Standards for Working with Interpreters in Courts and Tribunals (2nd ed, 2022).
94Western Australia v Gibson [2014] WASC 240.
95Gibson v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 141.
96Western Australia v Gibson [2014] WASC 240.
97Western Australia v Gibson [2014] WASC 240, [7]–[11] (Hall J).
98Western Australia v Gibson [2014] WASC 240, [175].
99Western Australia v Gibson [2014] WASC 240, [176]–[179].
100Western Australia v Gibson [2014] WASC 240, [180].
101Western Australia v Gibson [2014] WASC 240, [162]–[163] (Hall J).
102Gibson v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 141, [25].
103Gibson v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 141, [157].
104Gibson v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 141, [157].
105Gibson v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 141, [200].
106Stephen Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law (Thomson Reuters, 20th ed, 2025).
107Jill Hunter and James Metzger, The Trial: Principles, Process and Evidence (Federation Press, 2021).
108Christpher Beale SC, Pocket Evidence Law, (2026).
109Supremem Court of Queensland, Equal Treatment Benchbook, Third Edition (Queensland Courts, 2026); Supremem Court of Queensland, Equal Treatment Benchbook, Third Edition (Queensland Courts, 2016).
110Stephanie Fryer-Smith, Aboriginal Benchbook for Western Australia Courts, Second Edition (Australian Institute for Judicial Administration 2008).
111Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 468 [14.78].
112The requirements for each state and territory are set out variously in legislation, regulations or police procedures: Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulation 2016 (NSW) reg 37; Police Administration Regulations 1994 (NT) reg 19B; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 420(2); Summary Offences Regulations 2016 (SA) reg 33C; Tasmania Police Manual s 7.5.2; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 464FA; Police Force Regulations 1979 (WA) reg 703.
113Campbell v DPP (NSW) [2008] NSWSC 1284. See also R v APCR (2006) 3 DCLR(NSW) 336.
114Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991) vol 5, recommendation 229.
115Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 479 [14.123]–[14.125].
116Justice Reform Initiative, Alternatives to Incarceration in the Australian Capital Territory (Report, February 2024) 28; Justice Reform Initiative, Alternatives to Incarceration in New South Wales (Report, March 2024) 31; Justice Reform Initiative, Alternatives to Incarceration in the Northern Territory (Report, May 2023) 20; Justice Reform Initiative, Alternatives to Incarceration in Queensland (Report, May 2023) 31; Justice Reform Initiative, Alternatives to Incarceration in South Australia (Report, November 2023) 34; Justice Reform Initiative, Alternatives to Incarceration in Tasmania (Report, August 2023) 32; Justice Reform Initiative, Alternatives to Incarceration in Victoria (Report, November 2023) 33; Justice Reform Initiative, Alternatives to Incarceration in Western Australia (Report, March 2023) 17.
117Justice Reform Initiative, Alternatives to Incarceration in the Australian Capital Territory (Report, February 2024) 28.
118Tom Calma, ‘NAIDOC Week Oration to Senior NSW Police’, Australian Human Rights Commission (Web Page, December 2012) <https://humanrights.gov.au/about/news/speeches/naidoc-week-oration-senior-nsw-police>.
119Australian Institute of Health and Welfare and Closing the Gap Clearinghouse, ‘The Role of Community Patrols in Improving Safety in Indigenous Communities’ (Resource Sheet No 20, July 2013) 1.
120Trudy Cooper, Margaret Sims, John Scott, Pamela Henry, Elaine Barclay and Terence Love, Evaluation of Indigenous Justice Programs: Project D — Safe Aboriginal Youth Patrol Programs in New South Wales and Northbridge Policy and Juvenile Aid Group in Western Australia (Final Report, Attorney General’s Department (Cth), 2014) 6–7. The final report evaluated two youth community patrol programs and found that patrols were highly valued by young people and the Indigenous community, and this offers opportunities to strengthen youth work and community development.
121Justice Reform Initiative, Alternatives to Incarceration in the Australian Capital Territory (Report, February 2024) 28 (citations omitted).
122Justice Reform Initiative, Alternatives to Incarceration in the Australian Capital Territory (Report, February 2024) 7 (citations omitted).
123Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, National Domestic and Family Violence Bench Book (August 2025) ch 3.1.11.
124Ellen Reeves, ‘“I’m Not at All Protected and I Think Other Women Should Know That, That They’re Not Protected Either”: Victim–Survivors’ Experiences of “Misidentification” in Victoria’s Family Violence System’ (2021) 10(4) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 39, 40.
125Royal Commission into Family Violence (Final Report, March 2016) vol 3, 38 (recommendation 41).
126R v Kina [1993] QCA 480.
127Supreme Court of Queensland, Equal Treatment Benchbook (Supreme Court Library Queensland, 2nd ed, 2016) 109, quoting R v Kina [1993] QCA 480, [63]–[64] (Fitzgerald P and Davies JA).
128Ellen Reeves, ‘“I’m Not At All Protected and I Think Other Women Should Know That, That They’re Not Protected Either”: Victim–Survivors’ Experiences of “Misidentification” in Victoria’s Family Violence System’ (2021) 10(4) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 39, 39.
129Ellen Reeves, ‘“I’m Not At All Protected and I Think Other Women Should Know That, That They’re Not Protected Either”: Victim–Survivors’ Experiences of “Misidentification” in Victoria’s Family Violence System’ (2021) 10(4) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 39, 39.
130Ellen Reeves, ‘“I’m Not At All Protected and I Think Other Women Should Know That, That They’re Not Protected Either”: Victim–Survivors’ Experiences of “Misidentification” in Victoria’s Family Violence System’ (2021) 10(4) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 39, 47.
131Ellen Reeves, ‘“I’m Not At All Protected and I Think Other Women Should Know That, That They’re Not Protected Either”: Victim–Survivors’ Experiences of “Misidentification” in Victoria’s Family Violence System’ (2021) 10(4) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 39, 45–6.
132Ellen Reeves, ‘“I’m Not At All Protected and I Think Other Women Should Know That, That They’re Not Protected Either”: Victim–Survivors’ Experiences of “Misidentification” in Victoria’s Family Violence System’ (2021) 10(4) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 39, 45–6.
133Ellen Reeves, ‘“I’m Not At All Protected and I Think Other Women Should Know That, That They’re Not Protected Either”: Victim–Survivors’ Experiences of “Misidentification” in Victoria’s Family Violence System’ (2021) 10(4) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 39, 47.
134Ellen Reeves, ‘“I’m Not At All Protected and I Think Other Women Should Know That, That They’re Not Protected Either”: Victim–Survivors’ Experiences of “Misidentification” in Victoria’s Family Violence System’ (2021) 10(4) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 39, 47.
135Ellen Reeves, ‘“I’m Not At All Protected and I Think Other Women Should Know That, That They’re Not Protected Either”: Victim–Survivors’ Experiences of “Misidentification” in Victoria’s Family Violence System’ (2021) 10(4) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 39, 47–8.
136Ellen Reeves, ‘“I’m Not At All Protected and I Think Other Women Should Know That, That They’re Not Protected Either”: Victim–Survivors’ Experiences of “Misidentification” in Victoria’s Family Violence System’ (2021) 10(4) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 39, 48–9.
137Ellen Reeves, ‘“I’m Not At All Protected and I Think Other Women Should Know That, That They’re Not Protected Either”: Victim–Survivors’ Experiences of “Misidentification” in Victoria’s Family Violence System’ (2021) 10(4) International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 39, 48–9.
138Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, National Domestic and Family Violence Bench Book (August 2025) ch 4.4.10.
139Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, National Domestic and Family Violence Bench Book (August 2025) ch 4.4.10.
140As at 30 June 2025, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people accounted for 37% of all prisoners whereas, at 30 June 2021, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people represented 3.8% of the Australian population: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Prisoners in Australia (Web Page, 11 December 2025) <https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/crime-and-justice/prisoners-australia/latest-release#aboriginal-and-torres-strait-islander-prisoners>. See also Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 154 [5.26].
141Bail Act 1992 (ACT); Bail Act 2013 (NSW); Bail Act 1982 (NT); Bail Act 1980 (Qld); Bail Act 1985 (SA); Bail Act 1994 (Tas); Bail Act 1977 (Vic); Bail Act 1982 (WA).
142Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) pt VIB; Federal Court (Criminal Proceedings) Rules 2016 (Cth) pt 5.
143Note that, in some jurisdictions, registrars also make bail decisions. However, the term ‘judicial officers’ will be used throughout this section.
144Bail Act 1992 (ACT) s 22; Bail Act 2013 (NSW) s 17; Bail Act 1982 (NT) s 24; Bail Act 1980 (Qld) s 16; Bail Act 1985 (SA) s 10; Bail Act 1977 (Vic) pt 2; Bail Act 1982 (WA) Schedule 1 Part C.
145Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Value of a Justice Reinvestment Approach to Criminal Justice in Australia (Report, June 2013) 10–11, citing National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Services, Submission No 72 to Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Justice Reinvestment in Australia (March 2013) 6.
146Yoorrook Justice Commission, Yoorrook for Justice: Report into Victoria’s Child Protection and Criminal Justice Systems (Report, August 2023) 295 (emphasis omitted).
147Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 169, recommendation 5-1; Select Committee on the High Level of First Nations People in Custody and Oversight and Review of Deaths in Custody, Parliament of New South Wales, The High Level of First Nations People in Custody and Oversight and Review of Deaths in Custody (Report, April 2021) 76, recommendation 8; Heather Agius, Larissa Behrendt (Eualayai/Gamilaroi), Chris Larkin, Leanne Liddle, Tracey McIntosh, Jonathan Rudin, Major Sumner and Scott Wilson, Advisory Commission into the Incarceration Rates of Aboriginal Peoples in South Australia (Report, February 2023) 45, recommendation 35(c); Caroline Homer, Impact of Incarceration for Mothers and Babies (Expert Report, Legal Aid NSW, 8 February 2023); ‘Incarceration of a Parent or Caregiver’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, September 2023).
148Office of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Indigenous Deaths in Custody, 1989–1996 (Report, October 1996) recommendation 10; Heather Agius, Larissa Behrendt (Eualayai/Gamilaroi), Chris Larkin, Leanne Liddle, Tracey McIntosh, Jonathan Rudin, Major Sumner and Scott Wilson, Advisory Commission into the Incarceration Rates of Aboriginal People in South Australia (Report, February 2023) recommendation 35(c).
149Yoorrook Justice Commission, Yoorrook for Justice: Report into Victoria’s Child Protection and Criminal Justice Systems (Report, August 2023) 37, recommendation 34.
150Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991) vol 5, recommendation 99.
151Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991) vol 5, recommendation 96.
152Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991) vol 5, recommendation 100; Select Committee on the High Level of First Nations People in Custody and Oversight and Review of Deaths in Custody, Parliament of New South Wales, The High Level of First Nations People in Custody and Oversight and Review of Deaths in Custody (Report, April 2021) 180, recommendation 37.
153Yoorrook Justice Commission, Yoorrook for Justice: Report into Victoria’s Child Protection and Criminal Justice Systems (Report, August 2023) 36, recommendation 32(e).
154See, eg, Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991); Office of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Indigenous Deaths in Custody, 1989–1996 (Report, October 1996); Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017); Select Committee on the High Level of First Nations People in Custody and Oversight and Review of Deaths in Custody, Parliament of New South Wales, The High Level of First Nations People in Custody and Oversight and Review of Deaths in Custody (Report, April 2021); Yoorrook Justice Commission, Yoorrook for Justice: Report into Victoria’s Child Protection and Criminal Justice Systems (Report, August 2023); Heather Agius, Larissa Behrendt (Eualayai/Gamilaroi), Chris Larkin, Leanne Liddle, Tracey McIntosh, Jonathan Rudin, Major Sumner and Scott Wilson, Advisory Commission into the Incarceration Rates of Aboriginal Peoples in South Australia (Report, February 2023).
155Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 154–5 [5.30]–[5.32].
156Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 155 [5.33].
157See 3.4 Cultural Barriers to Understanding, 3.6 Effective Communication in General Legal Settings, and 3.7 Effective Communication in Court.
158Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 157–8 [5.41]–[5.43].
159See, eg, ‘Significance of Funeral Attendance and Sorry Business for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, May 2023).
160Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 149 [5.2], 154–5 [5.30]–[5.33].
161Robyn Shields (Bunjalung) and Andrew Ellis, Impacts of Institutionalisation (Expert Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2024).
162Legislative Council Legal and Social Issues Committee, Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry into Victoria’s Criminal Justice System (Report, March 2022) vol 1, 586.
163Vanessa Edwige (Ngarabal) and Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2021) 42 [176].
164R v Vincent [2023] NSWSC 8.
165R v Vincent [2023] NSWSC 8 [12].
166R v Vincent [2023] NSWSC 8, [12] (Yehia J).
167R v Vincent [2023] NSWSC 8, [16]–[22] (Yehia J), citing ‘Impacts of Imprisonment and Remand in Custody’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, November 2022).
168Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991) vol 1, ch 5.
169Inquest into the Passing of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) app B, 1 [1].
170Inquest into the Passing of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023). The Coroner made 51 findings and 39 recommendations.
171Inquest into the Passing of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) app B, 7 [50].
172Inquest into the Passing of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) app B, 3–7 [16]–[50].
173Aunty Donna Nelson, ‘Statements from Veronica Nelson’s Family’ (Statement, Victorian Aboriginal Legal Service, 30 January 2023) <https://www.vals.org.au/statements-from-veronica-nelsons-family/>.
174Inquest into the Passing of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) app B, 1 [4]–[6].
175Inquest into the Passing of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) app B, 2 [9]–[10].
176Inquest into the Passing of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) app B, 2 [13].
177Inquest into the Passing of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) app B, 2 [14].
178Inquest into the Passing of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) app B, 8 [51].
179Andrew Hemming, Francine Feld and Thalia Anthony, Criminal Procedure in Australia (LexisNexis, 3rd ed, 2024) [1.38]–[1.39].
180Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991) vol 5, recommendation 96.
181Law Society of New South Wales, Working with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Clients: Resources for Solicitors in NSW (Resource, September 2021) 7–9; Stephanie Fryer-Smith, Aboriginal Benchbook for Western Australian Courts (Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, 2nd ed, 2008) ch 6.1.
182Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 169, recommendation 5-1.
183R v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178.
184R v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178, [34].
185R v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178, [35]–[36].
186Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Equality before the Law Bench Book (April 2025) 2.3.2.
187Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Equality before the Law Bench Book (April 2025) 2.3.2.
188Vanessa Edwige (Ngarabal) and Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2021) 31 [124].
189Vanessa Edwige (Ngarabal) and Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2021) 32 [129], quoting Victoria Hovane, Tania Dalton (Jones) and Peter Smith, ‘Aboriginal Offender Rehabilitation Programs’ in Pat Dudgeon (Bardi) Helen Milroy (Palyku) and Roz Walker (eds), Working Together: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Mental Health and Wellbeing Principles and Practice (Report, 2nd ed, 2014) 509, 510.
190Vanessa Edwige (Ngarabal) and Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2021) 32 [130], quoting Queensland Corrective Services, Rehabilitative Needs and Treatment of Indigenous Offenders in Queensland (Report, 1993) 16.
191DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347.
192DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347, [10] (Baker J), citing Vanessa Edwige (Ngarabal) and Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2021).
193DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179, [65] (Baker J).
194Community justice groups are non-government organisations, established to address key recommendations following the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. Their goal is to reduce the over-representation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in the criminal justice system. They are run by members of the local Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community and provide a community-based response to local issues, working cooperatively with magistrates, police, corrective services personnel and staff from other government agencies and community organisations, and delivering a number of court-related services.
195Magistrates Court of Queensland, Bail Benchbook (2024) ch 24.
196Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 169, recommendation 5-1.
197Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 16 August 2023, 2900 (Anthony Carbines, Minister for Police and Crime Prevention). See also HA v The Queen [2021] VSCA 64.
198Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 16 August 2023, 2900 (Anthony Carbines, Minister for Police and Crime Prevention).
199Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 19(2). This includes the right to enjoy identity and culture, and maintain kinship ties and connection to Country, traditional laws and customs. See Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 16 August 2023, 2896, 2900 (Anthony Carbines, Minister for Police and Crime Prevention).
200Bail Act 1977 (Vic) s 3A.
201‘First Peoples’, Judicial College of Victoria (Web Page, February 2026) <https://judicialcollege.vic.edu.au/resources/first-peoples>.
202Department of Justice and Community Safety (Vic), Bail Considerations for Aboriginal People (Guide, 25 March 2024).
203Re McLaughlin [2024] VSC 706.
204Re McLaughlin [2024] VSC 706, [43] (Incerti J).
205Re McLaughlin [2024] VSC 706, [49] (Incerti J).
206Supreme Court of Western Australia, Equal Justice Bench Book (September 2021) 709 [11.4.7.3].
207Vanessa Edwige (Ngarabal) and Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2021) 7 [25].
208R v Alchin [2015] NSWSC 2112, [3].
209R v Alchin [2015] NSWSC 2112, [3].
210R v Alchin [2015] NSWSC 2112, [2]–[3]. See also R v Wright [2015] NSWSC 2109, [7]–[9].
211Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Equality before the Law Bench Book (April 2025).
212Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Equality before the Law Bench Book (April 2025) 2.3.2.
213Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Equality before the Law Bench Book (April 2025) 2.3.2; Burnet Institute, Impact of Incarceration for Mothers and Babies (Expert Advice, 8 February 2023); ‘Incarceration of a Parent or Caregiver’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, September 2023).
214R v Webb [2019] SASC 8.
215R v Webb [2019] SASC 8, [14], [16], [20], [27]–[32] (Hinton J) (citations omitted).
216Re Males [2024] VSC 802.
217Re Males [2024] VSC 802, [45].
218Robyn Shields (Bunjalung) and Andrew Ellis, Impacts of Institutionalisation (Expert Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2024) 4 [13].
219Robyn Shields (Bunjalung) and Andrew Ellis, Impacts of Institutionalisation (Expert Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2024) 11 [38].
220Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024).
221Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 6.
222Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 6.
223Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 7.
224Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 9.
225Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 9–10.
226Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 10–11.
227Robyn Shields (Bunjalung) and Andrew Ellis, Impacts of Institutionalisation (Expert Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2024).
228Robyn Shields (Bunjalung) and Andrew Ellis, Impacts of Institutionalisation (Expert Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2024) iii. See contents page for section on each topic.
229Robyn Shields (Bunjalung) and Andrew Ellis, Impacts of Institutionalisation (Expert Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2024) 19.
230Robyn Shields (Bunjalung) and Andrew Ellis, Impacts of Institutionalisation (Expert Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2024) 19–20.
231Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, Regional Report of Inquiry into Individual Deaths in Custody in Western Australia (Report, 1991) vol 2, 719–20.
232Office of the Inspector of Custodial Services (WA), Funeral Attendances by Incarcerated People in Western Australia (Report, September 2013) 2 [1.4]–[1.5].
233Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 8.
234Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Equality before the Law Bench Book (April 2025) 2.3.2, citing DPP (NSW) v PH [2022] NSWSC 1245, [45] (detention application founded on s 22B of the Bail Act where the Aboriginal applicant’s detention would have prevented him attending his grandfather’s funeral) and ‘Significance of Funeral Attendance and Sorry Business for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, May 2023).
235Corrective Services Administrators Council Indigenous Issues Working Group, Indigenous Strategic Framework (Guide, July 2016) 27.
236Office of the Inspector of Custodial Services (WA), Funeral Attendances by Incarcerated People in Western Australia (Report, September 2013) i.
237Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, ‘Aboriginal Customary Laws’ (Discussion Paper No 94, December 2005) 256. See also Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Aboriginal Customary Laws: The Interaction of Western Australian Law with Aboriginal Law and Culture (Final Report No 94, September 2006) 215–16.
238Megan Wynne-Jones et al, ‘Aboriginal Grief and Loss: A Review of the Literature’ (2016) 16(3) HealthBulletin 1, 2 (citations omitted).
239Wiyi Yani U Thangani (Women’s Voices), Securing Our Rights, Securing Our Future (Report, Australian Human Rights Commission, December 2020). See also ‘Cultural Dispossession and Cultural Resilience: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples Experiences of Colonising Practices’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, April 2025); Vanessa Edwige (Ngarabal) and Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2021).
240Wiyi Yani U Thangani (Women’s Voices), Securing Our Rights, Securing Our Future (Report, Australian Human Rights Commission, December 2020) 188–9.
241‘Significance of Funeral Attendance and Sorry Business for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, May 2023).
242Selina Tually et al, Urban Indigenous Homelessness: Much More than Housing (Final Report No 383, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, August 2022) 8 [1.1].
243Australian Bureau of Statistics, Estimates of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians (2021 Census, 31 August 2023).
244Australian Bureau of Statistics, Estimating Homelessness: Census (2021 Census, 22 March 2023).
245Lachlan Auld and Julia Quilter, ‘Changing the Rules on Bail: An Analysis of Recent Legislative Reforms in Three Australian Jurisdictions’ (2020) 43(2) UNSW Journal 642.
246Heather Agius (Aunty Heather Agius), Larissa Behrendt (Eualayai/Gamilaroi), Chris Larkin (Kokatha), Leanne Liddle (Central Arrerente), Tracey McIntosh (Ngāi Tahu), Jonathan Rudin, Major Sumner (Uncle Moogy, Ngarrindjeri) and Scott Wilson (Aboriginal man of the Stolen Generation from Darwin), Advisory Commission into the Incarceration Rates of Aboriginal Peoples in South Australia (Report, February 2023) 44.
247Supreme Court of Western Australia, Equal Justice Bench Book (2nd ed, 2021) 79 [2.6] (citations omitted).
248‘Homelessness’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, January 2020).
249But note that ‘[i]f a person referred to in subparagraph (1)(a)(i) or (ii) is living in, or otherwise located in, a remote community, the bail authority must also take into consideration that fact in considering the potential impact of granting bail on that person’: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 15AB(2).
250Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 15AB(3A)(a)–(i). The provisions are: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth) s 22; Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) ss 15A, 15C, 17B, 22A, 27A, 74AA, 142A, 142B, 207B, 354A, 355A, 470; Aboriginal Land and Waters (Jervis Bay Territory) Act 1986 (Cth) s 48; Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) ss 69–70; Aboriginal Land (Lake Condah and Framlingham Forest) Act 1987 (Cth) s 30; Northern Territory Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act 1989 (NT) ss 33–35; Aboriginal Land Act 1978 (NT) s 4; Heritage Act 2011 (NT) ss 111–113. Also excluded is ‘any other law prescribed by the regulations that relates to: (i) entering, remaining on or damaging cultural heritage; or (ii) damaging or removing a cultural heritage object’: at s 15AB(3A)(j).
251Northern Territory Law Reform Committee, ‘Two Justice Systems Working Together’: Report on the Recognition of Local Aboriginal Laws in Sentencing and Bail (Report No 46, November 2020) 35.
252Ebatarinja v The Queen [2000] NTSC 26.
253Northern Territory Law Reform Committee, ‘Two Justice Systems Working Together’: Report on the Recognition of Local Aboriginal Laws in Sentencing and Bail (Report No 46, November 2020) 29 [73], discussing Ebatarinja v The Queen [2000] NTSC 26.
254Re Anthony [2004] NTSC 5.
255Re Anthony [2004] NTSC 5, [26].
256Re Anthony [2004] NTSC 5, [36] (Martin CJ).
257Northern Territory Law Reform Committee, ‘Two Justice Systems Working Together’: Report on the Recognition of Local Aboriginal Laws in Sentencing and Bail (Report No 46, November 2020) 30 [76].
258Northern Territory Law Reform Committee, ‘Two Justice Systems Working Together’: Report on the Recognition of Local Aboriginal Laws in Sentencing and Bail (Report No 46, November 2020) 42 [100].
259Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Sentencing Bench Book (2025); Supreme Court of Queensland, Benchbook on Sentencing (Supreme Court Library Queensland, 2017); Judicial College of Victoria, Victorian Sentencing Manual (Bench Book, 4th ed, 2025).
260Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Sentencing Bench Book (2025) ch 16.
261Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth), Sentencing of Federal Offenders in Australia: A Guide for Practitioners (7th ed, July 2024).
262Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 14 (recommendation 6-1).
263Penalties and Sentencing Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(2)(oa).
264Penalties and Sentencing Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(2)(p). Community justice groups comprise ‘Elders and respected persons who volunteer their time to develop and implement local strategies for addressing crime and justice issues in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities’: Explanatory Notes, Penalties and Sentences and Other Acts Amendment Bill 2000 (Qld).
265Penalties and Sentencing Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(2)(p).
266Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 1 June 2000, 1539 (Matthew Foley).
267Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 1 June 2000, 1540 (Matthew Foley).
268Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 33(1)(m).
269Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 40A(b).
270Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) s 42.
271Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017); Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991).
272Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991); Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017).
273Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305, 326 (Brennan J).
274R v Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58.
275R v Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58, 62–3 (Wood J).
276Janet Manuell SC, ‘The Fernando Principles: The Sentencing of Indigenous Offenders in NSW’ (Discussion Paper, December 2009) 10 [25]. This paper includes a comprehensive analysis of NSW cases that followed R v Fernando and observes that a reason for the uneven application of the principles in New South Wales was that the principles were being applied in the context of the very different objective and subjective circumstances of each offender.
277R v Fuller-Cust [2002] VSCA 168, [79].
278Bugmy v The Queen (2013) HCA 37, [41].
279R v Ipeelee [2012] 1 SCR 433; R v Gladue [1999] 1 SCR 688.
280Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37, [36] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).
281Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37, [43]–[44] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).
282Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37, [44] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).
283Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38, [50], quoting Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305, 326 (Brennan J).
284Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38, [51] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ), quoting R v Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58, [48] (Wood J).
285Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38, [52] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ).
286Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38, [54].
287See, eg, Don McKenzie and Helen Forbes-Mewett, ‘Bugmy in the Courtroom: Ensuring Fair and Just Outcomes for “Profoundly Deprived” Offenders’ (Preliminary Findings, Monash University, July 2023); Guy Charlton, ‘Indigenous Over-Incarceration and Individualised Justice in Light of Bugmy v The Queen’ (2021) 50(3) Australian Bar Review 427; Thalia Anthony, ‘Indigenising Sentencing? Bugmy v The Queen’ (2013) 35(2) Sydney Law Review 451; Lucy Jackson, ‘Sentencing Indigenous Women after Bugmy’ (2015) 40(3) Alternative Law Journal 171; Sarah Krasnostein, ‘Too Much Individualisation and Not Enough Justice’ (2014) 39(1) Alternative Law Journal 12.
288Judge Sophia Beckett, Jennifer Wheeler and Lauren Stefanou, The Bugmy Bar Book: Presenting Evidence of Disadvantage and Evidence Concerning the Significance of Culture on Sentence (Paper, October 2021).
289R v MJ [2023] NSWCCA 306, [2].
290R v MJ [2023] NSWCCA 306, [3] (Simpson AJA), quoting Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571, [40] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).
291R v MJ [2023] NSWCCA 306, [5] (Simpson AJA).
292R v MJ [2023] NSWCCA 306, [15] (Simpson AJA).
293DS v The King [2025] NSWCCA 53, [68].
294DPP (Vic) v Herrmann [2021] VSCA 160, [44] (Maxwell P, Kaye, Niall, T Forrest and Emerton JJA).
295DPP (Vic) v Herrmann [2021] VSCA 160, [44] (Maxwell P, Kaye, Niall, T Forrest and Emerton JJA).
296Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 214 (recommendation 6-3).
297Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37, [41] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).
298Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 29.
299Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 214 (recommendation 6-2).
300Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 214–26 [6.115]–[6.164].
301Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 217 [6.125].
302Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 217 [6.126].
303Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 217 [6.127].
304Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 220 [6.137].
305Victorian Aboriginal Legal Service, Aboriginal Community Justice Reports Program (Preliminary Findings, November 2023).
306Victorian Aboriginal Legal Service, Aboriginal Community Justice Reports Program (Preliminary Findings, November 2023) 2.
307Victorian Aboriginal Legal Service, Aboriginal Community Justice Reports Program (Preliminary Findings, November 2023) 2: ‘ACJRs are an opportunity for Aboriginal people sentenced in Victoria to share their story in a culturally safe environment that is with Aboriginal workers and within an Aboriginal Legal Service’.
308Victorian Aboriginal Legal Service, Aboriginal Community Justice Reports Program (Preliminary Findings, November 2023) 34.
309DPP (Vic) v Jones [2022] VCC 1939.
310DPP (Vic) v Jones [2022] VCC 1939, [41]–[58] (Todd J) (citations omitted). Other cases referring to ACJR reports include DPP (Vic) v Morgan [2021] VCC 1860 and DPP (Vic) v Austin [2023] VCC 995.
311Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37, [41] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).
312Anthony Hopkins et al, ‘Indigenous Experience Reports: Addressing Silence and Deficit Discourse in Sentencing’ (2023) 46(2) UNSW Law Journal 615, 626–7.
313Anthony Hopkins et al, ‘Indigenous Experience Reports: Addressing Silence and Deficit Discourse in Sentencing’ (2023) 46(2) UNSW Law Journal 615, 629–30.
314Vanessa Edwige (Ngarabal) and Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2021) 9.
315R v Sharpley [2014] NSWDC 166, [48].
316R v Sharpley [2014] NSWDC 166.
317Kentwell v The Queen (No 2) [2015] NSWCCA 96.
318Kentwell v The Queen (No 2) [2015] NSWCCA 96, [94] (Rothman J) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
319Kentwell v The Queen (No 2) [2015] NSWCCA 96, [73]–[74] (Rothman J) (citations omitted).
320Kentwell v The Queen (No 2) [2015] NSWCCA 96, [90]–[92] (Rothman J) (citations omitted).
321Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 16 (recommendation 10-2). Recommendation 10-3 stated: ‘Relevant Aboriginal Torres Strait Islander organisations should play a central role in the design, implementation and evaluation of specialist Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander sentencing courts’.
322As at 17 February 2026.
323R v Wanganeen [2010] SASC 237, [4].
324Harlovich v Sebbens [2024] ACTSC 153, [10]–[12].
325‘Walama List: A Reflection’, Bugmy Bar Book (Web Page, September 2023) <https://bugmybarbook.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Walama-A-Reflection.pdf>.
326See, eg, District Court of New South Wales, Practice Note 26: Walama List Sentencing Procedure (5 March 2025).
327See, eg, District Court of New South Wales, Judge Beckett initiated the Parramatta West Referral List, working with Marrin Weejali Aboriginal Corporation and other First Nations organisations and therapeutic organisations in 2022 from Penrith District Court. The List now operates from Parramatta District Court and the Parramatta West Referral List and sits every 5 to 6 weeks.
328Crimes (Sentencing Act) 2005 (ACT) s 27; Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 11; Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 29; Sentencing Act 1997 (Tas) s 7A; Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 83A; Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 16 (for up to 6 months following conviction).
329‘Te Ao Mārama — Enhancing Justice for All’, New Zealand Ministry of Justice (Web Page, 12 March 2025) <https://www.justice.govt.nz/justice-sector-policy/key-initiatives/te-ao-marama>. This web page also sets out a list of therapeutic courts operating across New Zealand.
330‘Te Ao Mārama — Enhancing Justice for All’, New Zealand Ministry of Justice (Web Page, 12 March 2025) <https://www.justice.govt.nz/justice-sector-policy/key-initiatives/te-ao-marama>.
331Te Aka Māori Dictionary (online at 20 February 2026) ‘extended family, family group … sometimes used to include friends’ (def 2).
332District Court of New Zealand, Te Ao Mārama Best Practice Framework (2023) 6–10.
333District Court of New Zealand, Te Ao Mārama Best Practice Framework (2023) 9.
334Te Aka Māori Dictionary (online at 20 February 2026) ‘extended kinship group, tribe, nation, people … often refers to a large group of people descended from a common ancestor and associated with a distinct territory’.
335Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19.
336Bales v Parameter (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 182, 188–90.
337Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [253].
338Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [266.2].
339Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [264].
340Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [263].
341Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [309].
342Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [12].
343Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [13].
344Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [14].
345Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [16].
346Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [19].
347Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [33].
348Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [45].
349Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [37]–[43].
350Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [43].
351Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [279].
352Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [331].
353Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [332].
354Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [333].
355Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [335], citing the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic).
356Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [367].
357Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [368].
358Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [369].
359Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [313].
360Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [313].
361Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [315].
362Inquest into the Death of Veronica Nelson (Coroners Court of Victoria, Coroner McGregor, 30 January 2023) [828]–[831].
363R v Vincent [2023] NSWSC 8, [1].
364R v Vincent [2023] NSWSC 8, [1]–[2].
365R v Vincent [2023] NSWSC 8, [2].
366R v Vincent [2023] NSWSC 8, [3].
367R v Vincent [2023] NSWSC 8, [5].
368R v Vincent [2023] NSWSC 8, [6].
369R v Vincent [2023] NSWSC 8, [8].
370R v Vincent [2023] NSWSC 8, [11].
371R v Vincent [2023] NSWSC 8, [10] (Yehia J), quoting Haidy v DPP (Vic) [2004] VSC 247, [15] (Redlich J).
372R v Vincent [2023] NSWSC 8, [12].
373R v Vincent [2023] NSWSC 8, [12].
374R v Vincent [2023] NSWSC 8, [12].
375R v Vincent [2023] NSWSC 8, [14].
376‘Impacts of Imprisonment and Remand in Custody’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, November 2022) 17.
377‘Impacts of Imprisonment and Remand in Custody’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, November 2022) 10.
378‘Impacts of Imprisonment and Remand in Custody’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, November 2022) 1.
379‘Impacts of Imprisonment and Remand in Custody’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, November 2022) 2.
380Devon Indig et al, 2009 NSW Inmate Health Survey: Aboriginal Health Report (Justice Health, Report, 2010) 47.
381R v Vincent [2023] NSWSC 8, [22].
382R v Vincent [2023] NSWSC 8, [23] (Yehia J).
383Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 2–4.
384Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 5–7.
385Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 15.
386Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 17–9.
387Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 4–5.
388Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 5.
389Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 5–7.
390Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 2–4.
391Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 6.
392Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 9–11.
393Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 13.
394Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 2, 12–13, 15.
395Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (ACT) v Pedro Swain (a pseudonym) (ACTSC, 313/2024, Justice Taylor, 22 November 2024) 19.
396DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347, [5].
397DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347, [5].
398DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347, [5]–[7].
399DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347, [7].
400DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347, [21].
401DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347, [6].
402DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347, [7].
403DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347, [8].
404DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347, [9], [10], [13], [21].
405DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347, [5].
406DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347.
407DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347.
408DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347, [7].
409DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347, [12].
410DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347, [21].
411DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347, [13].
412DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347, [13], [21].
413DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347.
414DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179, [6]–[13].
415DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179, [2]–[5].
416DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179, [65]–[67].
417DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 347.
418DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179, [23].
419DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179, [25].
420DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179, [26].
421DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179, [1]–[2].
422DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179, [9].
423DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179, [2], [20]–[2].
424DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179.
425DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179, [4].
426DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179, [5].
427DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179, [5].
428DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179, [5].
429DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179, [65].
430DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179.
431DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179, [66].
432DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179, [67].
433DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179, [66].
434DPP (ACT) v Welsh (No 3) [2024] ACTSC 179, [66] (Baker J), quoting Vanessa Edwige (Ngarabal) and Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2021) 32 [130].
435Griffiths v The Queen [1977] HCA 44, [1].
436Griffiths v The Queen [1977] HCA 44, [1].
437Griffiths v The Queen [1977] HCA 44, [5].
438Griffiths v The Queen [1977] HCA 44, [8].
439Griffiths v The Queen [1977] HCA 44, [11].
440Griffiths v The Queen [1977] HCA 44, [14].
441Griffiths v The Queen [1977] HCA 44, [19]–[20].
442Griffiths v The Queen [1977] HCA 44, [43]–[44].
443Re Males [2024] VSC 802, [1]–[9].
444Re Males [2024] VSC 802, [26], [31]–[36], [40]–[43].
445Re Males [2024] VSC 802, [20].
446Re Males [2024] VSC 802, [40]–[42].
447Re Males [2024] VSC 802, [2]–[6].
448Re Males [2024] VSC 802, [8].
449Re Males [2024] VSC 802, [9].
450Re Males [2024] VSC 802, [1].
451Re Males [2024] VSC 802, [2]–[6].
452Re Males [2024] VSC 802, [11]–[3].
453Re Males [2024] VSC 802, [11].
454Re Males [2024] VSC 802, [36]–[45].
455Re Males [2024] VSC 802, [40].
456Re Males [2024] VSC 802, [40]–[41].
457Bail Act 1977 (Vic) s 3A; Re Males [2024] VSC 802, [37]–[39].
458Re Males [2024] VSC 802, [39]–[42].
459R v Alchin [2015] NSWSC 2112, [1].
460R v Alchin [2015] NSWSC 2112, [3].
461R v Alchin [2015] NSWSC 2112, [2].
462R v Alchin [2015] NSWSC 2112, [2].
463R v Alchin [2015] NSWSC 2112, [3].
464R v Alchin [2015] NSWSC 2112, [2].
465R v Alchin [2015] NSWSC 2112, [4].
466R v Alchin [2015] NSWSC 2112, [5].
467Re McLaughlin [2024] VSC 706, [22].
468Re McLaughlin [2024] VSC 706, [2]–[3].
469Re McLaughlin [2024] VSC 706, [10]–[11] .
470Re McLaughlin [2024] VSC 706, [22].
471Re McLaughlin [2024] VSC 706, [23]–[27].
472Re McLaughlin [2024] VSC 706, [29].
473Re McLaughlin [2024] VSC 706, [17]–[18].
474Re McLaughlin [2024] VSC 706, [20].
475Re McLaughlin [2024] VSC 706, [42].
476Re McLaughlin [2024] VSC 706, [42].
477Re McLaughlin [2024] VSC 706, [48].
478Re McLaughlin [2024] VSC 706, [7].
479Re McLaughlin [2024] VSC 706, [49].
480Re McLaughlin [2024] VSC 706, [54].
481Re McLaughlin [2024] VSC 706, [48] (Incerti J).
482Re McLaughlin [2024] VSC 706, [57].
483R v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178, [3].
484R v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178, [12] .
485R v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178, [1].
486R v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178, [1] .
487R v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178, [27] (Rothman, Fullerton and Beech-Jones JJ).
488R v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178, [28].
489R v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178, [32].
490R v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178, [33].
491R v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178, [37].
492R v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178, [34].
493R v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178, [36].
494R v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178, [38].
495R v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178, [39].
496R v Brown [2013] NSWCCA 178, [40].
497R v Webb [2019] SASC 8, [1]–[6].
498R v Webb [2019] SASC 8, [6].
499R v Webb [2019] SASC 8, [32].
500R v Webb [2019] SASC 8, [27]–[30].
501R v Webb [2019] SASC 8.
502R v Webb [2019] SASC 8, [1]–[6].
503R v Webb [2019] SASC 8, [6].
504R v Webb [2019] SASC 8, [1].
505R v Webb [2019] SASC 8, [36]–[48].
506R v Webb [2019] SASC 8, [40]–[48].
507R v Webb [2019] SASC 8, [63]–[65].
508R v Webb [2019] SASC 8, [31]–[33].
509R v Webb [2019] SASC 8, [15]–[17] (Hinton J), quoting R v Lombardi (2013) 115 SASR 577, [25] (Kourakis CJ).
510R v Gladue [1999] 1 SCR 688.
511R v Ipeelee [2012] 1 SCR 433.
512Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37.
513R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102.
514R v Fuller-Cust [2002] VSCA 168, [60] (citations omitted).
515R v Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58.
516Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37.
517Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, National Domestic and Family Violence Bench Book (August 2025).
518Supreme Court of Queensland, Equal Treatment Benchbook (Supreme Court Library Queensland, 2nd ed, 2016).
519Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Equality before the Law Bench Book (April 2025).
520Australian Law Reform Commission, Pathways to Justice: An Inquiry into the Incarceration Rate of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples (Report No 133, December 2017) 14 (recommendation 7-1).
521Pat Dudgeon (Bardi), Helen Milroy (Palyku) and Roz Walker, Working Together: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Mental Health and Wellbeing Principles and Practice (Report, 2nd ed, 2014) 292–6.
522Vanessa Edwige (Ngarabal) and Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2021) 3.
523Vanessa Edwige (Ngarabal) and Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2021) 10 [43], quoting Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, The National Scheme’s Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health and Cultural Safety Strategy 2020–2025 (Report, 2020) 9.
524Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Trauma-Informed Courts: Guidance for Trauma-Informed Judicial Practices (Report, 2022) 22.
525Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Trauma-Informed Courts: Guidance for Trauma-Informed Judicial Practices (Report, 2022) 23.
526Nicholas Cowdery, Jill Hunter and Rebecca McMahon, ‘Sentencing and Disadvantage: The Use of Research to Inform the Court’ (2020) 32(5) Judicial Officers Bulletin 43.
527See, eg, Vanessa Edwige (Ngarabal) and Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2021).
528‘What is Intergenerational Trauma?’, Healing Foundation (Web Page, July 2018) <https://healingfoundation.org.au/intergenerational-trauma/>.
529Australian Law Reform Commission, Family Violence: A National Legal Response (Report No 114, November 2010) 47 (recommendation 31-2).
530Department of Social Services (Cth), National Plan to End Violence against Women and Children 2022–2032 (National Plan, October 2022).
531Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, National Domestic and Family Violence Bench Book (August 2025) ch 1.
532Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, National Domestic and Family Violence Bench Book (August 2025) ch 1.
533Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, National Domestic and Family Violence Bench Book (August 2025) ch 3.1.11.
534Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, National Domestic and Family Violence Bench Book (August 2025) ch 4.4.10.
535Supreme Court of Queensland, Equal Treatment Benchbook (Supreme Court Library Queensland, 2nd ed, 2016) 1.
536R v Kina [1993] QCA 480, [63] (Fitzgerald P and Davies JA), quoted in Supreme Court of Queensland, Equal Treatment Benchbook (Supreme Court Library Queensland, 2nd ed, 2016) 109.
537Terri Libesman, ‘Dispossession and Colonisation’ in Larissa Behrendt (Eualayai/Gamilaroi), Chris Cunneen, Terri Libesman and Nicole Watson (Birri Gubba and Munanjali) (eds), Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Relations (Oxford University Press, 2019) 13.
538The Justice Reform Initiative recommends that the Australian Capital Territory and Tasmania dedicate at least 30% of their ‘Breaking the Cycle’ funds to First Nations–led organisations: ‘The Need for Alternatives to Incarceration in the Australian Capital Territory’ (Highlights Paper, February 2024) 5; ‘The Need for Alternatives to Incarceration in Tasmania’ (Highlights Paper, August 2023) 7. It recommends that New South Wales, South Australia and Victoria dedicate 40% of their funds: ‘The Need for Alternatives to Incarceration in New South Wales’ (Highlights Paper, March 2024) 5; ‘The Need for Alternatives to Incarceration in South Australia’ (Highlights Paper, November 2023) 10; ‘The Need for Alternatives to Incarceration in Victoria’ (Highlights Paper, November 2023) 9. It recommends that Western Australia dedicate 50% of its funds: ‘The Need for Alternatives to Incarceration in Western Australia’ (Highlights Paper, March 2023) 7. And it recommends that the Northern Territory dedicate 80% of its funds: ‘Alternatives to Incarceration in the Northern Territory’ (Highlights Paper, May 2023) 7.
539Justice Reform Initiative, ‘The Need for Alternatives to Incarceration in Queensland’ (Highlights Paper, May 2023) 6.
540Justice Reform Initiative, ‘The Need for Alternatives to Incarceration in Queensland’ (Highlights Paper, May 2023) 6.
541Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991) vol 1 [1.4.17].
542Royal Commission into Family Violence (Final Report, March 2016) vol 3, 38 (recommendation 41).
543Yoorrook Justice Commission, Yoorrook for Justice: Report into Victoria’s Child Protection and Criminal Justice Systems (Report, August 2023) 253.
544Yoorrook Justice Commission, Yoorrook for Justice: Report into Victoria’s Child Protection and Criminal Justice Systems (Report, August 2023) 253 (emphasis added).
545Don Weatherburn et al, ‘Towards a Theory of Indigenous Contact with the Criminal Justice System’ (Research Report No 32, Australian Institute of Criminology, May 2024) 5.
546Nicholas Cowdery, Jill Hunter and Rebecca McMahon, ‘Sentencing and Disadvantage: The Use of Research to Inform the Court’ (2020) 32(5) Judicial Officers Bulletin 43.
547‘Impacts of Imprisonment and Remand in Custody’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, November 2022) 8–9 [39]–[41].
548‘Significance of Funeral Attendance and Sorry Business for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, May 2023) 3–4 [9]–[13].
549‘Significance of Funeral Attendance and Sorry Business for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, May 2023) 4 [14]–[16].
550‘Significance of Funeral Attendance and Sorry Business for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, May 2023) 1 [2], citing Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991) vol 3, 313 (recommendation 171).
551‘Homelessness’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, January 2020) 7–9 [36]–[42].
552‘Homelessness’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, January 2020) 7–9 [36]–[42].
553‘Homelessness’ in Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Chapter, January 2020) 11–12 [53]–[55].
554Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Equality before the Law Bench Book (April 2025) 2.3.2.
555Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Equality before the Law Bench Book (April 2025) 2.3.2.
556Community justice groups are non-government organisations, established to address key recommendations following the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. Their goal is to reduce the over-representation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in the criminal justice system. They are run by members of the local Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community and provide a community-based response to local issues, working cooperatively with magistrates, police, corrective services personnel and staff from other government agencies and community organisations, and delivering a number of court-related services.
557Department of Justice and Community Safety (Vic), ‘Bail Considerations for Aboriginal People’ (Guide, 25 March 2024) 1.
558Longman, Craig and Alison Whittaker (Gomeroi), ‘Practitioner Perspective: Chasing Professionalism — The Practitioner Role in Responding to First Nations Deaths in Custody’ in Marg Camilleri and Alistair Harkness (eds), Australian Courts: Controversies, Challenges and Change (Palgrave Macmillan, 2023) 264, 264.
559Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (Final Report, April 1991) vol 1, ch 5, recommendation 41.
560Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37.
561Bugmy Bar Book Committee (eds), Bugmy Bar Book (Web Page) <https://bugmybarbook.org.au/>.
562Vanessa Edwige (Ngarabal) and Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2021).
563R v Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58.
564Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37.
565Judge Andrew Haesler SC, ‘Applying Bugmy: An Address to the NSW Legal Aid Commission’s Aboriginal Services Branch’ (Conference Paper, Legal Aid Aboriginal Cultural Competency Branch Training for Legal Practitioners Day, 31 July 2018) 22–3.
566Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37.
567Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37.
568Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38.
569Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37.
570Munda v Western Australia [2013] HCA 38.
571Vanessa Edwige (Ngarabal) and Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2021).
572Nicholas Cowdery, Jill Hunter and Rebecca McMahon, ‘Sentencing and Disadvantage: The Use of Research to Inform the Court’ (2020) 32(5) Judicial Officers Bulletin 43.
573See, eg, Vanessa Edwige (Ngarabal) and Paul Gray (Wiradjuri), Significance of Culture to Wellbeing, Healing and Rehabilitation (Report, Bugmy Bar Book Committee, 2021).